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INTRODUCTION

Legal scholars have recently advanced a behavioral approach to
the law and economics school of thought in an attempt to improve its
external validity and predictive power.1 The hallmark of this new ap
proach is the replacement of the perfectly rational actor with a
"boundedly rational" decisionmaker who, apart from being affected
by emotion and motivation, has only limited cognitive resources.2 To
function effectively in a complex :world, boundedly rational individuals
must rely on cognitive heuristics - simplifying mental shortcuts that inevitably lead people to make some systematic decision errors; as
a result, their behavior necessarily deviates from that predicted by ra
tional actor models.3

1. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471 (1998) (offering a broad vision of how law and economics could be improved by
increasing its attention to insights about actual human behavior); Russell B. Korobkin &
Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000) (examining the role of the rational actor
in law and economics and suggesting replacing it with a behaviorally informed actor).
2. The term "bounded rationality" is used here broadly, encompassing the major find
ings of behavioral decision research over the last thirty years on the deviations of actual hu
man behavior from rational models due to the limitations of human information processing
abilities and the effects of motivation and emotion on human cognition. For instructive re
views of this enormous literature, see, for example, Colin Camerer, Individual Decision
Making, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587 ( John H. Kagel & Alvin
E. Roth eds., 1995); Robyn M. Dawes, Behavioral Decision Making and Judgment, in THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 497 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). The
concept of bounded rationality was originally developed by Herbert A. Simon. See Herbert
A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1956); Herbert A.
Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure ofthe Environment, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 129 (1958);
see also HERBERT A. SIMON, REASON IN HUMAN AFFAIRS 17-23 (1983). In Simon's termi
nology, however, bounded rationality denoted only the cognitive limitations of the human
mind. Contrast Jolls et al.'s depiction of bounded rationality as only one of three "bounds"
differentiating actual human behavior from the rational actor (the other two being bounded
self-interest and bounded willpower, but without reference to the broader effects of motiva
tion and emotion on cognition). Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1476-79.
3. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al.eds., 1982) (stating, in an early formula
tion of the authors' highly influential "heuristics and biases" research paradigm, that:
"[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex task of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general,
these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.").
Thus, Jolls et al.explain:
Bounded rationality ...refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not infi
nite ....[P]eople sometimes respond rationally to their own cognitive limitations .... [b)ut
even with these remedies, and in some cases because of these remedies, human behavior dif
fers in systematic ways from that predicted by the standard economic model of unbounded
rationality.Even when the use of mental shortcuts is rational, it can produce predictable mis
takes.
Jolls et al., supra note l, at 1477.
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In response, advocates of traditional law and economics have ar
gued that boundedly rational behavior is of little significance for the
analysis of economic activities in market environments, most notably
because competitive pressures will discipline such behavior. According
to this view, the boundedly rational will underperform and conse
quently fail and exit the market.4 Some cautious supporters of the be
havioral approach have been quick to agree that bounded rationality
is of limited importance for the analysis of market behaviors because
of competitive discipline.5 In fact, even the most influential proponents
of behavioral law and economics have found it necessary. to state, "law
is a domain where behavioral analysis would appear to be particularly
promising in light of the fact that nonmarket behavior is frequently in
volved. "6
This Article heartily agrees that behavioral insights are highly ap
plicable to those numerous areas in the law addressing nonmarket be
haviors. Questioning the accepted wisdom on market discipline, how
ever, it argues that advocates of the behavioral approach have
conceded too much too quickly. It shows in the context of new entry
into industry that, although intense competition eliminates many
boundedly rational actors, competitive fo rces inevitably select some
other such actors for success. Consequently, and because of their very
large numbers, boundedly rational actors become overrepresented, as
a group, among the ranks of successful entrants. In other words, this
Article does not argue against the existence of market discipline; in
stead, it highlights how competitive forces unexpectedly facilitate
bounded rationality in the market. The profo und role of boundedly
rational action in markets therefore renders its understanding su
premely important for the legal regulation of economic phenomena. A
study of the competition fo r profitability and survival among new
entrants into industry thus highlights the unique contribution a
behaviorally informed approach stands to make to legal and economic
scholarship writ large, while shedding new light on the important topic
'
of entry competition specifically.

4. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50
REV. 1551, 1570-71 (1998) (arguing that "selection effects" in markets largely dis

STAN. L.

cipline boundedly rational behavior and therefore render experimental findings on human
decisionmaking largely irrelevant); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL
THEORY 280 (2001) (hereinafter POSNER, FRONTIERS] (same).
5. E.g. , Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1748-49, 1758-60 (1998); see also Jennifer Arlen, Comment, The Future
of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 YAND. L. REV. 1765, 1782 (1998) (suggesting
that behavioral findings from nonmarket settings may not necessarily generalize to market
settings).
6. Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1473 (emphasis added).
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New entry into industry has been a major topic of analysis in both
legal and nonlegal literatures.7 Thi.s Article offers a behavioral analysis
of entrant decisionmaking that explains many empirical findings about
entry that appear highly puzzling and seemingly unrelated from a tra
ditional economic perspective. Part I describes these phenomena,
which include the prevalence of excess entry, the relative insensitivity
of entrants to market predictors of success, and the inferior perform
ance of startup entrants as compared to those who enter by diversifica
tion. This Article reveals how these phenomena all result from the op
eration of the various processes of entrant overconfidence.8
On the most basic level, the processes of overconfidence - most
notably, optimistic and desirability-related biases - explain the puz
zling empirical phenomenon of excess entry, wherein the high rate of
entry appears economically inexplicable in the face of its low expected
value.9 This conclusion is the main theme of an important recent ex
perimental study in the nonlegal literature of the relationship between
overoptimism and excess entry.10
Notwithstanding the findings of this leading study, the literature on
entry, both legal and nonlegal, has thus far failed to examine whether,
beyond revealing the basic fact of excess entry, the empirical data cor
roborate or contradict the claim of entrant overconfidence. By en
gaging in a closer analysis of both the economics and the psychology
of entry, this Article breaks new ground in two important ways. First,
it links additional puzzling empirical findings - such as entrants' rela
tive insensitivity to entry barriers and other market predictors of suc
cess and, most importantly, the lower survival rates and inferior aver
age performance of startups as compared to diversifying entrants - to
7. E.g., 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'ft 112b {2d ed. 2000) (dis
cussing the important role entry plays in numerous antitrust doctrines); 2A PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 'ft 420b (2d ed. 2002); Richard J. Gilbert, The Role of
Potential Competition in Industrial Organization, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 107 (1989) (surveying
the main roles of entry in economic theory).

8. For the sake of clarity, this Article distinguishes between overconfidence - a charac
terization of certain behaviors of entrants or other decisionmakers - and the psychological
processes that generate manifestations of overconfidence. The latter are referred to either
globally, as "the processes of overconfidence," or individually, by the term or terms assigned
to them in the behavioral literature.
9. See Giovanni Dosi & Dan Lovallo, Rational Entrepreneurs or Optimistic Martyrs?
Some Considerations on Technological Regimes, Corporate Entries, and the Evolutionary
Role ofDecision Biases, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: OVERSIGHTS AND FORESIGHTS
41 (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Dosi & Lovallo, Rational Entrepreneurs) (re

porting findings of excess entry in experimental games and suggesting, more generally, that
various decision biases may play a role in generating excess entry); see also infra Section
I.B.1.
10. See Colin Camerer & Dan Lovallo, Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experi
mental Approach, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 306 (1999). For further discussion of this study, see
infra text accompanying notes 101-103.
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the same psychological processes of entrant overconfidence that ex
plain the basic fact of excess entry. Second, it provides a unified
framework for a new understanding of the various aspects of entry de
cisionmaking, its economic consequences, and.its implications for legal
policy.
Part II shows how, from a behavioral perspective, deciding
whether to attempt new entry is, first and foremost, an investment de
cision with significant personal stakes that must. be made under condi
tions of extreme uncertainty. In these circumstances, entrants are likely
to be overconfident in their prospects, .thereby making excessive entry
attempts. Moreover, the behavioral analysis of entry shows that en
trants' insensitivity to pale, if potentially important, background mar
ket, whose impact on their fate is statistical and indirect, is a likely by
product of many of the processes of entrant overconfidence. A close
analysis of these processes also exposes important and hitherto unno
ticed behavioral differences between startups and diversifying en
trants, differences that closely fo llow the economic differences be
tween these . two entrant types. The effects of two important
psychological variables determining the extent of · entrant overconfi
dence - the intensity of preferences and the ambiguity of the decision
environment - are likely to cause startup entrants to exhibit a greater
bias than diversifying ones. This novel finding .explains the perplexing
inferior average performance of startups.
Part III reveals that the same competitive pressures that weed out
many overconfident entrants also generate a post-entry landscape in
which the more extremely biased startups are over-represented, at the
expense of some of their less-biased, ex ante better-qualified, competi
tors. After exploring why the private action of financiers fails to curb
entrant overconfidence significantly, this Part considers the desirabil
ity and possibility of government intervention..
In Part IV, a careful study of the social costs and benefits of
boundedly rational entry and the possibility of implementing an effec
tive policy on this matter reveals, however, that the governmental
regulation of entry is probably undesirable. An effort to regulate
boundedly rational entry is impractical because of the difficulty of
identifying negative expected value entry, determining when exactly to
limit it at the margin, and finding an effective means of actually doing
so. This Article finds, moreover, that although overconfident entrants
generate social and private losses, they also fulfill an important eco
nomic function, serving as the voluntary cannon fodder of innovation.
These entrants, even when they fail and more so when they succeed,
facilitate economic growth and expand the range of consumer choice.
Equally important, they make a significant long-term contribution to
the disciplining of incumbent firms.
This analysis also has important implications for antitrust law. The
Article suggests that the role assigned to entry barriers in judicial and
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regulatory determinations of market power should be modified, be
cause even when such barriers create only a limited impediment to en
try they may still protect incumbents by making post-entry survival
less likely. Relying on the insights of the behavioral analysis of entry,
the Article reevaluates legal doctrine in two important areas of anti
trust law, suggesting modifications in the rules concerning predatory
pricing by dominant firms and horizontal mergers between competi
tors.
Finally, Part V highlights the profo und impact of bounded ration
ality on market behavior and market outcomes outside the domain of
antitrust law. The Article concludes by discussing the nature of and
providing specific examples for the unique contribution a psychologi
cally informed approach to legal scholarship stands to make to the le
gal analysis of market and nonmarket behaviors alike.
I.

THE PUZZLES OF ENTRY

Current economic theories of entry commonly assume that en
trants are rational profit maximizers. How�ver, the evidence from the
field of industrial organization regarding entry, exit, entrant market
penetration, and related economic variables appears to contradict the
assumption of entrant rationality. This Part examines the apparent
tension between the empirical findings and the economic theory of en
try, showing it to span a number of related phenomena, including the
prevalence of excess entry, the relative insensitivity of entrants to
market predictors of future profitability, and the inferior average per
formance of startup entrants. After exploring these puzzling findings,
the Part concludes by showing that attempts to explain why entry may
still be rational are not very compelling and fall short of accounting for
the full magnitude and range of the various puzzles, although they
may provide a partial account for some of the empirical evidence.
A.

The Assumption of Entrant Rationality: Empirical Findings vs.
Economic Theory

The dynamics of competition among new entrants into industry11
are an important subject of economic analysis: the existence of actual,
11. This Article defines entry as the construction of a new plant by a firm that was not
previously manufacturing in the particular industry. While other definitions exist (e.g., plant
level entry that counts as entrants new plants constructed by firms already manufacturing in
the industry, or firm-level entry that counts as entrants firms who enter by acquisition of in
cumbents or their existing plants without adding capacity to the industry), the one used here
is both common in the literature and highlights the relationship between the number of new
decisionmakers in the industry and production capacity, which is foundational to the eco
nomic theories of entry examined in this Article. See, e.g., JOHN R. BALDWIN, THE
DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL COMPETITION: A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 11-12
(1995) (explaining the importance of both firm-level and plant-level information); Timothy
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and even potential, entry exerts competitive pressure on extant firms
in an industry.12 In antitrust law, for instance, the idea "that unneces
sary restrictions on new business entry are socially harmful" is a basic
proposition.13 Examples of this important role include how the law in
fers that firms enjoy market power from observations of market con
centration only when barriers to entry are high, and how the conduct
of firms that creates an unjustified barrier to entry may be deemed
illegal.14
Importantly, current theories of entry assume that entrants are ra
tional decisionmakers who will attempt entry only if it is profit maxi
mizing.15 The assumption of profit maximization is therefore com
monly relied upon in the many antitrust doctrines founded upon
economic theories of entry.16 Profit maximization is accomplished by
maximizing the net present value ("NPV") of investments.17 If en
trants were to follow the economic theory of investment decision
making, they would attempt entry only if its expected returns - where
the values of outcomes are multiplied by their respective probabilities
- were to exceed the necessary investment to enter the industry after

Dunne et al., Patterns of Entry and Exit in U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 19 RAND J. ECON.
495, 500-01 (1988) [hereinafter Dunne et al., Patterns] (a leading, longitudinal empirical
study of entry and exit using a similar definition).
12. This effect was observed a century ago by JOHN BATES CLARK, THE CONTROL OF
TRUSTS: AN ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF CURBING THE POWER OF MONOPOLY BY A
NATURAL METHOD 13 (1901); see also GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 18 (1968) (a more modem version of this argument).
13. See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, '1112b, at 120.
14. 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, lf420b, at 60.
15. Specifically, the "structuralist" school of industrial organization pictured a world in
which the rate of entry is a function of its profitability. JOE s. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW
COMPETITION 4-5, 11-19 (1956). Profit maximization also underlies the classical theory of
"limit pricing" - the notion that established firms may deter entry by cutting prices before
entry occurs and thereby signal that post-entry prices will not be sufficiently profitable to
justify rational entry. Franco Modigliani, New Developments on the Oligopoly Front, 66 J.
POL. ECON. 215 (1958). Similarly, one of the most influential theories regarding the effect of
potential entry on the market - Baumol's theory of contestable markets - is founded on
the notion that entrants will enter if and only if entry is profitable. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET
AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982);
William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72
AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982). Last, like their neoclassical counterparts, modern game theoretic
models of entry decisionmaking used by scholars of the New Industrial Organization also
assume profit maximization. See, e.g., JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 34-35 (1988).
16. 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, '1113, at 137 (stating that "[a]s a general
proposition business firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit-maximizers"); 2A AREEDA
& HOVENl):AMP, supra note 7, '1422a, at 71 (stating, when discussing the likelihood of entry,
that " 'likely' generally means 'profitable,' for entry will not occur in the absence of expected
profits, after taking all costs and risks into account") (emphasis added).
17. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 11-28, 85-108 (5th ed. 1996).
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being discounted for risk.18 In other words, rational entrants would not
embark on negative expected value ventures.19
Although entrants are assumed to maximize the expected value of
entry,20 the large body of empirical data on entry reveals a set of puz
zling phenomena that appear to contradict this assumption of entrant
rationality.
1.

The First Puzzle: The Prevalence ofNegative Net Present Value
Entry

The empirical evidence strongly suggests that negative net present
value entry is commonplace. First, while. entry is pervasive, amounting
on average to about 50% of all existing firms every five years across all
domestic manufacturing industries,21 entrants also exhibit strikingly
high mortality rates. Within ten years, only about 20% of any entrant
cohort still operates. Attrition, moreover, begins right from the start,
with more than 25% of new entrants exiting within two years, over
60% disappearing within five years.22 In fact, high-volume exit accom-

18. See, e.g., id. at 12-17, 179-83, 204-29.
19. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 26 (3d ed.
2000) (noting that in decisions involving monetary outcomes economists assume decision
makers are risk neutral or, at times, risk averse); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAw AND ECONOMICS 51 (1983) (same).
20. The terms "expected value" and "net present value" are used interchangeably.
21. E.g. , Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 497 & n.4 (the average rate of gross
entry in the United States during the period 1963-1982 is greater than 10% per year,
amounting to more than 25,000 annual new entrants). International comparisons, especially
from other industrialized countries, report high rates of gross entry as well. See, e.g., P.A.
Geroski, Domestic and Foreign Entry in the United Kingdom, in ENTRY AND MARKET
CONTESTABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 63, 64, 76 (P.A. Geroski & Joachim
Schwalbach eds., 1991) [hereinafter Geroski, Domestic and Foreign Entry] (United Kingdom
data); Joachim Schwalbach, Entry, Exit, Concentration, and Market Contestability, in ENTRY
AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY, supra, at 121, 121-22 (German data). But see BALDWIN,
supra note 11, at 17, 401-02 (reporting somewhat smaller figures in a study disregarding
those small firms that together account for 40%-54% of all manufacturing establishments).
'

22. David B. Audretsch & Talat Mahmood, The Post-Entry Performance of New Firms,
in MARKET EVOLUTION: COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 245, 250, tbl.1 (Arjen van
Witteloostuijn ed., 1995) [hereinafter Audretsch & Mahmood, Post-Entry Performance]
(analysis of data in table); Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 509, tbl.8; Geroski, Do
mestic and Foreign Entry, supra note 21, at 79 (reporting even more striking figures from the
U.K. between 1974-1982: "Roughly 12.4 percent of entrants survived no longer than 6
months, 27.3 percent no longer than a year, 55 percent no longer than 2 years, and roughly
85 percent no longer than 4 years. Only 0.1 percent of the cohort of 1974 entrants were still
operating in 1982.") (emphasis added); see also Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Per
ceived Chances for Success, 3 J. Bus. VENTURING 97, 99 (1988) [hereinafter Cooper et al.,
Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances] (citing earlier studies reporting extremely high failure
rates).
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panies the high volume of entry in most industries, such that the two
phenomena are strongly correlated,23 and result in little net24 entry.25
Second, the limited success of entrants is even more apparent from
market penetration figures.26 When measured by either output or em
ployment, the share of new entrants in the industry is even smaller
than their numbers suggest; it is nearly negligible in the short term rarely amounting to more than a few decimal points and often nega
tive.27 This minimal penetration reveals, importantly, that the success
of those entrants who survive and grow does not compensate suffi
ciently for the strong effect of their peers' extremely high attrition
rate, a conclusion that studies following specific cohorts of entrants
longitudinally corroborate.28 These findings of high mortality and low
penetration also suggest that most entrants simply displace preceding
ones rather than diminish the market share of incumbents,29 leading
23. See, e.g., Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 507-08, tbls.7-8; see also Geroski,
Domestic and Foreign Entry, supra note 21, at 77 (U.K. data); Schwalbach, supra note 21, at
123 (German data).
24. Net entry is calculated by deducting the number of firms exiting the industry in a
particular year from the number of firms entering it. References below will generally be to
gross entry, however, which reflects actual entry rates. See, e.g. , BALDWIN, supra note 11, at
12 (noting that net entry measures expansion rather than entry, underestimating the amount
of entry by the amount of exit). But see Jose Mata, Sunk Costs and the Dynamics of Entry in
Portuguese Manufacturing, in MARKET EVOLUTION, supra note 22, at 270 (discussing the
limits of gross entry measures).
25. E.g., Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 503, tbl.2 (exit rates averaging 95% of
the entry rates); id. at 506, tbl.5 (the similarity appears at all levels: the particular industry,
the industrial sector, and all manufacturing industries together). These figures are represen
tative of net entry findings in numerous other studies. See, e.g., P.A: Geroski, What Do We
Know About Entry?, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORO. 421, 423 (1995) [hereinafter Geroski, What Do
We Know] (concluding, in a recent review of the empirical findings on entry, that "[e]ntry
and exit rates are highly positively correlated, and net entry rates and penetration are mod
est fractions of gross entry rates and penetration").
26. "Entry is common. Large numbers of firms enter most markets in most years, but
entry rates are far higher than market penetration rates." Geroski, What Do We Know, supra
note 25, at 422 (emphasis added).
27. Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 504 tbl.3; id. at 505, tbl.4 (analysis of data in
tables yielding a net negative market share penetration of 0.1%); see also BALDWIN, supra
note 11, at 16 tbl.2-2 (Canadian data showing a negative penetration of 0.3% employment,
with the best of the twelve years reported showing a positive net penetration of 0.3%); John
Cable & Joachim Schwalbach, International Comparisons of Entry and Exit, in ENTRY AND
MARKET CONTESTABILITY, supra note 21, at 256, 260 tbl.14.2 (a review of eight, mostly in
ternational studies, showing similar findings); Geroski, Domestic and Foreign Entry, supra
note 21, at 76 (finding an almost "negligible" net market share penetration in the UK).
28. Dunne et al. show how the already limited market share of entrants further shrinks
with time when all entrants are included. Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 509, tbl.8.
But see BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 21-23 & n.14 (asserting his Canadian data show an in
crease in entrant cohorts' value-added share (indexed on entrants' initial share), but accom
plishing this feat only by cumulating the data of successive cohorts and using only about the
larger half of the entrant population. Even then, moreover, he admits that "if employment
were used rather than value-added, the results would show a decline in share after several
years . . . ).
"

29. See, e.g., Cable & Schwalbach, supra note 27, at 266.
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scholars to term post-entry competition as "turbulence," "churning,"
or a "revolving door" phenomenon.30
Scholars familiar with these striking findings could not fail to ob
serve how entry seems excessive given poor rates of success.31 With
high attrition and many costly years to profitability, entrants would
have to expect much higher returns to success than they appear to
enjoy, on average, to be making only rational entry attempts.32

2.

The Second Puzzle: Entrants' Insensitivity to Predictors ofFuture
Profitability

In addition to the basic puzzle of excess entry, other puzzling
findings on the .effects of economic variables that should facilitate or
inhibit entry remain largely unexplained by the literature. Specifically,
rational entry should be proportional to its anticipated profitability.
The presence of factors that rationally indicate lower profits or dimin
ish the probability of success - such as entry barriers, strategic deter
rence, or the anticipated intensity of competition - should inhibit en
try. The data, however, portray a picture of entrant behavior that
clearly differs from these expectations.33
The behavior of entrants is not completely irrational: they are at
tracted to markets exhibiting growth, a factor associated with future

30. BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 359 ("churning"); Laurie Beth Evans & John J. Sieg
fried, Entry and Exit in United States Manufacturing Industries from 1977 to 1982, in
EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEONARD W.
WEISS 253, 254 (1992) ("revolving door"); P.A. Geroski, Some Data·Driven Reflections on
the Entry Process, in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY, supra note 21, at 282, 295
(hereinafter. Geroski, Data-Driven Reflections] ("turbulence").
31. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 359; Geroski, Data-Driven Reflections, supra
note 30, at 282, 295.
32. As pointed out by Camerer and Lovallo, however, "even if cumulative industry
profits are actually negative at some point in time, it is possible that positive returns will roll
in later . . . . So it is hard to imagine how to establish conclusively that expected industry re
turns were negative." Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10, at 307. In fact, Schumpeter already
pointed to a similar ambiguity when discussing the possibility that entry may bring "negative
return[s] to entrepreneurs . . . as a group," explaining, "[w]hether this actually is so in any
particular case is, of course, extremely difficult to establish." Joseph A. Schumpeter, The
Creative Response in Economic History, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 149, 156 & n.14 (1947).
33. While the evidence cited below supports the claim that entrants are not rational de
cisionrnakers, a finding that the rate of entry does vary with those factors rationally related
to entrants' objective prospects would only suggest that entrants' judgments are coherent; it
would not show, however, that the "baseline" rate of entry is itself rational. Entrants could
respond to differences in the attractiveness of entry, while still being strongly biased overall.
Cf Dan Ariely et al., "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable
Preferences 3-4 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing evi
deµce that consumers' absolute valuations of pain are arbitrary, even while their relative
valuations of stimuli are internally coherent, and arguing that such data cast doubt on
whether data showing that changes in circumstances cause theoretically predicted changes in
valuation can support the claim that individuals' fundamental valuations are rational).
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survival,34 although they are also attracted to· industries with a more
volatile rate of growth, a factor suggesting higher risk.35· It is unclear,
moreover, whether industries with higher past profitability or profit
ability growth - both of which are associated with future profitability
- attract more entry.36 In any case, entrants seem slow in reacting to
high profits,37 and to the extent entrants attempt entry more frequently
in high profit industries, they seem to ignore the anticipated increase
in competition from other similarly attracted entrants that they will
likely face upon entry.38
In addition to showing insensitivity to the expected intensity of
competition in high-profit industries, entrants also disregard many en
try barriers.39 They are not significantly deterred from industries
where capital intensity and scale economics play an important role,40

34. See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 366-72 (finding industry growth associated with
an increase in gross entry but not gross exit rates); Timothy Dunne & Mark J. Roberts,
Variation in Producer Turnover Across U.S. Manufacturing Industries, in ENTRY AND
MARKET CONTESTABILITY, supra note 21, at 187, 191, 193-94 [hereinafter Dunne &
Roberts, Variation] (finding growth associated with increased entry rates and decreased exit
rates).But see Geroski, Data-Driven Reflections, supra note 30, at 81 (reporting variations in
industry growth rates have little effect on entry flows).
35. See BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 366-72 (finding the increase in entry rate in indus
tries with greater variability robust, without clear evidence of increased survival rates).
36. Evans & Siegfried, supra note 30, at 265-66 (finding that all entrants are not more
likely to enter industries with higher profitability, and that historical growth is unrelated to
startup entry and citing various studies); see also BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 368-78 (finding,
using a variety of estimation procedures, that neither past profits nor profitability growth is
significantly associated with entry rates). But see Duilne & Roberts, supra note 34, at 194
(finding that price-cost margins are positively correlated with entry rates); Geroski, Data
Driven Reflections, supra note 30, at 81 (finding effect of expected profits on gross entry in
U.K. study).
37. See Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at 427.
38. Because industries with higher rates of entry also show higher rates of exit, they ex
hibit little net entry (i.e., entrants into these industries are not significantly more successful
than those entering other industries). See supra text accompanying notes 22-28; see also
BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 349, 352-53 (reporting greater turnover in high-profit indus
tries); Dunne & Roberts, supra note 34, at 191 (finding that price-cost margins are negatively
correlated with entry shares).
39. In summarizing the current state of the findings on entry Geroski concludes: "Al
though there is a very large cross-section variation in entry, differences in entry between ip.
dustries do not persist for very long. In fact, most ofthe total variation in entry across indus
tries and over time is 'within' industry variation rather than 'between' industry variation. "
Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at 423 (emphasis.added). Hence, while
"[e)conometric estimates of the height of entry barriers suggest that they are high," id. at
429, "fe]ntry rates are hard to explain using conventional measures ofprofitability and entry
barriers," id. at 430 (emphasis added).
40. E.g., Audretsch & Mahmood, Post-Entry Performance, supra note 22, at 245 & n.2
("One of the more striking empirical results to emerge ... was that the entry of new firms
into an industry is apparently not substantially deterred in industries where capital intensity
and scale economies play an important role."); Evans & Siegfried, supra note 30, at 268-69
(finding little evidence for any effect of these barriers).
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unless those industries are concentrated,41 even though these barriers
diminish their prospects for success.42 The evidence on sunk cost ef
fects, although limited, similarly suggests that they do little to deter
most entrants.43 Last, instead of deterring entry, the intensity of in
vestment in R&D is positively correlated with entry,44 and the inten
sity of investment in advertising that is often considered an impedi
ment to entry seems to have non-significant effects.45

3.

The Third Puzzle: An Inferior A verage Performance ofStartup
Entrants

Significantly, the empirical findings on entry also reveal that
startup entrants - new firms entering industry by new plant construc
tion46 - attempt entry more frequently than diversifying entrants47 those already existing firms entering a new industry by new plant con
struction. Startups also exhibit higher failure rates48 and an inferior av
erage performance as compared to diversifying entrants49•
41. Hence, although Dunne & Roberts, supra 'note 34, at 200, find capital intensity nega
tively associated with entry, BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 378, examines further a similar pat
tern in his data and finds it is in fact limited to concentrated industries.
42. See, e.g., Audretsch & Mahmood, Post-Entry Performance, supra note 22, at 252;
Ioannis N. Kessides, Entry and Market Contestability: The Evidence from the United States,
in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY, supra note 21, at 23, 41, 44.
43. See, e.g., Kessides, supra note 42, at 41; Jose Mata, Sunk Costs and Entry by Small
and Large Plants, in ENTRY AND MARKET CONTESTABILITY: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON, supra note 21, at 49, 52-58 (finding that sunk costs deter only large entrants,
those with over 250 employees).
44. BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 368-73 & tbl.14.2; Audretsch & Mahmood, Post-Entry
Performance, supra note 22, at 252; Evans & Siegfried, supra note 30, at 265-66.
45. BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 368-73; Evans & Siegfried, supra note 30, at 265-66 &
tbl.3.
46. This is a typical definition of startup entry. See, e.g. , Dunne et al., Patterns, supra
note 11, at 501; see also BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 10-15 (discussing different definition and
categories of entry). Note, however, that this definition includes all new firms in the startup
category, regardless of whether they are started by individuals or are subsidiaries of existing
firms. Consequently, some startup entrants resemble diversifying firms more than they re
semble the quintessential startup. This ambiguity only suggests, however, that the empirical
puzzles discussed in this Article would be even more striking if the data were to allow
a sharper distinction between prototypical and atypical startups and diversifying entrants
respectively.
47. Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 504 & tbl.3 (analysis of data shows that
startups comprise 87% of all entry by new plant creation in the United States, while diversi
fying firms make up only the remaining 13% ).

48. Thus, Geroski's summary states, "(d)e novo entry is more common but less success
ful than entry by diversification." Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at 424; see also
BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 11-15; Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 501, 513, tbl.11
(providing cumulative exit rates for both startups and diversifying entrants). Note that start
ups are compared to diversifying firms who enter by new plant construction rather than to
all diversifying firms, including those who enter by changing their product mix in an existing
facility. While the latter entrants comprise a significant portion of diversifying entry, they
only partly resemble the prototypical diversifying firm - they do not construct new produc-
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Taken alone, the higher failure rates of startups could simply indi
cate that these ventures tend to be riskier but also more profitable,
with startups exhibiting an average performance at least resembling
that of diversifying entrants.50 The data show, however, that startups
do not perform as well as diversifying entrants. The performance of
startups - as indicated by their relative size, .growth, productivity,
profitability, and mortality - strongly suggests that the higher average
risk they bear is not coupled with an appropriately high return, as
NPV maximization demands. In fact, these entrants' performance is
significantly worse than the already unimpressive performance of their
diversifying competitors. Hence, while the overall findings on entry
have generated a consensus that entry rates are excessive, the data on
startups show them to deviate from the rationality standard of entry to
an even greater degree, establishing the third puzzle of entry.
Startups enter at a small scale51 and fail to reach the average size in
the industry even after fifteen years.52 Diversifying entrants, on the
other hand, begin operating at levels comparable to industry aver
ages,53 and grow at spectacular rates.54 Smaller ventures are typically of
a suboptimal size, which prevents them from enjoying the benefits of

tion facilities, and they enter under the same management of the existing facility. Moreover,
most empirical studies do not consider them entrants and the data concerning their perform
ance are therefore very limited. See also infra note 50.
49. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
50. Startups could face higher risk because their limited resources force them to begin
operating at a smaller scale (assuming that capital lending markets are imperfect; otherwise
startups should have been able to obtain the financing necessary to enter at optimal size).
Ventures taking the startup route may also be biased towards higher-risk products that en
trepreneurs find difficult to sell to incumbents or that existing firms 'do not want to produce
via diversification, under the same corporate ownership, because of the associated exposure
to increased liability. Cf. infra Section III.C (analyzing the relationship between risk, innova
tion, and startup entry). Last, diversifying entrants who want to reduce their risk exposure
and "test the waters" may choose to enter without constructing new facilities, changing the
mix of products they produce in existing facilities, an option that is unavailable to startups.
Thus, the rate of entry of diversifying product-mix entrants is between 2.3 to 6.2 times
greater than that of diversifying firms entering by new plant creation, although still lower
than the rate of startup entry. Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 504, tbl.3. These pat
terns of entry and exit show a greater resemblance to those exhibited by startups than to
those of diversifying firms entering by new plant formation, lending support to the "testing
the waters" hypothesis. Id. at 504 (pro�uct-rnix entrants are only slightly larger than start
ups); id. at 513, tbl.11 (the exit rates of product-miX entrants are as high as those of startups,
sometimes even higher).
51. Thus, Dunne et al. report that startup entrants are on average 28.4% as large as in
cumbent producers, while diversifying entrants are as much as 87.1% of the size of the latter.
Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 504.
·

52. Id. at 512, tbl.10.
53. See, e.g., Timothy Dunne et al., The Growth and Failure of U.S. Manufacturing
Plants, 104 Q. J. ECON. 671, 676 (tbl.1), 689 (1989) [hereinafter Dunne et al., Growth].
54. Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 512.
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scale economics55 and results in productivity rates that are lower than
industry-wide averages.56
Furthermore, when looking at the longitudinal performance of
new entrant cohorts we find that the market share of startup entrants
as a group declines with the passage of time, indicating that the in
crease in the 'share of successful startups does not compensate for the
decline in share resulting from those who fail. The opposite obtains for
diversifying entrants, however, where the impressive growth of sur
viving entrants more than offsets the loss of market share due to the
failure of others, resulting in an overall gradual increase in their mar
ket share.57
Interestingly, when comparing the performance of successful plants
alone, startups exhibit higher growth and fare better than diversifying
firms, in relative terms.58 These findings indicate that while the aver
age fate of startups is worse, a successful startup may be better off
than a successful diversifying entrant. This pattern suggests, in turn,
that the higher risk associated with startups may be coupled with
somewhat higher returns to success.59 These higher returns are never
theless insufficient to compensate the average startup for the signifi
cantly increased risk of failure it is must bear upon entry.

55. See, e.g., David B. Audretsch & Michael Fritsch, Creative Destruction: Turbulence
and Economic Growth in Germany, in BEHAVIORAL NORMS, TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS,
AND ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: STUDIES IN SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 137, 139-40 & n.2
(Ernst Helmstadter & Mark Perlman eds., 1996) (citing numerous studies indicating that
small entrants enter at suboptimal scale that often forces them to exit unless they can ex
pand); Audretsch & Mahmood, Post-Entry Performance, supra note 22, at 245-46 (arguing
that smaller entrants are of sub-optimal scale).
56. The evidence suggests that all entrants have lower productivity than incumbents be
cause of their smaller size.See, e.g., BALDWIN, supra note 11, at 209-10, 217-18.
57. Dunne et al., Growth, supra note 53, at 672-73, 689-93.Diversifying firms also show
a higher growth rate even after controlling for the systematic size differences between these
two entrant types.See id. at 686-93; Dunne et al., Patterns, supra note 11, at 509-13.
58. Dunne et al., Growth, supra note 53, at 672-73, 689-93.Thus, Dunne et al. note:
When the failure probability is integrated into the analysis, however, the relationship be
tween plant growth and size is negative for plants owned by single-plant firms but positive
for plants owned by multiplant firms . .. . For single-plant firms the decline ofthe growth rate
of successful plants with size overwhelms the reduction in the failure rate. Expected growth
rates then decline with size. For plants owned by multiplant firms, the decline in the failure
rate with size is the dominant effect, and expected growth increases with size.
Id. at 672-73 (emphases added).
59. See Leo A. Weiss, Start-up Businesses: A Comparison of Performances, 23 SLOAN
MGMT. REV. 37 {1981) (comparing the performance of successful startups started by individ
ual entrepreneurs with those started by large firms, finding the former to grow faster and
achieve higher profitability sooner, and speculating that the possibly higher risk associated
with individually started ventures is reflected in their higher re.turns).
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Can the Rationality Assumption Be Salvaged?

The rationality assumption - that entrants will make only posi
tive, risk-adjusted net present value entry attempts - is difficult to
reconcile with the empirical data. The first and second puzzles - en
try that is both excessive and insensitive to market predictors of suc
cess - challenge the applicability of the rationality assumption to all
entrants, while the third puzzle - the systematically inferior average
performance of startups - suggests that startup entrants exhibit be
haviors that are even more difficult to reconcile with the rationality
assumption.
The following section examines two categories of responses to the
puzzles of entry that attempt to salvage the rationality assumption:
those suggesting that entrants may still be attempting to make positive
net present value entry, and those modifying the rationality assump
tion to allow "rational" entry without positive NPV.
1 . Maintaining the Rationality Assumption: Windows of
Opportunity, Limited Information, and the Fruits of Learning

a. Entrants Exploit Short-Term "Windows of Opportunity. " Theo
retically, entrants may recognize "windows of opportunity" in the
market that allow "hit and run" entry - a quick, low-cost entry that
yields short-term profits and is followed by exit once the opportunity
for profits has dissipated.60 If this were the case, it should not be sur
prising to find that many entrants exit soon after they enter. The em
pirical data, however, cast doubt on the likelihood of low-cost, highly
profitable short-term entry. First, in most manufacturing industries
new plant creation requires significant and partially irretrievable in
vestments of labor and capital,61 while hit-and-run entry should occur
only where there is little risk of capital loss.62 Second, the findings on

60. See, e.g., Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10, at 307; Geroski, Data Driven Reflec
tions, supra note 30, at 282-83.

61. Thus, the economic literature distinguishes between fixed costs (which should not
create a barrier to entry even while they give rise to scale economics) and "sunk costs." See
PAUL A. GEROSKI ET AL., BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND STRATEGIC COMPETmON 26-37
(1990); William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981). The measurement of the proportion
of investment that must be sunk is difficult and has thus not been attempted often. One
study examining various industries concluded that the range of sunk costs ranged from a low
of 23% in petroleum refining to a high of 59% in electric motors. Richard J. Gilbert, Pre
emptive Competition, in N E W DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE
90, 108, tbl.3.1 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., 1986).
62. See, e.g., GEROSKI ET AL., supra note 61, at 4 (reviewing the relevant arguments in
the literature).
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entrant profitability indicate that high profitability does not occur in
the short-term but, instead, quite the opposite.63
b. Entrants Make Rational Decisions Based on Limited Informa
tion. Another possible argument is that entrants are guided by net pre
sent value considerations, but possess limited information.64 They can
not predict with certainty the expected costs of and revenues from
entry, which depend on numerous future events;65 they may even be
unable to determine accurately in advance their ability to manage and
develop the new enterprise.66 If this were the entrants' predicament,
many entrants would misestimate their net present values and attempt
entry when they should not.
While the limits of information available to entrants could explain
the empirical findings, they could do so only given extreme assump
tions about entry.67 Entrants with incomplete information should still
make accurate predictions on average in the absence of a bias in the
available sources of information, although they would be somewhat
less likely to succeed as a group than would be the case if perfect in
formation were available. Entrants with incomplete information
should be expected to make inaccurate NPV calculations at times.
Some will wrongly conclude that entry is worthwhile; others will make
the opposite mistake. These mistakes will affect the rate of entry, but
only when they are large enough to cause a reversal of the sign of the
perceived NPV of their prospective ventures - making a negative
NPV seem positive or vice versa.
63. See E. RALPH BIGGADIKE, CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION: ENTRY, STRATEGY,
AND PERFORMANCE 1 9 1 ( 1 979) (a study of diversifying ventures of Fortune 200 firms

showing that these entrants required, on average, more than eight years since entry to
"break even"); Weiss, supra note 59 (a study finding that even the most successful surviving
startups take about four years to begin making profits).
64. Thus, GEROSKI ET AL., supra note 61, at 36, state that "[t]he threat of excessive en
try is particularly severe when entrants act with incomplete information about the decisions
of potential competitors," without explaining why incomplete information would be ex
pected to lead to a skewed distribution of errors in favor of more frequent entry. The few
economic models of entry decisionmaking with incomplete information generate diverse
conclusions depending on their particular assumptions. See, e.g., Roger Sherman & Thomas
D. Willett, Potential Entrants Discourage Entry, 75 J. POL. ECON. 400, 402-403 & n.9 (1967)
(concluding, in an early model of simultaneous entry, that limited information about other
entrants' decision rules can discourage entry, while the effects under imperfect information
are indeterminate).
65. Cf MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY (1989)
(using "learning" to refer not to an active adaptation process but, instead, simply to remov
ing uncertainty by finding out whether the entering firm is sufficiently able to meet market
demand efficiently vis-a-vis its rivals):
66. Cf. Boyan Jovanovic, Selection and the Evolution of Industry, 50 ECONOMETRICA
649 (1982) (an early, influential, learning model in which entrants face random costs that
differ among firms, with the assumption that new entrants do not know their ability to man
age the new startup but rather learn it from their actual post-entry performance).
67. Thus, the analysis below highlights only the implausibility of the information-based
explanation as the sole cause of observed entry patterns, as limited information could ex
plain any observation with appropriate assumptions.
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Furthermore, the overall effect of these errors on entrants' success
rates should be even smaller than the number of mistaken entry at
tempts alone suggests. All of the mistaken entrants reversing the NPV
sign from positive to negative will simply avoid entry. At the same
time, not all of those mistaking negative NPV entry as positive will
fail. Depending on their objective success probability, these latter en
trants will sometimes succeed, albeit at rates lower than those exhib
ited by their truly positive NPV competitors. Moreover, rationally mis
taken entrants would not be likely to make frequent entry attempts
that have a very low probability of success; instead, the attempts of
such entrants are likely to represent ventures whose NPV are only
moderately negative.
Such mistaken entry could partially explain increased entry rates,
especially given the relatively large number of potential entrants with
negative NPVs as compared to their few counterparts with positive
NPV ventures.68 This rational mistaken entry could also explain in
creased rates of failure; after all, the more negative NPV entrants that
attempt entry, the greater the proportion of actual entrants that will
eventually fail. This type of entry, however, would be highly unlikely
to reduce survival rates to 40% or less within five years, as observed in
data.69
Given reasonable assumptions, the argument based on limited in
formation explains only a small amount of negative NPV entry, not
the large proportion of failed entry observed in the data.70 Moreover,
the argument does not explain entrant insensitivity to market predic
tors - a form of information that rational actors would find relatively
cheap to obtain and incorporate into the decision-making process as the second puzzle reveals. Last, the information argument may sug
gest that rational startups have less information than diversifying en
trants and therefore make more frequent errors and fail at higher
rates.71 The analysis of the first puzzle, however, has shown that ra68. This would occur, for example, under the reasonable assumption that potential ven
tures are not normally distributed around a zero NPV, but are rather mostly negative NPV
ventures, with only a few bearing positive NPVs.
69. For rationally mistaken entry alone to bring average survival rates down to the ob
served levels, rational entrants would have to enter when their objective probability of suc
cess is even lower than industry averages since the few entrants who are not mistaken will be
attempting higher probability entry. Ventures with a very low success probability, however,
must expect extremely high returns that the masses of new entrants could not be rationally
anticipated to obtain.
70. In reality, the proportion of.failed entrants would have probably been even smaller
than that suggested by the above analysis to the extent the entrants' probability of success
were not fixed but rather normally distributed and determined by the rate of entry. If this
were the case, the replacement of some more-effective entrants by less-effective ones would
result in an overall increase in the probability of success of other entrants rather than an in
creased failure rate.
·

71. Although one could also argue that many of the objective predictors of success

economic and demographic alike - can be estimated by professional analysts at a cost that
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tional mistakes alone do not explain extremely high failure rates. Ra
tionally erring startups, moreover, would exhibit inferior performance
not only on average, but upon success as well: These mistaken entrants
would be riskier ventures with average returns that are unlikely to
generate the superior performance in case of success that the data
suggest.
c. Entrants Engage in a Long-Term Learning Process. The third
possible defense of the rationality assumption is that entrants engage
in a learning process:72 They may knowingly attempt negative NPV en
try because the information and experience they obtain from the entry
attempt, even if it fails, increase their probability and magnitude of
success in future ventures. According to this view, entrants will at
tempt entry as long as the NPV of all their entry attempts, taken to
gether, is positive.
This learning-by-entering explanation seems compatible with the
image of an entrepreneurial individual who repeatedly starts new ven
tures, unfazed by early failures, until striking gold.73 Whether this pro
totypical entrepreneur is representative of new entrants is anybody's
guess; statistics on repeated entry are not available. Learning, how
ever, is very difficult in real-world settings where feedback is ambigu
ous and not always available.74 The limited evidence on learning by en
trants suggests that no learning occurs in the early years of the
venture, and only some learning occurs as the venture progresses.75
For learning alone to account for the striking failure statistics in
the data (as opposed to contributing to the success probability of ex
perienced entrants) - as the case with the limited information argu
ment. First, for entrants to plan repeated entry rationally they must be
able to estimate the NPV of all of their expected attempts. Such a cal
culation, while theoretically possible, is highly implausible. It also con
tradicts the fundamental intuition behind the learning argument, that
good estimates of complex future events are hard to come by. The

is unlikely to be large in comparison with the financial benefits and costs of entry. In addi
tion, as limited as any objective analysis may be, a startup with very limited information
could reduce the rate of error significantly by obtaining and properly analyzing these data.

72. See, e.g., Geroski, Data Driven Reflections, supra note 30, at 283-84; see also
Jovanovic, supra note 66 (modeling entry as a learning experiment).
73. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 91-94
(Redvers Opie trans., 1934) (Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (describing the motives and character
of the entrepreneurial "type").
74. See infra note 273 (discussing the difficulty of learning to overcome decision biases
in real-world environments).
75. See Andrew H. Van de Ven & David N. Grazman, Technological Innovation,
Learning, and Leadership, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: OVERSIGHTS AND
FORESIGHTS 279-80 (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 1997) (reviewing recent empirical findings to
this effect).
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possibility that this calculation could actually be made appears even
more remote given the type of information necessary to determine the
NPV of potential future ventures. Paradoxically, entrants would have
to forecast future events based on information they do not have, when
the need for repeated entry itself results from a similar, albeit less
complicated, absence of information.76
Second, even if entrants had all the relevant information but sim
ply needed to improve their ability to perform an entry task, they
would be unlikely to attempt a significantly negative NPV entry. For
entry to be rational, it is not enough for the aggregate of all attempts
to have positive NPV. Rather, one must deduct the expected sunk
costs, including time value, of all previous negative NPV entry at
tempts. Consequently, the positive NPV attempt has to be highly suc
cessful - as only few ventures are.77
While the learning argument may explain some excess entry, it re
solves less adequately the other puzzles of entry, much like the previ
ous arguments attempting to reconcile the empirical findings with the
rationality assumption.78

2.

Modifying the Rationality Assumption: Maximizing Expected
Utility with Negative Net Present Values

The arguments attempting to reconcile the data with the rationality
assumption do not adequately account for the various puzzles of entry
under reasonable assumptions. It is therefore appropriate to examine
whether modifying the definition of what rational entry consists of
could save the assumed rationality of entrants. According to this line
of reasoning, entrants may be acting rationally while attempting nega
tive NPV entry if they derive other, non-monetary benefits from entry.
To the extent the utility entrants derive from these benefits is greater
than their disutility from the expected economic losses of entry, their
behavior is still "rational."79 Entrants may wish to fulfill a dream, en
joy running their own business, or even derive utility directly from the

76. Entrants with unlimited resources could keep attempting entry until successful, but
that would not make their overall investment rational, of course.
77. Failed entry is an expensive teaching tool. It provides only a limited range of infor
mation about the market, and even less information that would be particularly relevant to
future ventures unless they were to repeat closely the original attempt.
78. Another possible argument for the rationality of diversifying entrants is that they
maximize the overall profits of their firms, using entry to punish or threaten rivals, protect
ing their profits in those industries where they are well established incumbents. We do not
discuss this argument in detail, however, since not only does it apply to diversifying entry
alone but it also explains - at best - but a small proportion of such entry.
79. Cf. Posner, supra note 4, at 1553-55 (claiming that the evidence presented by Jolls et
al. of bounded rationality can be explained by various ad hoc hypotheses regarding individu
als' utility functions).
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entry attempt, regardless of its consequences - a sort of gambling in a
business context.80 A stronger version of this argument would claim
that entrants must be maximizing their subjective expected utility. This
view would assert that the studies of entry all misinterpret the data, or
otherwise fail to identify what is it that entrants in fa ct maximize.81
These and similar suggestions may accommodate puzzling data,
but at the cost of abandoning the NPV standard82 together with its un
derlying justification as "the managerial compass" in financial deci
sionmaking.83 Once individual tastes and values enter the calculation,
managers lose their NPV-based legitimacy vis-a-vis investors, who do
not share the managers' personal preferences.
Moreover, the arbitrary addition of "value" sources reduces the ra
tionality assumption to a tautology.84 It protects the rationality as
sumption from empirical criticism by eliminating its predictive power

80. Using anecdotal observation and some empirical studies, the entrepreneurship lit
erature often states as obvious the notion that entrants, while motivated by profit seeking,
also seek to fulfill other preferences. See, e.g., Thomas M. Begley & David P. Boyd, Psy
chological Characteristics Associated with Performance in Entrepreneurial Firms and Smaller
Businesses, 2 J. Bus. VENTURES 79, 82 (1987) (citing studies); James W. Carland et al., Dif
ferentiating Entrepreneurs from Small Business Owners: A Conceptualization, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 354, 356 & tbl.1 (1984). Nevertheless, one wonders whether unsuccessful entry
that ends with quick failure is even utility maximizing in the minimal sense.
81. Compare Posner's telling defense of the traditional economic analysis of law in his
important introductory book:
The reader who Jacks previous acquaintance with economics may be troubled by what ap
pear to be the severely unrealistic assumptions that underlie economic theory. The basic as
sumption. that human behavior is rational, seems contradicted by the experiences and ob
servations of everyday life. The contradiction is less acute when one understands that . . .
[r]ationality means little more to the economist than a disposition to choose . . . an apt means
to whatever ends the chooser happens to have.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.3, at 17 (5th ed. 1 998) (emphasis
added); see also Posner, supra note 4, at 1 553-55 (using a similar approach to explain evi
dence of bounded rationality). See generally Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 1, at 1060-66
(citing sources explaining that according to this type of definitional approach, all behavior is
necessarily rational and necessarily "worth it" to the actor).

82. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, at 180 (NPVs do not include the en
joyment of risks or other non-pecuniary values).
83. Id. at 24 ("The remarkable thing is that managers of firms can be given one simple
instruction: Maximize net present value."). NPV is the basis on which managers maximize
the firm's, and thereby its shareholders' wealth. Id.; see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 23 (1991) (stating
that management decisions should aim to maximize shareholder wealth). It justifies the
separation of ownership and control, "the fundamental condition for the successful opera
tion of a capitalist economy." BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 17, at 24.
84. See MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 230-32 (2d ed. 1 992) (cit
ing examples of similar tautologieal claims in modem economic thought); see also DANIEL
M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 205-26, 247-80
(1992) (providing an overview of the limits of economic methodology vis-a-vis rationality
assumptions).
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and converting it to an irrefutable axiom, capable of accommodating
any data.85
II.

A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF ENTRY DECISIONMAKING

Unlike traditional theories of entry, a behavioral approach does
not expect entrants to make decisions under µncertainty according to
norms of strict rationality. Instead, it accepts that entrants are bound
edly rational: they may weigh the pros and cons of entry, but their
ability to do so rationally is impeded by the limitations of human cog
nition and affected by motivation and emotion. To utilize their limited
mental resources effectively, entrants employ simplifying decision
heuristics that enable them to function reasonably well in a complex
environment, but also lead them at times to systematic, predictable er
rors.86 More specifically, the psychological literature reveals a number
of cognitive processes that lead entrants, like other individuals making
judgments with significant personal stakes under uncertainty, to be
overconfident about the prospects of their ventures and insensitive to
background statistical information.87

.

, .

85. Cf Christine Jolls et al., Theories and Tropes: A Reply to Posner and Kelman, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1600 (1998) (responding to Posner's argument by stating that "[i]t is
difficult to see what conclusions should be drawn from the fact that evolution can be shown
to produce a behavior and the absence of that behavior"); see also ANATOL RAPOPORT,
DECISION THEORY AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 8 (2d rev. ed. 1998) ("[I]t would be futile to
infer the decision-maker's values entirely ad hoc . . . . For this sort of inference would make
any hypothesis and hence any descriptive theory of decision unfalsifiable, hence worthless.")
(second emphasis added).
86. See supra note 2 (various sources citing evidence for and discussing the systematic
nature of judgmental errors); see also Jeffery j, Rachlinski, The New Law and Psychology: A
Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 750-52 (2000)
(describing the general psychological parameters of the behaviorally informed actor). For
some general, though not comprehensive, reviews of legal articles applying a behavioral ap
proach, see Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making
in Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV 1499 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein,
Behavioral Law and Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999).
87. Entrants are likely to use many of those cognitive heuristics that impact individuals'
judgments under uncertainty even when these judgments bear no significant personal conse
quences for the decisionmaker. The analysis below nevertheless focuses on those powerful,
robust, and systematic biases that generate overconfidence when decisionmakers must make
self-interested judgments. Other cognitive phenomena are mentioned only to the extent they
are likely to have any systematic impact on entrants' propensity to enter. See, e.g. , infra notes
136-140 and the accompanying text. In doing so, this Article follows the practical approach
suggested by Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1481 (noting, when describing the main application
of a behavioral law and economics, that they "do not emphasize behavioral patterns that de
part from standard economic assumptions but fail to point in systematic directions" but in
stead "focus [on] robust, empirically documented phenomena that have reasonably precise
implications for legal issues") (emphasis added).
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A. Solving the First Puzzle: The Processes of Entrants'
Overconfidence
From a behavioral perspective, the most significant characteristics
of the judgments that entrants must make when deciding whether to
enter are two. First, entrants must make their decision under a veil of
uncertainty. They are unable to predict the fate of their venture with
certainty, and they cannot know with certainty all the relevant infor
mation about the market they consider entering nor can they process
it fully. In fact, entrants cannot even know with certainty all their per
sonal characteristics pertinent to the entry task or even what exactly
these abilities, skills, and experiences might be. Second, the conse
quences of the decisions that potential entrants must make are in
credibly significant for them. These consequences implicate their self
perception and self-esteem as effective, successful business decision
makers and managers. The decisions they make also have important
positive and negative financial and reputational implications for them.
Ironically, a wealth of psychological data show that in circum
stances of this kind, where rational judgment would arguably be most
beneficial to the decisionmaker, people tend to exhibit a significant
bias.88 As the analysis below shows, this bias results from a number of
psychological processes that affect entrants' judgments of both the
probability and value of their prospective ventures.
Some scholars, recognizing the puzzle of excess entry, have sug
gested that entrants' behavior may primarily reflect an optimistic bias,
in addition to other psychological phenomena.89 An important recent
set of experiments provides direct evidence of overoptimism in a mar
ket entry game.00 This Part both reviews these findings and develops a
systematic framework showing how various psychological processes
are highly likely to generate entrants' overconfidence - making this
biased behavior common and robust even in those real-world contexts
that have not been examined experimentally.
88. The numerous, mostly egocentric (self-related) biases in perception, evaluation, and
prediction that generate entrant overconfidence result from a combination of motivational
and cognitive factors. Dale W. Griffin & Carol A. Varey, Towards a Consensus on Overcon
fidence, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION. PROC. 227, 228 (1996). More
generally, the identification of an important "egocentric " component of these phenomena
does not exclude the role of "cold" cognitive processes in generating the biases, but only
emphasizes the role of self-implication as the thread unifying them. See ZIVA KUNDA,
SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 211-46 (1999) (reviewing some findings);
Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 179 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) (reviewing the early literature on egocentric biases in attribution).
89. See, e.g., Geroski, Data Driven Reflections, supra note 30, at 282, 284 (suggesting
that "low survival rates may reflect either systematic errors made by entrants in forecasting
post-entry returns, or a positively risk-taking attitude " without explaining why entrants
make mistakes or which mistakes they actually make).
90. Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10.
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The comprehensive framework developed in this Part will be fur
ther applied to the yet unaddressed and unresolved second and third
puzzles of entry. Consequently, this Part describes the processes of
overconfidence in detail, laying important foundations for the remain
der of the behavioral analysis of entry decisionmaking.

1.

Optimistic Bias

The evidence on optimistic bias indicates that entrants are likely to
have inflated views of both their absolute and comparative ability,
with a resulting bias in the perception of their probability of success
(and the concomitant risk associated with their ventures). To the ex
tent that the value (e.g., net profits) of successful entry depends on the
entrant's business acumen, moreover, overconfident entrants will also
expect their value to be higher than objectively warranted.
Individuals have a strong tendency to exhibit optimistic bias. They
overestimate their positive traits, abilities, skills, and likelihood of ex
periencing positive events, while they underestimate their vulnerabil
ity to certain risks.91 Overoptimism is especially pronounced in com
parative contexts, in which people judge themselves in relation to
others.92
91. See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Self-Serving Prototypes of Social Categories, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 957 (1991) (showing how people judge positive traits to be
overwhelmingly more characteristic of themselves than negative attributes, and define per
sonal attributes in idiosyncratic ways that emphasize their perceived strengths); Shelley E.
Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective
on Mental Health, 103 PsYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988) [hereinafter Taylor & Brown, Illusion
and Well-Being]; Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon D. Brown, Positive Illusions and Well-Being
Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 22-23 (1994) [hereinafter
Taylor & Brown, Separating Fact from Fiction] (reviewing and discussing findings on indi
viduals' mildly distorted positive perceptions); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism
About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism]; Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Opti
mism: Present and Future, 15 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-6 (1996) [hereinafter
Weinstein & Klein, Present and Future] (discussing findings showing that people think them
selves invulnerable to certain risks). For some pertinent recent findings, see Valerie A.
Clarke et al., Unrealistic Optimism and the Health Belief Model, 23 J. BEHAV. MED. 367,
372-74 (2000) (healthy subjects exhibit bias in absolute (non-comparative) judgments of the
expected risk and severity of cancer, as well as the potential benefits and costs they will ex
perience in using screening methods); Marsha T. Gabriel et al., Narcissistic Illusions in Self
Evaluations of Intelligence and Attractiveness, 62 J. PERSONALITY 143 (1994); Janet
Metcalfe, Cognitive Optimism: Self-Deception or Memory-Based Processing Heuristics?, 2
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. REV. 100 (1998) (resembling positive illusions).
92 See, e.g., David Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation: The Role of Idiosyn
cratic Trait Definitions in Self-Serving Appraisals of Ability, 57 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PsYCHOL 1082 (1989) [hereinafter Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation] (academic
skills, leadership ability, marriage prospects, and health); Gabriel et al., supra note 91 (intel
ligence and attractiveness); Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our
Fellow Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGIA 143 (1981); Taylor & Brown, Illusion and Well
Being, supra note 91, at 195-96; Taylor & Brown, Separating Fact from Fiction, supra note
91, at 22-23 (stating that people choose dimensions of comparison in which they excel, and
select worse-off comparison targets that guarantee a favorable comparison); Weinstein &
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Over the last twenty years a wealth of empirical econometric data
evidencing boundedly rational behavior in financial markets has ac
cumulated,93 with recent studies documenting the effects of optimistic
bias on the performance of investors and markets alike.94 Optimistic
bias is common in investment decisionmaking, as exemplified by a re
cent study examining portfolio allocation decisions of eighty MBA
students from the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at
Northwestern University in a computerized investing simulation.95 The
participants in this study were not only business-oriented, but had an
average investment experience of almost five years.96
The study created a simulated market based on real performance
data of the nine largest mutual funds as of 1985, plus an S&P 500 index
fund. The game covered ten years, which corresponded to the period
1985-1994, although the subjects were not aware of that. Participants
had $100,000 to invest and the opportunity to review their investments
every six months, resulting in a twenty-period game. They could invest
their money in any combination of the ten funds or leave it in the
"bank." Participants also had full information about the performance
of the funds and the market for each period.97
As expected, study participants consistently overestimated their
predicted performance relative to the market. Even more strikingly,
they overestimated the past performance of their portfolios - believ
ing at the end of the game that, on average, they matched the perKlein, Present and Future, supra note 91, at 4 n.2 (mentioning a list of more the 200 studies
showing unrealistic optimism in expectations regarding positive and negative life events the
author had accumulated by 1996).
93. See ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993) (a classic
collection of articles on behavioral finance); ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000) (a readable and comprehensive re
view of the behavioral finance literature).
94. See, e.g., Terrance Odean, Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are
Above A verage, 53 J. FIN. 1 887 (1998) (testing a model of overconfidence and surveying the
literature).Other empirical studies show that stock markets overreact, that both individual
and professional investors cannot "beat the market" in the long run, that investors trade too
much, SHLEIFER, supra note 93 (reviewing and discussing many of these studies), and that
this excessive trading has a negative effect on their returns. Brad M. Barber & Terrance
Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock Investment, 116
Q.J. ECON. 261 (2001) (finding that men underperform women, who are already overconfi
dent, because the former trade even more frequently); Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean,
Trading is Hazardous to Your Health: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Indi
vidual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773 (2000) (finding in a sample of 66,465 households a high port
folio turnover and a negative correlation between turnover and profitability).
95. Don A. Moore et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund In
vestment Decisions, 79 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95
(1999).
96. They also reported average investments of over $20,000, and rated their investment
knowledge as close to amateur, on a novice-amateur-expert scale; their ages ranged from 23
to 45 years old. Id. at 100-01,103.
97. Measured by the S&P 500 index.Id. at 103.

November 2002]

The Fable ofEntry

507

formance of the market, while in fact their performance was signifi
cantly below the market. This finding was also accompanied by the
participants' overestimation of the consistency of their portfolios' per
formance over the twenty periods of the game. It was obtained despite
the unusually clear feedback the subjects received at the end of every
game period. Last, the subjects switched their investments too fre
quently, a behavior that correlated with (and possibly caused) poorer
investment performance.98 These and similar findings99 are not sur
prising to those familiar with the investment behavior of both ama
teurs and professionals, who report how analysts commonly overesti
mate their investment selection ability and consequently overestimate
the expected returns on their investments.100
The optimistic bias pervasive in business environments has also
been directly tested in simulated entry decisionmaking. Experimental
economists have recently shown that entrants' overestimates of their
comparative skill generate excessive entry.101 Camerer and Lovallo
created an experimental game, where participants chose simultane
ously, without communicating with each other, whether to enter the
market. Participants were told in advance the "capacity" of the market
- the number of participants who can make a positive profit from en
tering. The larger the number of participants who decide to enter the
experimental market, the smaller the average returns to the entrants.
Participants were also informed that not all entrants will receive the
same returns. Instead, their returns depended on how they ranked in
comparison with their counterparts, with the ranking determined
based on either a random drawing or their performance in a skill or
trivia task. Under these circumstances, most participants realized that
the average profit of entrants would be negative.102 They erroneously
98. Id. at 104-10
99. See, e.g., William N. Goetzmann & Nadav Peles, Cognitive Dissonance and Mutual
Fund Investors, 20 J. FIN. RES. 145 (1997) (also finding that mutual fund investors exhibit
overly optimistic perceptions of past mutual fund performance). See generally MAX H.
BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 96-108 (5th ed. 2002) (dis
cussing a variety of common investment mistakes including overconfidence and optimism).
100. See, e.g., Arnold S. Wood, Behavioral Risk: Anecdotes and Disturbing Evidence, J.
INVESTING, Spring 1997, at 8; Arnold S. Wood, Fatal Attractions for Money Managers, FIN.
ANALYSTS ]., May-June 1989, at 3.
101. Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10, at 310-12.
102. In f act, earlier studies have shown that when the market is simple, and skill and
self-selection into competition play no role, entrants are a little biased but after a sufficient
number of repeated trials converge close to the rational rate of entry. See Daniel Kahneman,
Experimental Economics: A Psychological Perspective, in BOUNDED RATIONAL BEHAVIOR
JN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES AND MARKETS 11 (Reinhard Tietz et al. eds., 1988) (introducing
the entry game paradigm and reporting that experiment participants enter roughly at market
capacity in a simple game where all participants know the market's capacity, where there are
obvious profits to those who decide not to enter, and where market outcomes depend only
on the number of entrants - not on their skill or performance); Amnon Rapoport, Individ
ual Strategies in a Market-Entry Game, 4 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 117 (1995)
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expected, however, that .their own profits would be positive. This bias
was especially strong where only those participants who self-selected
to participate (though not necessarily enter) in a skill-based entry
game competed among themselves. These participants exhibited sig
nificant overconfidence in their comparative skill, and failed to antici
pate the greater intensity of competition they were bound to face in
the self-selection condition, where only participants who considered
themselves skilled enough to win positive returns chose to partici
pate.103

2.

The Desirability Bias and Related Phenomena

While overoptimism affects entrants' perceptions and expectations
regarding their future . performance by inflating their self-perception,
desirability related phenomena bias a far broader range of judgments.
These biases occur when people predict future events that implicate
their self-perception, emotions, or interests. They cause decisionmak
ers to align their expectations with preferences for particular outcomes
of events even when these events do not concern their own actions
specifically, as when predicting market-wide trends or the behavior of
other actors. Such desirability related biases affect predictions of fac
tors that determine a future venture's value as well as factors that bias
probability judgments.
a. The Desirability Bias. Nl,lmerous studies show that people ex
hibit biased predictions of external events that are not under their con
trol, but whose outcomes nevertheless implicate their self-perception
or are otherwise important to the predictors who hold clear prefer
ences regarding them.104 When manifesting such biased predictions re
garding desirable outcomes, entrants may not only overestimate the
profitability of successful entry, but also underestimate the invest
ments and the time necessary for the venture to become viable. This
(replicating the design using larger stakes with similar findings). The subjects' ability in
Camerer and Lovallo's study to forecast average returns with reasonable accuracy provides
only a limited consolation, however; the clear and simple nature of the game constrained the
subjects' wishful thinking dramatically more than most real-world situations do.
103. Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10, at 310-16 (describing this phenomenon as "ref
erence group neglect"); see also Edward J. Zajac & Max H. Bazerman, Blind Spots in In
dustry and Competitor Analysis: Implications of Interfirm (Mis)Perceptions for Strategic De
cisions, 16 ACAO. MGMT. REV. 37 (1991) (reviewing studies showing the scope of
competitive blind spots and suggesting these play a role in new business failures).
104. See, e.g., Elisha Babad & Yosi Katz, Wishful Thinking - Against All Odds, 21 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1921 (1991) [hereinafter Babad & Katz, Against All Odds]; David
V. Budescu & Meira Bruderman, The Relationship Between the Illusion of Control and the
Desirability Bias, 8 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109 (1995); Roy M. Poses & Michele
Anthony, Availability, Wishful Thinking, and Physicians Diagnostic Judgments for Patients
with Suspected Bacteremia, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 159 (1991) (reporting a "value
bias"). For a clear, early study, see Douglas McGregor, The Major Determinants of the Pre
diction ofSocial Events, 33 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 179 {1938).
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may happen if they underestimate the full scope of the required in
vestments for ventures of the type they contemplate, the various fu
ture events in the industry or economy at large that may negatively af
fect the prospects of the entry attempt, or the time. they - like other
entrants - will need to become profitable. In addition, entrants may
also underestimate their likely losses upon failure.105
The desirability bias has been measured directly, with many ex
periments showing that estimates of the likelihood of future events are
correlated with people's desirability ratings of these events.106 The ef
fects of this bias even occur when people have no pre-existing stake in
the subject of their judgment and cannot affect the outcome of the
predicted event.107
The evidence shows that even professional investment managers
exhibit the desirability bias. In two related studies, American and
Taiwanese investment managers were requested to" make predictions
of whether certain economic events or trends of importance to them
and their clients (e.g., trends of merger activity, effects of high debt
levels, and relevant regulation) would occur or change a year from the
prediction date. Both studies revealed systematic positive correlations
between the managers' predictions and their ratings of these events'
desirability.108
While even ad hoc designations create desirability and affect pre
dictions, the bias is especially strong and pervasi.ve where people have
preexisting, vested interests in the outcomes of a predicted event, such
as when voters predict election outcomes109 and sport fans predict the

105. This latter misperception differs from an inability to recognize the full scope of
necessary investment, reflecting an underestimation of the proportion of the investment that
cannot be recouped upon f ailure (i.e., the "sunk costs").
106. See Budescu & Bruderman, supra note 104; George Wright & Peter Ayton, Sub
jective Confidence in Forecasts: A Response to Fischhoff and McGregor, 5 J. FORECASTING
117 (1986) (reviewing these findings).
107. For example, participants in a recent study who where designated either "plain
tiffs" or "defendants," exhibited systematically bi1;1sed expectations of the decision an objec
tive judge would arrive at in a tort case, each group in accordance with its designation, al
though their roles were merely ad hoc designations and they had no opportunity to address
the judge. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bar
gaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 151, tbl.2 (1993); see also Linda Babcock et al., Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995). But see Maya Bar
Hillel & David Budescu, The Elusive Wishful Thinking Effect, 1 THINKING & REASONING
71, 72-74 (1995) (not always finding a desirability bias for emotionally neutral outcomes that
are only endowed with value ad hoc in the experiment).
108. Robert A. Olsen, Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some
Evidence from Experts, 10 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 66-70 (1997).
109. McGregor, supra note 104, at 181-83, 191, tbl.5.For a review of election studies and
a large-scale analysis of the preference-expectation link in U.S. presidential elections, see
Donald Granberg & Edward Brent, When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-Expectation
Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1952-1980, 45 ]; PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477,
477-79, tbl.1 (1983).
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outcomes of matches.110 As noted above, entry is also characterized by
the significant positive and negative consequences it harbors for en
trants, who are therefore likely to exhibit a strong desirability bias as
well.
b. The Affect Heuristic. In addition to exhibiting the desirability
bias, people often use an "affect heuristic," making judgments based
on affective "tags" they associate with the subjects of their judg
ment.111 They frequently simplify judgmental processes by consulting
readily available affective impressions, using affective shortcuts very
much like they utilize cognitive heuristics in decisionmaking.112 For ex
ample, when assessing the risks and benefits of different activities,
people rely on the affect they associate with them; consequently,
judgments of the risks and benefits of hazards are often negatively cor
related (e.g., people deem those activities they consider beneficial as
low-risk), although risks and benefits tend to be positively corre
lated.113
Thus, the affect heuristic contributes to individuals' tendency to
align expectations with preferences, especially when preferences are
strong and the predicted events carry significant affective importance
to the predictor. This judgmental process provides an important com
plement to our understanding of the processes of entrant overconfi
dence: while the basic desirability bias has been recorded mainly in the
realm of probabilistic or binary (i.e. yes or no) predictions, the evi
dence on the affect heuristic reveals its impact on judgments of bene
fits as well as those of risks. The affect heuristic therefore explains how
desirability can impact entrants' estimates of the value of a potential
venture and their judgments of the risk associated with it. The evi
dence on the positive correlation between individuals' predictions of
benefits and risks further suggests that entrants will not only overesti
mate the value of entry and underestimate its risks, but that these bi
ased perceptions will further support and reinforce one another.
c. The Planning Fallacy. Findings on the "planning fallacy" further
document how desirability leads people to underestimate the time and
costs required for completing projects, especially when these projects

1 10. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports Fans, 2
Soc. BEHAV. 231 (1987) [hereinafter Babad, Objectivity Among Sports Fans]; Babad &
Katz, Against All Odds, supra note 104, at 1923-24, 1929-32 (finding that high incentives for
accuracy do not eliminate fans' bias).
11 1. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits,
13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1 (2000). Special thanks to Paul Slovic for directing my
attention to the relevance of the affect heuristic research for the present analysis.
112. See, e.g., id. at 3.
113. See id. at 3-4 (reviewing studies showing this effect and discussing the objective re
lationship between risk and benefit).
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are complex and protracted,114 as in the case of entry. In addition to
countless real-world examples of this fallacy,115 a series of recent stud
ies highlights the prevalence of optimistic predictions of task comple
tion times.116 Participants in these studies exhibited the planning fal
lacy when predicting the completion of a significant and somewhat
novel academic task,117 in familiar everyday activities,118 and in the fa
miliar (though infrequent) annual task of completing tax forms.119

1 14. See Roger Buehler et al., E:cploring the "Planning Fallacy": Why People Underes
timate Their Task Completion Times, 67 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 366 (1994)
(hereinafter Buehler et al., The Planning Fallacy); Roger Buehler et al., The Role of Moti·
vated Reasoning in Optimistic Time Predictions, 23 PERSONALITY& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
238 (1997) [hereinafter Buehler et al., Optimistic Time Predictions); Ian R. Newby-Clark et
al., People Focus on Optimistic Scenarios and Disregard Pessimistic Scenarios While Pre·
dieting Task Completion Times, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED. 171 (2000). As
Kahneman and Tversky note:
The context of planning provides many examples in which the distribution of outcomes in
past experience is ignored. Scientists and writers. for example, are notoriously prone to un
derestimate the time required to complete a project, even when they have considerable ex
perience of past failures to live up to planned schedules. A similar bias has been documented
in engineers' estimates of the completion time for repairs of power stations. Although this
planning fallacy is sometimes attributable to motivational factors such as wishful thinking, it
frequently occurs even when underestimation of duration or cost is actually penalized.
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Intuitive Prediction: Biases and Corrective Procedures
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 414, 415 (Daniel Kahneman
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction] (citation omitted).
1 15. See Buehler et al., The Planning Fallacy, supra note 1 14, at 366 (reviewing such
evidence). Other striking and oft-cited examples appear in Rand's large-scale Pioneer Plants
Study, conducted for the U.S. Department of Energy. The study reviewed "what was known
about the problem of poor cost estimation and performance for advanced technologies in
particular and very large projects in general" and concluded: "Severe underestimation of
capital costs in the norm for all advanced technologies; the underestimation for energy proc
ess technologies mirrored that seen in major weapon systems acquisition, very large ad
vanced construction projects, and major public works activities." EDWARD W. MERROW ET
AL., RAND, UNDERSTANDING COST GROWTH AND PERFORMANCE SHORTFALLS IN
PIONEER PROCESS PLANTS 2 (1981). In their own data, based on a large sample of plants,
the authors of this study found, moreover, that the earliest estimates made for the plants
"averaged less than one-half of actual costs. And many of the early estimates . . . reflected
little more than one-third of what the plants actually cost to design and construct . . . " Id. at
38.
116. For a brief review of some earlier studies documenting the planning fallacy in labo
ratory settings, see Buehler et al., The Planning Fallacy, supra note 1 14, at 367.
117. Only 10.8% of the subjects finished their tasks by the time they indicated it would
take them if "everything went as well as it possibly could," and fewer than half of them fin
ished by the time they indicated the task would take them if "everything went as poorly is it
possibly could." Id. at 369 (Study 1).
1 18. These tasks included school assignments and various tasks around the home. Id. at
370-71 (Study 2), 372 (Study 3), 374-75 (Study 4); see also Newby-Clark et al., supra note
114, at 174, 175, 177, and 178 (reporting Experiments 1-4 showing, inter alia, a main effect
for bias in final predictions).
119. Buehler et al., Optimistic Time Predictions, supra note 114, at 241.
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The Illusion of Control

Individuals often deem themselves able to control chance occur
rences and risky eventualities, especially when final outcomes depend
on a mixture of skill and chance, exhibiting the illusion of control.120
This illusion stems from people's inability to distinguish between
"skill" and "chance" situations and their more general desire to be
lieve they can control the world around them. It leads to inflated ex
pectations of personal success in tasks whose outcomes depend, in part
or in whole, upon chance factors.121
Studies show that decisionmakers often behave in chance situa
tions as if skilled behavior could influence outcomes; consequently,
the same factors that people associate with success in skill-dependent
tasks affect their expectations regarding the outcomes of pure chance
events, such as lotteries and gambles.122 They think they are more
likely to win, for example, when they can choose among options; when
they are more familiar or skilled with either the stimulus (e.g., the par
ticular lottery ticket) or the necessary response; when they are actively
(versus passively) involved in the task; and, importantly, when compe
tition is present.123
In addition to its direct effect on judgments, the illusion of control
also facilitates124 both optimistic bias125 and the desirability bias,126 fur-

120. See Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
311 (1975) (citing earlier studies); see also Budescu & Bruderman, supra note 104, at 110
(citing additional studies).
121. Budescu & Bruderman, supra note 104, at 109-10; Langer, supra note 120, at 313.
122. Wh_ile the illusion of control operates even in pure chance environments, it is
clearly more pernicious in real-world settings, where outcomes depend on a mix of skill and
chance factors, and where the respective contribution of skill and chance to final outcomes
cannot be determined with certainty. As Langer noted, "there is an element of chance in
every skill situation and an element of skill in almost every chance situation." Langer, supra
note 120, at 324.
123. Id. at 315 (Experiment l, competition); id. at 316-17 (Experiment 2, choice); id. at
318 (Experiment 3, stimulus familiarity); id. at 319-20 (Experiment 4, response familiarity),
id. at 320-22 (Experiments 5-6, type of involvement). Thus, for example, participants wa
gered more money in competitive situations when they perceive their opponent as less
skilled, even when the outcome of the bet was completely determined by chance, id. at
313-15, and placed a higher value on lottery tickets they choose for themselves than those
chosen for them. Id. at 315-1 7; see also Budescu & Bruderman, supra note 104, at 109-10,
114-15 (illusion of control results in experiment 1).
124. Some studies even purport to show that optimistic bias is completely dependent on
perceptions of control. See, e.g., Frank P. McKenna, It Won't Happen to Me: Unrealistic Op
timism or Illusion of Control?, 84 BRIT. J. PSYCHOL. 39 (1993) (reporting studies showing
optimistic overconfidence regarding risk of accidents for drivers but not for passengers, who
realize that their driving skill would have no impact on the outcome of accidents). Many
studies, however, provide evidence that overoptimism exists regardless of perceived control.
See, e.g., Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism, supra note 91; Weinstein & Klein, Present and
Future, supra note 91 .
125. See Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism, supra note 91, at 808:
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ther increasing individuals' willingness to engage in risk-taking be
haviors under the erroneous belief that that they can control the
risk.127 This effect appears to be especially pervasive in business con
texts: managers do not consider themselves risk takers but rather "risk
controllers," sophisticated actors who only take calculated, controlled
risks; they think that "managerial risk taking is an endeavor in which a
manager can use his judgment, exert control, and utilize skills. "128
Entrants, like other business decisionmakers, are especially prone
to exhibit the illusion of control, often perceiving the risks associated
with their new ventures as significant but largely controllable.129 The
The greater the perceived controllability of a negative event, the greater the tendency for
people to believe that their own chances are less than average; the greater the perceived con
trollability of a positive event, the greater the tendency for people to believe that their own
chances are greater than average.
Thus, typical expressions of optimistic bias appear in areas such as health, crime, and ac
cidents, where the outcome is often dependent to some extent on the people's actions or
psychological attributes, see, e.g, supra notes 91-92 (citing studies), while in other studies par
ticipants show a strong illusion of control as one component of their optimistic bias, even
regarding events that are objectively completely out of their control. See, e.g., Shelley E.
Taylor et al., Beliefs About Control, and Adjustment to Breast Cancer, 46 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 489 (1984) (finding breast cancer patients asserting they have a high degree
of personal control over the cancer though there is little scientific evidence of such control,
with many exhibiting overoptimistic assessments of their survival likelihood despite medical
records to the contrary); see also Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?: The Rela
tionship Between Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias, 15 J. Soc. & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 9, 24-25 (1996) (reviewing the findings on the relationship between the two phe
nomena, finding strong evidence for its existence in predictions of positive events and
weaker evidence for its existence in predictions of negative ones).

126. Much like optimistic bias, the desirability bias has been shown to exist independ
ently of control perceptions, although the two phenomena often coexist. See Budescu &
Bruderman, supra note 104 (reviewing previous studies and providing further evidence on
this relationship).
127. This is true even for behavior with life and death consequences. One study reports,
for example, that only few of those gay men who engage in high-risk sexual behavior admit
it, justifying their beliefs and attendant behavior by some objectively ineffective precautions
they take. Laurie J. Bauman & Karolynn Siegel, Misperception Among Gay Men ofthe Risk
for AIDS Associated with Their Sexual Behavior, 17 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 329 (1987).
128. ZUR SHAPIRA, RISK TAKING: A MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE 46-49 (1995) (man
agers' emphasis on control and skills). Reporting the findings of this in-depth study of mana
gerial perspectives on risk using a sample of over 700 managers, Shapira notes:
The managers . . . . believed that risk was manageable. Seventy-three percent of the respon
dents saw risk as controllable. As a result, they made a sharp distinction between gambling
(where the odds are exogenously determined and uncontrollable) and risk taking (where
skill or information can reduce the uncertainty). The situations they faced seemed to them to
involve risk taking but not gambling.

Id.

at 73 (also citing earlier studies reporting managers' perceptions of their ability to control
risks).

129. Unsurprisingly, an experimental study that presented MBA students with a de
tailed case involving a possible venture found participants to exhibit a significant illusion of
control that was further found to affect their decision to start a venture both directly and by
decreasing the risk they perceived the venture to entail. Mark Simon et al., Cognitive Biases,
Risk Perception, and Venture Formation: How Individuals Decide to Start Companies, 15 J.
Bus. VENTURING 113 (1999).
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factors that facilitate the illusion of control are typically found in entry
decisionmaking, where entrants choose their ventures and strategies,
often consider themselves familiar with both the task and the neces
sary behaviors (regardless of the accuracy of such perceptions), are
most actively involved in the venture, and make judgments in highly
competitive settings.
The illusion of control enhances the already significant effects of
overoptimism and the desirability biases in causing entrants to under
estimate the risks associated with entry. Often, this illusion will not
only bias entrants' probability estimates, but also indirectly inflate
their predictions of the venture's value, which they will not reduce
enough to account for the true risk associated with their ventures.
B.

Solving the Second Puzzle: The Side Effects of Entrants'
Overoptimism

The analysis of the processes of overconfidence resolved the first
puzzle of entry, showing the various biases likely to make many en
trants overoptimistic in their judgments of the attractiveness of entry.
These phenomena also shed light on the puzzling insensitivity of en
trants to many of those market characteristics that affect their pros
pects.
Significantly, this framework explains why entrants are somewhat
better in responding to the past profitability of industry and even to
growth trends, while otherwise appearing less rational. Profitability
and growth are frequently the focus of entrants' attention, the very
factors that lead many of them to embark on new ventures. Although
entrants will not analyze these factors perfectly, given their bounded
rationality, entrants will nevertheless focus much attention on them.
Entrants are likely to ignore other background variables, however, es
pecially if these variables do not affect entrants' ability to embark on a
new venture but "only" the venture's prospects. The analysis of such
variables, if done at all, would therefore be more likely to fall prey to
the processes of overconfidence, leading entrants to exhibit a relative
insensitivity to their presence.

1.

Optimistic Bias

The entry games of Camerer and Lovallo have shown that optimis
tic bias inflates experimental entrants' perceptions of their prospects,
also leading them to ignore the anticipated intensity of competitionY0
The behavioral findings on optimistic bias do not explain, however,
1 30. Recall that the participants in these studies showed the greatest degree of excess
entry when competing with others who similarly self-selected to enter skill-based competi
tion. Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10, at 311-12.
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why entrants are largely insensitive to those market factors that affect
their prospects but have only little to do with their knowledge or skill.

2.

Desirability Biases

Desirability biases, unlike optimistic bias, generate overconfidence
in predictions of events that entrants clearly cannot influence. An en
trant predicting, for example, the direction and extent of future profit
ability growth in a particular industry will tend to align expectations
with preferences, arriving at overly positive estimates of future
trends.131 Such biased projections may not be wholly unrelated to the
objective evidence, but are nevertheless likely to be quite insensitive
to variations in the data.
Some of the factors affecting entrants' prospects do not require en
trants to make any significant projections, however. Evidence on entry
barriers, for example, need only be rationally incorporated into de
terminations of a venture's attractiveness. When present in a particu
lar industry, barriers such as capital intensity or sunk costs do not dis
appear rapidly. Entrants suffering from the desirability bias alone
would thus be less likely to exhibit the insensitivity, revealed by the
evidence of the second puzzle, to such market characteristics whose
presence and impact on the prospects of entry involve little uncer
tainty.132
The bias of these entrants is better explained, however, by other
desirability-related phenomena. First, recent studies of the affect heu
ristic have shown that when the consequences of an event carry a
sharp affective meaning, variations in the probability of these conse
quences do not impact people's judgments. In the extreme cases of
winning a large lottery or becoming ill with cancer, for example, indi
viduals' images and feelings change little whether the probability is
one in ten million or one in ten thousand, although the objective dif
ference between these two eventualities is thousand-fold. Because
these images and feelings are responsible for the impact of the affect
heuristic on judgments, biased evaluations of different probabilistic
outcomes vary far less than rational decisionmaking requires.133 One
study even found that when the potential outcome of a gamble is emo
tionally powerful, judgments of its attractiveness or unattractiveness
131. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 108.
132. Strictly speaking, of course, any judgment of entry involves "projections" in the
minimal sense of anticipating the continued existence of market characteristics or estimating
the impact of these factors on the particular venture.
133. George Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings (unpublished paper), cited in Slovic et
al., supra note 111, at 20; cf Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes
on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998) (finding that while
moral judgments are widely shared, people have a great deal of difficulty in translating such
judgments onto a scale of dollars).
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had only a very limited impact on changes in probability as dramatic
as the change from 0.99 to 0.01 !134
Second, while the planning fallacy results from a combination of
cognitive and motivational factors,135 one of the most important of
these factors, the "inside view," is especially likely to make entrants
insensitive to background market predictors. The inside view, also
known as the "internal approach" to prediction, is very common in
managerial and business decisionmaking.136 This approach produces
underestimation of time to completion and the risk of failure, because
it does not adequately represent the combinatorial effect of all those
things that can go wrong, and directs the decisionmakers' attention in
stead to their positive plans regarding the implementation of the
task.137
When using an internal approach to prediction, people focus "on
the constituents of the specific problem rather than on the distribution
of outcomes in similar cases."138 The inside view contributes to en
trants' insensitivity, in addition to increasing their overconfidence, by
leading them to focus on their plans and disregard distributional
data.139 Because those market characteristics affecting entrants' pros
pects are inevitably "distributional data" that provide general infor
mation affecting all potential entrants, the inside view leads entrants
to be largely insensitive to this important statistical base-rate inforrna
tion.140
134. Yuval Rottenstriech & Chris K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, Electric Shocks: On the Af
fective Psychology of Probability Weighting (unpublished paper), cited in INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 20 (Tom Gilovich et al. eds., forthcoming) (on file
with author).These findings are especially striking because the opposite effect - an under
weighting of outcomes and an excessive reliance on probabilistic information - usually ob
tains when outcomes are affectively vague. See, e.g., Slovic et al., supra note 111, at 17-19
(discussing the findings on the latter effect).
135. See Buehler et al., Optimistic Time Predictions, supra note 114, at 239-40, 245-46;
Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 1 14.
136. Daniel Kahneman & Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive
Perspective on Risk Taking, 39 MGMT. SCI. 17, 25-26 (1993); Kahneman & Tvesky, Intuitive
Prediction, supra note 114, at 414.
137. See Maya Bar-Hillel, On the Subjective Probability of Compound Events, 9
ORGANIZATJONAL BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 396 (1973) (finding that people consis
tently exaggerate the probability of the conjunction of a series of likely events); Kahneman
& Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 114, at 415 (also adding that because the combi
natorial consideration is not adequately represented in people's intuitions, "[a)ttempts to
combat this error by adding a slippage factor are rarely adequate, since the adjusted value
tends to remain too close to the initial value that acts as an anchor") (citation omitted).
138. Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 114, at 415.
139. See Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 136, at 26; Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive
Prediction, supra note 1 14, at 415.
140. The impact of the inside view is likely to be further reinforced by the general ten
dency of decisionmakers to overweight vivid anecdotal evidence and underweight pallid
base rates.See, e.g. , Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
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The Illusion of Control

The illusion of control diminishes managers' sensitivity to prob
ability estimates, leading them to give more weight to the anticipated
value of the "downside" risk of a venture than to the probability that
this risk would materialize.141 Of course, these managers are not com
pletely insensitive to risk. When they find a venture too risky or when
they think that they cannot manage the risks associated with the ven
ture effectively, they are likely to refrain from embarking on it.142
When a given alternative promises good enough returns but poses an
unacceptable danger, however, they will seek additional information
or a different perspective on the problem in an attempt to revise their
probability estimates and make the venture acceptable.143
The illusion of control therefore contributes to entrants' relative
insensitivity to objective predictors of success. Any barrier or impedi
ment reflected in market statistics is considered a mere obstacle to be
conquered. Once conquered - in the entrant's mind - the barrier is
irrelevant for the prospects of the future venture and entrants will
therefore be prone to disregard it when judging the venture's attrac
tiveness.144

4.

Underestimating the Importance of Indirect Effects in
Competitive Settings

Another phenomenon that is especially likely to lead entrants to
insensitivity toward market predictors is the tendency to underesti
mate indirect effects. Many decision errors people make in competi
tive settings result from this fundamental cognitive characteristic of
human decisionmaking.145 Indirect effects are those factors other than

eds., 1982) (providing a brief summary and further references to studies showing various
sources of this tendency, including the representativeness and availability heuristics).
141. SHAPIRA, supra note 128, at 43-53; see also James G. March & Zur Shapira, Mana
gerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk-Taking, 33 MGMT. SCI. 1404, 1411-12 (1987) (describing
and discussing reasons for managerial insensitivity to probability in risk estimates).
142. Cf. SHAPIRA, supra note 128, at 74-78.
143. In doing so, the managers exhibited not only the illusion of control, but also desir
ability biases, adjusting their estimates to fit their preferences and aspirations. These manag
ers also showed additional optimistic bias, thinking that they could perform better than ex
pected even after making upward revisions of their estimates. Id.
144. Cf. Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to Explain Entrepre
neurial Risk-Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 425 (1995)
(finding, in an experimental study comparing entrepreneurs to non-entrepreneurs, that the
former consistently frame ambiguous business prospects more positively, viewing a fictitious
retailing company described in various scenarios as having more strengths and opportunities,
fewer weaknesses and threats, and a greater future potential).
145. See Avishalom Tor & Max H. Bazerman, Understanding Indirect Effects in Com
petitive Environments: Explaining Decision Errors in the Monty Hall Game, the Acquiring a
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the decision-maker's own behavior that affect the consequences of the
decision-maker's decisions.146 These indirect effects include back
ground variables, such as market conditions and the decisions that
other market participants make, both of which statistically determine
the outcomes of the game but do not impact the actor's ability to take
any particular course of action initially.
Until recently, studies have mainly explored how market actors'
failure to consider the decisions made by others in the market gener
ate common decision errors.147 A recent comprehensive study shows
that common failures in three seemingly unrelated decision problems
all result from the difficulty people experience in properly addressing
indirect effects in decisionmaking.148 Strikingly, in each of the tested
problems, individuals frequently made the wrong decision, although
the problems required no complex reasoning.149
In one famous problem, decisionmakers in a takeover game sys
tematically made negative expected value offers for a target firm.150
The problem describes the Target and requires the decisionmaker to
determine whether another company, the Acquirer, should make a
tender offer for the target's shares; it then states that the Target is
worth 50% more under the Acquirer than under its present manage
ment, and that the value of the Target ranges between $0-$100 per
share, all values being equally likely, with the ultimate value of the
Target depending on the yet unknown outcomes of an oil drill. The
problem also explains, however, that the Acquirer must make its offer
now, without knowing the ultimate value of the Target, while the
Target - who wishes to be acquired by the Acquirer but will only
agree to a profitable offer - will make the decision of whether to ac
cept the offer only after it finds out the outcomes of its oil drill.151

Company Problem, and Multi-party Ultimatums (May 2002) (manuscript under review, on
file with author).
146. Id. (manuscript at 3).
147. See, e.g., John S. Carroll et al., Negotiator Cognitions: A Descriptive Approach to

Negotiators' Understanding of their Opponents, 41 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM .
DECISION PROCESSES 352 (1988) (using protocol analysis to show how participants' failure

in a well-known decision problem is related to their tendency to ignore the cognitions of
others); see also Tor & Bazerman, supra note 145 (manuscript at 5) (listing various studies
whose findings can be explained, at least in part, by the indirect effects framework).
148. Most studies documenting such decision failures do not use the indirect effects
framework that was only recently developed by Tor & Bazerman, supra note 145.
149. Id. (manuscript at 5-11) (detailing the three problems tested in this study, some of
them in more than one version).
150. This problem was originally developed by William F. Samuelson & Max H. Bazer
man, The Winner's Curse in Bilateral Negotiations, in 3 RESEARCH IN EXPERIMENTAL
ECONOMICS 105 (Vernon L. Smith ed., 1985).
151. See Tor & Bazerman, supra note 145 (manuscript at 7-8) (providing the full text of
the problem in Appendix A).
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Most subjects make offers in the range between $50-$75, the cur
rent expected values of the Target under present management and the
Acquirer, respectively.152 The correct answer, however, is making no
offer at all, because all offers have a negative expected value. The rea
son for this is simple: if the Target accepts the offer, knowing the out
comes of the oil drill, the true value under current management must
be less than the offer. Since all values are equally likely, the expected
value of an accepted offer is 1h of the offer price (e.g., the expected
value of a $60 offer is $30). At the same time, the Target is worth 50%
more under the Acquirer, resulting in an expected value of exactly %
of any given offer (i.e., $45 for a $60 offer). Hence, at any offer price,
the expected value of acquiring the Target is negative for the
Acquirer.153
Using the process-tracing method of protocol analysis,154 the study
found that participants fail to recognize the simple trap in the prob
lem. They reason correctly that the Target is always worth more under
the Acquirer but fail to recognize the informational asymmetry be
tween the parties, wherein the Target makes its decision to accept only
after the outcomes of the oil drill are known but the Acquirer must
make its offer before these outcomes are known. Moreover, even
those few subjects who recognize the asymmetry usually fail to draw
the normative conclusion - that .they should make no offer at all.155
Numerous studies show the robustness of the decision errors that
result from the difficulty of incorporating even simple indirect effects
into competitive decisions. Replications of the Acquiring a Company
problem, for example, produced similar results with sophisticated par
ticipants including accounting firm partners, CEOs, investment bank
ers, and many other skilled decisionmakers.156 Moreover, participants
who were paid based on performance and given multiple trials to fos
ter learning continued to make similar errors.157

152. See id. (manuscript at 8) (citing various studies).
153. See also id. (manuscript at 8-9).
154. Protocol analysis allows experimenters to test participants' conscious thought proc
esses by coding their verbalizations while solving experimental problems based on a pre
existing coding scheme, and then conducting statistical analyses of these codes. For a good
introduction to and description of this method, see K. ANDERS ERICSSON & HERBERT A.
SIMON, PROTOCOL ANALYSIS: VERBAL REPORTS AS DATA (rev. ed. 1993); Ola Svenson,
Eliciting and Analyzing Verbal Protocols in Process Studies of Judgment and Decision mak
ing, in PROCESS AND STRUCTURE IN HUMAN DECISION MAKING 65 (Henry Montgomery &
Ola Svenson eds., 1989).
155. Tor & Bazerman, supra note 145 (manuscript at 18-27).
156. See BAZERMAN, supra note 99, at 145-49.
157. See generally Sheryl B. Ball et al., An Evaluation of Learning in the Bilateral Win
ner's Curse, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1 {1991); Brit
Grosskopf & Yoela Bereby-Meyer, Leaming to Avoid the Winner's Curse (manuscript in
preparation, Harvard Business School) (on file with author).
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The common difficulty decisionmakers have in integrating indirect
effects therefore provides a cognitive explanation for the overconfi
dence of entrants, who inevitably give greater weight to their plans
than to other important factors such as the behavior of potential com
petitors.158 Even more significantly, entrants' difficulty in incorporat
ing indirect effects into their judgments also explains why they appear
insensitive to many market characteristics objectively found to affect
their ultimate survival prospects.
C. Solving the Third Puzzle: All Entry is Not the Same
The behavioral framework has offered a solution to the first two
puzzles of entry, suggesting that both phenomena may result from the
processes of overconfidence; it also provides, however, a novel solu
tion to the third puzzle of entry. Although the psychological literature
has yet to direct significant attention to the variables that facilitate and
inhibit overconfidence, a close study of these variables suggests that
startups are likely to exhibit a greater bias than their diversifying com
petitors. The enhanced bias of startups explains both their extremely
high rate of entry and their otherwise puzzling inferior performance.
In providing this new solution to the third puzzle, the behavioral ap
proach also reveals how the various perplexing findings on entry all
reflect closely related aspects of entrant overconfidence.
The most important variables moderating entrant overconfidence
are the intensity of the entrant's preferences (i.e., how desirable he
finds the potential venture) and the ambiguity surrounding those
judgments entrants must make when determining the attractiveness of
entry.

1.

The Intensity of Preferences

a. The Moderating Effects of Preference Intensity. One would ex
pect individuals with a greater stake in the subject of their predictions
to exhibit a greater degree of optimistic and desirability biases. There
is some evidence that overoptimism is more pronounced for events as
sociated with greater affect for the predictors,159 and the magnitude of
various desirability biases is clearly and strongly related to their de
gree of desirability.160
158. In fact, Tor & Bazerman, supra note 145 (manuscript at 5), already suggest this
phenomenon may explain, at least in part, the findings of Camerer & Lovallo, supra note 10.
159. See, e.g., Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism, supra note 91, at 807, 810-13 (demon
strating that strength of preference affects extent of bias for positive events).
160. As McGregor already noted in his early work that predates the modem findings on
the desirability bias:
The influence of (preferences] on prediction will undoubtedly vary with the importance for
the predictor of the predicted event. If his own welfare, or pride, or ethical ideals are in-
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Predictions of natural occurrences, including world events,161 elec
tion outcomes,162 and the outcomes of sport matches163 show, unsur
prisingly, that the desirability bias depends on the strength of the pre
dictors' preference for a particular outcome. The effects of strong
preexisting preferences are practically unchanged, moreover, when
decisionmakers are given monetary incentives for correct predic
tions.164 In fact, a strong bias remains even when predictions are made
solely for the purpose of profit-making that is totally dependent on the
accuracy of these predictions.165
The intensity of preference also affects the degree of bias in predic
tions of otherwise neutral events, such as the drawing of a particular
card from a deck. Many early studies have shown that one can en
hance desirability effects by providing increasing levels of rewards for
successful prediction.166 Recent studies similarly show that incentives
volved, we may expect the intensity of his wishes concerning the outcome of the situation to
be greater than when the situation and its outcome are relatively remote from his personal
life.
McGregor, supra note 104, at 189-90 (citation omitted).
161. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 104, at 183 tbl.1 (predicting if and how likely the
King of England is to announce his marriage before a certain date in 1937).
162 See Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking Among Voters: Motivational and Cognitive In
fluences, 9 INT'L. J. PUB. OPINION RES. 105, 120 (1997) (hereinafter Babad, Voters] (finding
a strong desirability bias in voters' predictions of mayoral elections, with the extent of bias
being a linear function of the intensity of preference); ·Granberg & Brent, supra note 109, at
480-81 (reporting that the correlation between preference and expectation increases some
what with political interest, concern about the outcomes of the election, and political party
affiliation); id. at 482 (reporting additional data on how the tendency to predict one's candi
date as the winner increases as a function of how favorable one's attitude is toward the can
didate); McGregor, supra note 104, at 191 tbl.5 (showing a monotonic increase across five
levels of preference among voters' predictions).
163. See Babad & Katz, Against All Odds, supra note 104, at 1929-32 (showing that fans'
bias is a function of their level of team support).
. 164. E.g., Babad, Voters, supra note 162, at 116 (finding that monetary rewards for accu
rate predictions have a significant effect, but of a very small magnitude as compared to the
remaining bias).
165. Thus, one study of sports fans' desirability bias examined whether fans exhibited
the bias when making anonymous predictions of game outcomes in pre-game betting sta
tions. These fans were filling betting forms, betting on the outcomes of fourteen games that
were to take place the f ollowing day, obviously aiming to make profits. While accurate pre
dictions are always important for winning bets, moreover, this particular form of betting
provided little reward for bettors predicting correctly thirteen of fourteen game outcomes,
but guaranteed enormous prizes for those making f ourteen correct predictions. Babad &
Katz, Against All Odds, supra note 104, at 1924-26. Nevertheless, bettors still exhibited a
strong bias in favor of "their" teams when betting, and even those who did not consider
themselves "fans" still showed a significant bias in favor of their "preferred" teams, albeit
weaker than the bias exhibited by "true" f ans. Id. at 1931-32.
166. See, e.g., Francis W. Irwin, Stated Expectations as Functions of Probability and De
sirability of Outcomes, 21 J. PERSON. 329 (1953); Francis W. Irwin & Cynthia N. Graae, Tests
of the Discontinuity Hypothesis on the Effects of Independent Outcome Values upon Bets, 76
J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYCHOL. 444 (1968); Francis W. Irwin & Joan Gay Snodgrass, Effects of
Independent and Dependent Outcome Values upon Bets, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 282
(1966); see also Rose W. Marks, The Effect of Probability, Desirability, and "Privilege" on
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for early task completion exacerbate the desirability-related planning
fallacy, making time-to-completion predictions more overoptimistic.167
Experiments studying the affect heuristic reinforce the picture
emerging from research on other desirability-related biases, finding
the extent of this bias positively correlated with the strength of the
positive or negative affect associated with the evaluated activity.168
b. The Enhanced Preference Intensity of Startup Entrants. The be
havioral evidence confirms that those entrants for whom the potential
venture is more important - financially, emotionally, or otherwise will also tend to be more biased, exhibiting more optimistic overconfi
dence and, especially, stronger desirability biases. Startup entrants,
however, will often harbor a greater intensity of preference for em
barking on a particular entry venture than diversifying entrants.
Startup entrepreneurs tend to be more involved in their ventures.
They commonly have greater emotional and personal interest in the
specific idea of the particular venture, often seeking to fulfill a dream
or introduce an innovation to the market.169 They may consult oth
ers,170 but will ultimately be the ones developing the new idea into a
startup venture and managing it, at least in its early stages. In addition,
startup decisionmakers are also likely to invest more of their own pri
vate resources in the particular venture than decisionmakers at diver
sifying entrants.171 As a result, both the fa ilure of the particular ven
ture and its success will often be of greater personal economic
consequence for the former.172
the Stated Expectations of Children, 19 J. PERSON. 332 (1951) (showing value bias in chil
dren's estimates of the probability of drawing a picture card).
167. Stephanie J. Byram, Cognitive and Motivational Factors Influencing Time Predic
tion, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APP. 216, 233 (Experiment 5) (1997) (reporting that
financial incentives for speed of performance exacerbate the bias, with participants making
shorter time predictions but performing that task no more quickly); see also Buehler et al.,
Optimistic Time Predictions, supra note 1 14, at 241 (finding that hopes of income tax refund
increase bias in time predictions of tax forms completion); id. at 243 (finding that rewards for
speed increase bias, although the provision of incentives for accuracy alone decreases it).
168. See, e.g., Ali Siddiq Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the Inverse
Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK ANALYSIS 1085, 1094-95
(1994); see also Finucane et al., supra note 111, at 9-13 (study 2: manipulating affect by pro
viding risk and benefit information).
169. See, e.g., Joshua Ronen, Some Insights into the Entrepreneurial Process, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 137, 140-41 (Joshua Ronen ed., 1983) (discussing the objectives of en
trepreneurs).
170. Although, strikingly enough, Kaish & Gilad report that those entrepreneurs who
perceived themselves as successful have showed a tendency to minimize their use of infor
mation from any external source. Stanley Kaish & Benjamin Gilad, Characteristics of Op
portunities Search of Entrepreneurs Versus Executives: Sources, Interests, General Altertness,
6 J. Bus. VENTURING 45, 49-50 (1991).
171. See, e.g., Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances, supra note 22, at 102.
172. Also, diversifying entrants, as the empirical evidence in Part I shows, are typically
larger firms. These tend to be managed professionally, by decisionmakers other than the
firms' owners.
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For diversifying managers, on the other· hand; any new venture
may be only one of several ventures and will likely be only one of their
many managerial responsibilities in the diversifying firm; ultimately,
therefore, they will not find most ventures as uniquely desirable as do
startup entrants.173 Moreover, when considering the prospects of a po
tential venture, diversifying managers will typically examine the char
acteristics of the specific venture and then seek the appropriate man
agement for it; they will look within or outside the diversifying firm,
but will almost never expect to run the future venture themselves.
Consequently, they will not have to consider their own managerial
qualities when judging the venture's prospects, thereby decreasing the
potential effects of optimistic bias.174
While diversifying managers still face significant organizational
and reputational consequences in the case of failure175 and therefore
have much at stake as well, the literature suggests that such factors
make corporate decisionmakers more timid in their actual choices.
Even if they maintain bold forecasts,176 in this case, the managers' ti
midity will decrease the effects of their overconfident predictions, fur
ther distinguishing them from startup entrants.177
173. Managers in diversifying firms often examine or even embark on a "portfolio" of
ventures, consequently having less at stake in any given one of these ventures. Cf
CHRISTOPHER FREEMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL lNNOVATION 156 (2d ed. 1982)
(suggesting that the high degree of uncertainty associated with innovation is likely to be ac
ceptable for large firms who can afford to use a "portfolio" approach, offsetting a very few
uncertain investments against a large number of low risk projects); Richard E. Caves &
Michael E. Porter, Barriers to Exit, in ESSAYS ON INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION IN HONOR
OF JOE S. BAIN 43 (Robert T. Masson & P. David Qualls eds., 1976) (arguing that the top
management of diversifying firms is well situated to make dispassionate decisions regarding
the necessity of exit).
174. See, e.g., Nicholas Epley & David Dunning, Feeling "Holier than Thou ": Are Self
Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social Prediction, 79 J. PERSON. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 861, 871-72 (2000) (finding that participants were more likely to overestimate the
likelihood they will act in generous or selfless ways, whereas their predictions of others' be
havior were considerably more accurate, and presenting evidence that this divergence arises,
in part, because people are unwilling to consult population base rates when predicting their
own behavior but use this diagnostic information more readily when predicting the behavior
of others). Of course, the venture decisions of diversifying managers' implicate their self
perception to some degree, since they are significant managerial actions. If the venture ulti
mately fails, the manager responsible for attempting it will be associated with the failure in
asmuch as either his decision to enter or his choice of management for the venture are
proven wrong.
175. There is, for example, some evidence that mature managers (i.e., older and more
senior in the organization), and those belonging to larger organizations tend to be more
averse to risks.See Kenneth R. MacCrimmon & Donald A. Wehrung, Characteristics of Risk
Taking Executives, 36 MGMT. SCI. 422, 425-32 (1990) (studying more than 500 top-level ex
ecutives testing the relationship between personal, financial, and professional characteristics
and measures of risk taking).
176. See, e.g., Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 136.
177. See, e.g., Kahneman & Lovallo, supra note 136. Managers may also be more averse
to taking the risk of a new venture because the negative consequences they must face in case
of failure are far greater than those awaiting them in case of missing a profitable opportu-
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Last, because diversifying managers are situated within established
organizations, their concern about organizational consequences would
combine with the structured environment in which they operate,
leading them to engage in a more formal decisionmaking process.178
And while such a process would be prone to bias as well, it could di
rect greater attention to relevant economic information than is the
case for startups, which operate in. a more unstructured environ
ment.119
It therefore appears that startups are highly likely to exhibit a
more extreme bias, overestimating the value of entry and the likeli
hood of success and underestimating the risks, time, and costs associ
ated with entry more than their diversifying competitors.180

2.

Judgmental Ambiguity

Much like the intensity of preference, the amount and type of in
formation available to entrants and the resulting level of ambiguity
they face when making their judgments regarding the attractiveness of
entry is another variable that moderates the processes of overconfi
dence.
a. Differentiating Ambiguity from Lack of Information. If all rele
vant information were known with certainty, there would be no bias;
entrants would simply know the fate of their ventures and would only
enter upon knowing they will succeed. In reality, there is no certainty
as to the future of the venture and all predictions and judgments are
nity, which is also much harder to identify. See, e.g., Raghu Garud et al., Technological
Choices and the Inevitability of Errors, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, supra note 9, at
20, 23-27, 32-34 (showing also how these two decision errors relate to and affect one an
other).
178. See, e.g., Ken G. Smith et al., Decision Making Behavior in Smaller Entrepreneurial
and Larger Professionally Managed Firms, 3 J. Bus. VENTUR. 223 (1988) (reviewing studies
suggesting managers are more likely to follow rational, formal decision processes than en
trepreneurs, corroborating these conclusions with a field study, and finding a correlation be
tween decision process and organizational performance).
179. Thus, one of the frequently suggested methods in the managerial and decision
making literatures for battling the effects of biases is to engage in a more formal and struc
tured judgmental process, resembling more of an "outside" rather than an "inside" view.
See, e.g., BAZERMAN, supra note 99, at 157-64 (suggesting a number of methods to debias
managerial judgment); Kahneman & Tversky, Intuitive Prediction, supra note 114, at 417-21
(describing a corrective procedure for prediction); see also Epley & Dunning, supra note
174, at 872 (finding that people predict others' behavior better than they predict their own
behavior in part because they use diagnostic information more readily when predicting the
behavior of others).
180. There is also some evidence that decisionmakers interacting with others or making
a decision together often provide more accurate responses. E.g., Carl Martin Allwood & Par
Anders Granhag, Realism in Confidence Judgments as a Function of Working in Dyads or
Alone, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. Dec. PROC. 277, 277-79, 286-88 (1996) (reporting better
performance of pairs as compared to individual subjects).If this were true, diversifying man
agers would probably enjoy an additional advantage over startups.
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probabilistic. The degree of uncertainty, however, will vary among
ventures and entrants. It is therefore plausible that those entrants
whose prospects are more uncertain will also be more biased.181
Importantly, however, an increase in the amount of information
alone may not decrease entrants' bias, as the psychological literature
clearly shows that additional information rarely changes people's pre
existing attitudes.182 To the extent entrants' preferences shape their
judgments regarding the attractiveness entry, a mere change in the
amount of information may not exert a significant impact on their
judgments. Nonetheless, the findings we discuss below suggest that
when the decision environment is more ambiguous - a function of the
quality and type of one's knowledge as well the amount of information
- entrants are likely to be more biased. The presence of uncertainty
provides opportunity for bias while the ambiguity of the decision envi
ronment "legitimates" the operation of egocentric, self-serving per
ceptions. A less ambiguous environment, to the contrary, limits the
manifestation of these biases.183
Two recent studies examining the effects of desirability on voters'
predictions of election outcomes provide a clear example of the dis
tinction between the respective roles of information and ambiguity in
the processes of overconfidence. In one study, voters who were better
informed about the outcomes of previous elections exhibited a degree
of bias similar to that exhibited by uninformed voters. These voters'
181. See, e.g., Jovanovic, supra note 66 (offering a model in which learning from post
entry performance reduces uncertainty and improves judgment).
182 See, e.g., Loewenstein et al., supra note 107, at 145-55 (sho\J\'ing how the interpreta
tion of neutral information can be biased even by an ad-hoc designation of participants to
one side in a hypothetical litigation). See generally KUNDA, supra note 88, at 111-160 (dis
cussing general evidence on biased hypothesis testing). Studies show, for example, that the
supply of additional information increases overconfidence in the accuracy of one's judgment
because it tends to increase judgmental confidence much more than it increases accuracy.
See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 29 J. CONSULTING

PSYCHOL. 261 (1965), reprinted in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 287 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (a classic study of this effect in clinical
judgments). But see Dane K. Peterson & Gordon F. Pitz, Effects of Amount of Information
on Predictions of Uncertain Quantities, 61 ACTA PSYCHOLOGJCA 229 (1986) (finding that the
provision of relevant information decreases overconfidence in the accuracy of judgment and
suggesting that this result does not conflict with findings like those of Oskamp who provided
participants with redundant information).

183. See Granberg & Brent, supra note 109, at 479 (concluding, after providing evidence
on the role of ambiguity in the effect of voter preferences on election outcome expectations
that "a certain degree of ambiguity may be necessary for the effect to occur, and a lack of
ambiguity may diminish the effect , . . ); McGregor, supra note 104, at 193-195 (discussing
the effects that the amount of information and its nature have on predictions). More gener
ally, Kunda notes when commenting generally on the processes of motivated reasoning:
"

Motivation can color our judgments, but we are not at liberty to conclude whatever we want
to conclude simply because we want to. Even when we are motivated to arrive at a particular
conclusion, we are also motivated to be rational and to construct a justification for our de
sired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer.

KUNDA, supra note 88, at 224.
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bias was moderated by their intensity of preference alone.184 In an
other study, however, voters who were more familiar with the results
of recent election polls were less biased than voters who were unfa
miliar with or had mistaken recall of these poll outcomes.185
The different kinds of information possessed by the voters explain
the seeming contradiction between these two studies. In the first
study, informed voters had information about past election outcomes
that, although relevant, still left an enormous degree of ambiguity as
to the outcomes of the present elections. Under these circumstances,
the moderating role of preference intensity dominated and the incre
mental informational advantage of some voters had no discernible ef
fect on their performance. The second study, on the other hand, ex
amined the effects of highly relevant information. Given accurate
knowledge. of recent poll outcomes, voters faced a far less ambiguous
prediction task. They could still be highly biased, as shown by the
study, because many uncertain factors may cause election outcomes to
differ from those reflected in recent polls. The lower-ambiguity setting
of the latter voters, however, constrained their bias due to ambiguity
more than the knowledge possessed by the first-study voters, causing
informed voters to exhibit a significantly lower bias than did their un
informed counterparts.186
b. The Moderating Effects of Judgmental Ambiguity. The experi
mental literature provides strong support for the existence of an intui
tive relationship between bias and ambiguity. In the case of optimistic
overconfidence, a number of studies show that predictions of ambigu
ous tasks and target events increase the predictors' bias, presumably
because ambiguity allows individuals to rely more on the information
that puts them in a more favorable light. For example, subjects exhibit
more overoptimistic absolute and comparative judgments of them
selves when they can choose on which dimension to focus their judg
ments.187 They also show a greater bias when making judgments on
matters where only limited feedback is available to them being, for
example, more likely to overestimate the morality of their behavior
than the intelligence it reflects,188 more likely to overestimate their
184. This similarity persisted, moreover, regardless of whether voters were better in
formed due to their pre-existing knowledge or because the experimenter provided them with
partial or full base-rate information about previous elections' outcomes. Elisha Babad, Can
Accurate Knowledge Reduce Wishful Thinking in Voters' Predictions of Election Outcomes,
129 J. PSYCHOL. 285 (1995).
185. Although informed voters were highly biased as well, the magnitude of their im
provement due to better information was very small as compared to their overall bias.
Babad, Voters, supra note 162.
186. Id. (discussing the differences between these studies).
187. See Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation, supra note 92.
188. Scott T. Allison et al., On Being Better But Not Smarter than Others: The
Muhammad Ali Effect, 7 SOC. COGNITION 275 (1989) (especially studies 2 and 3).
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physical attractiveness than their intelligence,189 and more likely to
deem themselves sophisticated than tall.190
These findings are further corroborated by a study of negotiation
and conflict resolution showing that the ambiguity of complex situa
tions increases self-serving perceptions of fairness and negatively af
fects negotiators' bargaining behavior.191 Interestingly, in this study an
increase in information was associated with increased, rather than di
minished, ambiguity, since subjects had no background knowledge of
the case they were bargaining over.192 Participants were told the ex
periment involved negotiation and conflict resolution, and were ran
domly assigned to the roles of representatives negotiating a labor
agreement between a teachers' union and a Board of Education.193
The results showed, as expected, that those teachers' representatives
who received a greater amount of neutral background information,
which was interpreted by objective decisionmakers as equally suppor
tive of both parties' positions, exhibited exacerbated egocentric per
ceptions of what would constitute a fair salary for the teachers.194
In addition to the evidence of the impact of ambiguity in overop
timism, recent findings suggest that highly unskilled actors exhibit the
most extreme overconfidence. These actors' incompetence saddles
them with a double burden: Not only do they perform poorly because
they lack relevant skill and knowledge, but they also find it difficult to
identify their errors. When their skill and knowledge are enhanced,
however, their overconfidence is reduced because their performance
189. Gabriel et al., supra note 91, at 149 (finding a medium correlation between partici
pants' self-rated intelligence and their performance on objective measures and no correla
tion at all between self-rated and other measures of attractiveness, for both men and
women).
190. See, e.g., Dunning et al., Ambiguity and Self-Evaluation, supra note 92 (reporting a
series of studies showing that subjects show a greater bias when making self-judgments of
more ambiguous traits that are reflected in a wider range of potential behaviors); see also
Judith Weiner Regan et al., Do People Have Inflated Views of Their Own Ability?, 31 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 295, 295 (1975) ("Self-esteem needs must be aroused in a
situation in which distortion of one's ability level is possible. This requires that the ability
dimension be important enough to arouse self-esteem needs and that actors be unsure of
how skilled they are on this dimension.") (emphasis added).
191. Leigh Thompson & George Loewenstein, Egocentric Interpretations of Fairness
and Interpersonal Conflict, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES
176, 184-96 (1992) (especially Experiment 2).
192. This is in striking contrast to real-world judgments of entrants, which are always

made under conditions of extreme uncertainty, and where more and better relevant informa
tion would be likely to decrease the effects of egocentric biases on prediction to the extent it
decreased ambiguity. The authors of the study, however, seem to suggest that increases in
the amount {though not the quality) of information may be generally associated with a
greater degree of egocentric bias. Id. at 182.

193. Id. at 184-86.
194. Id. at 188-89 (noting, however, that the effect was asymmetric, with Board repre

sentatives with more background information showing a level of bias not significantly differ
ent from that exhibited by those with less background information).
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improves while they also develop a more realistic appraisal of their
limited ability.195
The clarity of either the task or the relevant information is also an
important moderator of the effects of desirability biases.196 Surveys
find voters more biased in favor of their preferred candidate, for ex
ample, when the objective winning odds (as measured by the overall
proportion of surveyed voters' support) are better197 and less biased
when they have more accurate knowledge of relevant information.198
Similarly, sport fans exhibit less biased predictions in favor of "their"
teams when making predictions at half-time as compared to pre-game
predictions.199 Last, experimental studies have also shown participants
to make more biased outcome predictions when the probability of the
target event is about equally likely to occur or not to occur,200 or when
making judgments on the basis of more ambiguous stimulus phrases
(e.g., "a good chance") as compared to less ambiguous ones (e.g., "im
probable").201
c. The Enhanced Ambiguity Facing Startup Entrants. Not all types
of entrants possess similar information or face the same level of ambi
guity when deciding whether to embark upon entry. Diversifying en
trants who already have relevant managerial and business experience
fa ce a less ambiguous task, because they know their relevant strengths
and weaknesses with greater certainty.202 Moreover, since these en
trants are already established in related industries, much of their spe
cific market knowledge, regarding factors affecting the costs of pro
duction and marketing, potential customers and suppliers, and similar
factors affecting their prospects, will be relevant to the decision on the
195. Justin Kruger & David Dunning, Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in
Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments, 77 J. PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 121, 1 130-31 (1999).
196. See, e.g., McGregor, supra note 104, at 183-89.
197. See, e.g., Granberg & Brent, supra note 109, at 478-79 ("[T]he tendency to predict a
preferred outcome is stronger in the high-ambiguity years.").
198. See, e.g., id. at 482 tbl.2; Babad, Voters, supra note 162, at 118-19.
199. Babad & Katz, Against All Odds, supra note 104, at 1923 (citing an earlier study by
the first author) (although a significant desirability bias remained at half-time for trailing
team).
200. Irwin, supra note 166, at 331-33.
201. Brent L. Cohen & Thomas S. Wallsten, The Effect of Constant Outcome Value on
Judgments and Decision Making Given Linguistic Probabilities, S J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 53, 61-62, 65-66 (1992); see also Dan Zakay, The Relationship Between the Prob
ability Assessor and the Outcomes of an Event as a Determiner of Subjective Probability, 53
ACTA PSYCHOLOGIA 271, 277-78 (1983) (finding a greater bias in the prediction of ambigu
ous target events).
202. This is not to say, of course, that managers are not overconfident in their ability
and skill, as the findings discussed supra Section II.A have shown. Also, some startup en
trants will have better knowledge and experience than others. See supra Section I.C.l.c (ad
dressing learning from repeated entry).
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new venture.203 In addition, they will often have better access to back
ground statistical data and better means to analyze this data more ef
fectively.204
Startup entrants, in contrast, will generally have less experience
and knowledge. Some may have experience in the industry but often
lack managerial expertise. Those startup entrants who have never
started a new venture will be even less aware of the factors likely to
affect its long-run performance. They will not only have less specific
knowledge of performance, but fewer resources to obtain such infor
mation and analyze it eff�cti\:ely. Startups will therefore face a more
ambiguous decision task, and will tend to exhibit more overconfident
predictions regarding the future of their contemplated ventures.205
A survey of 2,994 new small business Qwners from a variety of in
dustries206 supports these conclu�ions. On average, these entrants ex
hibited a great degree of optimistic bias. Almost all of the entrepre
neurs in this survey (95%) perceived their odds of success as being
greater than five out of ten, 81 % perceived odds greater than seven
out of ten, and a full 33% thought their chances were a "dead certain"
ten out of ten.207 Moreover, when making comparative judgments, only
5 % thought their chances poorer than those of similar businesses,
about 27% thought their chances as good as others, and as many as
68% of the respondents perceived their odds of success as better than
those of similar entrants.208 These inflated perceptions did not change
with time since entry, with entrants who have been in business sixteen
months or more exhibiting patterns similar to those who had just
started their businesses.209 In fact, perceptions of the entrants in this
study were also remarkably unrelated to various demographic factors
that affect one's probability of success. Those who were poorly pre
pared for the entry task were just as optimistic as their better-prepared

203. See BIGGADIKE, supra note 63, at 90-115 (discussing and analyzing the benefits di
versifying entrants derive from the "relatedness" of their new venture to the experience of
the parent company).
204. Better and cheaper access to information and its processing may provide a rational
justification for the search for and use of more information, and the opposite is true when
information is costly to obtain and process. This would matter, however, only when the mar
ginal costs of information acquisition and processing are of the same order as the benefits of
more accurate judgments, which would rarely be the case for entry with its high attendant
costs and benefits.
205. See Kruger & Dunning, supra note 195 (showing how low skill promotes biased
estimates).
206. Notably, most of these new entrants were not in manufacturing industries, see
Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances, supra note 22, at 102, although there is no
reason to expect this to impact their overoptimistic perception.
207. Id. at 103.
208. Id. at 104.
209. Id. at 105-06.
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counterparts,210 presumably because of their strongly inflated self
perceptions.211
Similarly, the small entrants participating in the study also showed
strong desirability effects, revealing an extreme bias when judging the
odds of "any business like theirs." With estimates far exceeding those
warranted, 78% of the surveyed entrants estimated their odds of suc
cess at five of ten or better, 39% estimated them at seven of ten or bet
ter, and 16% thought these odds nine of ten or better!212
The conclusion that startup entrants exhibit a greater degree of
boundedly rational decisionmaking is further buttressed by the anec
dotal evidence on patterns of information gathering and processing by
startup entrants.213 The few studies to survey these entrepreneurs have
generally revealed patterns incompatible with rational decisionmak
ing. Specifically, one study found that those who were inexperienced
searched more intensely for information, but preferred personal
sources, such as fa mily and friends, to professional ones.214 When
planning a new venture in business domains where they had less rele
vant experience, these entrepreneurs tended to search less, rather than
more, for information.215 Another study has similarly reported that
while entrepreneurs were generally more alert to new opportunities,
they directed their information search to less formal sources. Impor
tantly, they were less concerned with economic and market fa ctors and

210. Id. at 105.
21 1 . These survey findings strongly echo the experimental data of Kruger & Dunning,
supra note 195, at 1 121, who showed how low skill not only decreases performance but also
deprives decisionmakers of the necessary meta-cognitive tools to observe their low level of
skill.
212. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs' Perceived Chances, supra note 22, at 103.
213. While the few existing studies of decisionmaking and information acquisition by
entrepreneurs do not make a formal distinction between the two entrant types we examine,
they tend to equate "entrepreneurs" with younger and often smaller startup entrants. See
Lowell W. Busenitz & Jay B. Barney, Differences Between Entrepreneurs and Managers in
Large Organizations: Biases and Heuristics in Strategic Decision-Making, 12 J. Bus.
VENTURING 9, 17 ( 1997) (comparing the decisionmaking of entrepreneurs to that of manag
ers in large organizations, using a sample of 124 founders of firms who started their ventures,
on average, 1 .7 years before to participating in the study); Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entre
preneurial Information Search, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 107, 1 1 1 (1995) [hereinafter Cooper
et al., Entrepreneurial Information Search] (using a sample of 1 ,176 founders whose new ven
tures were, on average, 1 1 months old at the time of the survey); Kaish & Gilad, supra note
170, at 50 (surveying 51 founders of New Jersey companies appearing on the mailing list of
the state's Small Business Administration Agency, without reporting time since venture in
ception); Ken G. Smith et al., Decision Making Behavior in Smaller Entrepreneurial and
Larger Professionally Managed Firms, 3 J. Bus. VENTURING 223, 227 (1988) (using size as
measured by number of employees as proxy for "entrepreneurial" firms, with the fifteen
such firms in the sample having between two to fifty employees).
214. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurial Information Search, supra note 213, at 114-15.
215. Id. at 1 15.
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more concerned with factors relating to the implementation of their
plans, in contrast to managers in a large financial conglomerate.216
In sum, the two most important moderators of entrants' overconfi
dence - the intensity of entrants' preference for the particular venture
and the level of ambiguity they face when making their judgments vary systematically with entrant type, making startups prone to exhibit
an enhanced bias. This novel conclusion solves the third puzzle of en
try, suggesting that startups enter more frequently because of their ex
treme overconfidence, which contributes to their inferior .average per
formance that would not ·have heen: exhibited · by non-biased
entrants.217 Finally, this analysis shows how the behavioral framework
provides a coherent and effective explanation for the various empirical
findings on entry.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENTRANT-BOUNDED RATIONALITY
The psychology of entrant overconfidence provides a clear expla
nation for the prevalence of boundedly rational, negative expected
value entry and the relative insensitivity of entrants, particularly start
ups, to many of the economic factors affecting the future success of
their ventures. While providing answers to the puzzles of entry, these
conclusions also confirm the widespread presence of boundedly ra
tional entry. The following sections examine how the presence of sig
nificant boundedly rational entry alters the dynamics of entry competi
tion.
A. How the Bounded Rationality of Entrants Transforms the
Competitive Landscape
Entrants who overestimate their prospects are more likely to fail
than entrants who make accurate average estimates, but their pres
ence also decreases other entrants' probability of success and changes
the composition of the final cohort of successful entrants. Boundedly
rational entrants diminish the prospects of all entrants because their
high-volume attempts substantially increase the intensity of competi
tion. Their influence on market outcomes for all entrants, however,
goes well beyond an across-the-board detraction from the net present
value of entry.

216. Kaish & Gilad, supra note 170, at 55-56. This latter finding suggests that these
startups applied an "inside view" to a greater degree than the other managers in the sample,
resembling the greater willingness of decisionmakers to use base-rates in predictions con
cerning others, as observed by Kruger & Dunning, supra note 195.
217. Thus, rational startups might have been expected to enter at high rates given the
very large absolute number of potential startups, but they would not have exhibited an infe
rior average performance. See supra Section l.A.3 (discussing the third puzzle of entry).

532

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101 :482

First, overconfident startups that "luck out" displace some diversi
fying entrants with better ex ante prospects, effectuating a process of
probabilistic replacement.218 Probabilistic replacement is the inevitable
consequence of competition under uncertainty: some competitors with
a low ex ante probability of success will always succeed, while some
having better ex ante prospects will ultimately fail.219 The impact of
this replacement is more pronounced in the competition because of
the highly disparate base-rates (i.e., the number of potential entrants)
of startup versus diversifying entrants and the extreme overconfidence
of startup entrants.220
Because startup entrants exhibit a strong bias regarding the pros
pects of their potential ventures, the proportion of startups attempting
entry is larger than it would have been if their entry predictions were
less biased. Their absolute numbers end up being very large, since
there is an almost unlimited number of potential negative expected
value ventures that could appear subjectively attractive to some
startup entrant. Diversifying firms, on the other hand, exhibit the op
posite pattern: not only are they far fewer in number, being limited to
those already established firms that may have an interest in the par
ticular industry, but they are also less biased than startups. The pro
portion of startups among successful entrants is thus far greater than
what it would have been if ex post outcomes were to mirror the re
spective ex ante probabilities of success of the two entrant types. In
other words, while startup entrants are individually less likely to sur-

218. The major role of luck in economic selection processes has been persuasively dis
cussed in the influential work of Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950). Building on this work, scholars have shown through
simulation that luck may be a more parsimonious explanation for differences in the
profitability of firms than many other factors known to be associated with profitability. See,
e.g., Richard B. Mancke, Causes of lnterjirm Profitability Differences: A New Interpretation
of the Evidence, 88 Q.J. ECON. 181 (1974). This claim has met with some disagreement,
although contrary arguments have been found hard to prove. For a brief review, see Jay B.
Barney, On Flipping Coins and Making Technology Choices: Luck as an Explanation of

Technological Foresight and Oversight, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: OVERSIGHTS
AND FORESIGHTS 13, 16-17 (Raghu Garud et al. eds., 1 997).

219. See Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting Con
centration Under Schumpeterian Competition, 9 BELL J. ECON. 524, 524-25 (1978) (intro

ducing an influential evolutionary model by describing competitive outcomes saying that
"[i]ndeed, a situation that is regarded as "highly competitive" is typically one in which luck is
the principal factor that finally distinguishes winners from near-winners . . . .") (emphasis
added).
220. Note that absent competition between startups and diversifying firms, probabilistic
replacement would have occurred only within each of the two types. In reality, however,
startup entrants and diversifying firms do compete with one another, even if just because a
particular market can accommodate only so many entrants at any particular point in time.
To the extent that the two groups of entrants compete for market share, therefore, some
overconfident startups will succeed despite their low ex ante probability of success, while
some diversifying firms with much better prospects will fa il.
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vive on average, they are likely, as a group, to replace some of their
diversifying competitors who appeared better-qualified ex ante.221
The effects of probabilistic replacement on the composition of the
successful entrant cohorts are further exacerbated when some diversi
fying entrants engage in a conscious process which may be termed
negative selection, whereby they choose to avoid entry altogether. Be
cause of diversifying entrants' ability to process the relevant informa
tion for entry more rationally, some of these entrants are likely to take
into account the reduction in the attractiveness of their .ventures due
to the increased intensity of competition from extremely overconfi
dent startups. Consequently, at the margin, some of these entrants
might refrain from entering altogether.
The initially puzzling statistics on entry - revealing systematically
different survival rates for the two entrant types which are altogether
lower than what would be expected under rational entry - may there
fo re reflect not only the effects of disparate base rates and differential
overconfidence, but also the additional impact of probabilistic re
placement and negative selection that further lower diversifying en
trants' entry and survival rates.222 In this way, the operation of com
petitive pressures on a background of entrant bounded rationality
draws a post-entry landscape with an increased proportion of ex ante
more biased, less qualified entrants, in contradiction to the conven
tional view of competition as the "survival of the fittest."223
221. Cf. J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets,
Bus. 1 (1991 ) (developing important early model). This model shows how noise traders
(i.e., investors with incorrect expectations about return variances), as long as they do not
affect market prices, can earn higher expected returns than rational investors with similar
risk aversion due to the relationship between risk and return. Id. at 3. Even more impor
tantly, under these assumptions, when "survival" is defined as an investor's group share of
total wealth almost surely not approaching zero and "dominance" is defined as a higher
than-half long run probability of an investor's group increasing its share of total wealth:

64 J.

Noise traders as a group might survive and come to dominate rational investors in wealth
even when on average a rational investor dominates any noise trader of a fixed type in
wealth . . . . But the wealth of noise traders as a group relative to that of rational investors as
a group need not tend toward zero, for the downward drift imparted by idiosyncratic risk
does not affect noise traders' collective wealth. If idiosyncratic risk is large, each individual

noise trader with high probability fails to survive in the market, but noise traders as a whole
can nevertheless survive. Evolution may leave an ever-shrinking army of ever-richer fools
who collectively dominate the market.

Id.

at 3-4 (emphasis added).

222. Probabilistic replacement and negative selection create a selection bias not only in
favor of startups as compared to diversifying entrants, but also in favor of the more overcon
fident entrants within each of these entrant types. For simplicity's sake, however, our analy
sis will focus on the main between-type effects and on the prevalence of negative expected
value entry.
223. One scholar has recently used the extreme metaphor of a large-scale coin-flipping
contest to highlight that the ex post survival of firms "cannot be taken as definitive proof
that some firms are somehow 'better,' 'more efficient,' or 'more able' " than their failed
competitors. See Barney, supra note 218, at 15. The study describes a hypothetical competi
tion between many thousands of technology management experts, who train hard in ad-
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The Limited Efficacy of Financier Gate Keeping

One obvious question raised by the prevalence of boundedly ra
tional entry is how overconfident entrants are able to obtain the nec
essary resources fo r rationally unjustified entry attempts. The empiri
cal findings of entry make it clear that financiers whose support is
often necessary for entrants to embark on new ventures do not pre
vent effectively boundedly rational entry from taking place.224 The
seeming ease with which boundedly rational entrants attempt entry is
surprising, however, since private financial .actors pursuing their own
interests should be loath to supply them with funds. A brief analysis of
this phenomenon will not only help understand why financiers are not
as effective gate-keepers as might have been expected, but also pro
vide a first glimpse at the difficulties involved in any attempt to limit
boundedly rational entry.
In contrast to diversifying entrants who can rely on internal re
sources, startups rarely have sufficient resources to embark on an en
try venture. Unless their venture is small, they will often have to seek
outside financing beyond family and friends.225 One would therefore
expect these entrants to face the close scrutiny of financiers, resulting
in few startups making negative NPV attempts. In fact, if financiers
were rational actors and the private optimality of financiers and en
trants were fully aligned, we would expect to find no boundedly ra
tional entry by startups. If this were the case, the average performance
of startup entrants would have been far superior to that exhibited by
diversifying firms relying on their internal resources.226

vance. At the end of a number of rounds only 156 contestants remained, and many of their
failed competitors sought their advice and secrets so they would be better prepared for fu
ture competition. Ultimately, after 18 rounds, the tale · finds one successful winner, whose
success from that moment on was insured by a combination of the value of the coins won
from other contestants and the high value others were willing to pay for participation in his
coin-flipping seminars. Id. at 13-15. A similar metaphor is already attributed by Alchian,
supra note 218, at 214-15, to the French mathematician Borel to show that pure chance pro
cesses may generate long-lived firms of disparate sizes.
224. A full-fledged analysis of the interaction between financiers' judgments and entrant
bounded rationality is outside the scope of the present analysis, which only highlights some
major aspects of this interaction.
225. These sources include professional venture capital funds, private investors, and
even banks. See, e.g. , Paul A. Gompers, Resource Allocation, Incentives and Control: The

Importance of Venture Capital in Financing Entrepreneurial Firms, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP,
SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE MACROECONOMY 206, 207-1 1 (Zoltan
J. Acs et al. eds., 1 999) (describing the main sources of funding available to entrepreneurs,
with an emphasis on the role of venture capitalists); William E. Wetzel, Jr., Angels and In
formal Risk Capital, 24 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 23 (1983) (discussing the presence and role of
an intermediate source of financing for startups).

226. As noted supra Section l.A.3, in the discussion of the third puzzle of entry, rational
startups could enter more frequently, but their average performance would then have to be
better than that of diversifying entrants.
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Even given the inevitable bounded rationality of financiers, we
would still expect them to be no more biased than diversifying en
trants, and possibly even less. The low intensity of preference finan
ciers have for any particular venture and the reduced ambiguity in the
decision environment they face given their continuous exposure to
market information both suggest they would exhibit a weaker bias.
These financiers should therefore be able to reduce the flood of over
confident startup entry attempts dramatically.
A comparison of the decision environment facing startup finan
ciers and startup entrants explains, however, why the former do not
significantly curb the boundedly rational behavior of the latter. First,
financiers and entrants face differing risk expostires.227 Some financiers
are quite diversified228 and may therefore rationally support some
riskier ventures to complement low-risk, low-return investments.229
Moreover, the financiers' risk exposure is determined, at least in prin
ciple, by their financing arrangement with the entrants rather than by
the entrants' prospects directly. Consequently, a negative expected
value venture might still promise the financier a positive net present
value. This could be done by limiting expected losses via security in
terests in property and other guarantees and enhancing expected gains
by allocating to the financier a proportionally large portion of the re
turns to success.
Second, financiers may have a limited ability to distinguish over
confident entrants from others. This problem would not hinder many
financiers' ability to remain in business, because of diversification and
deep pockets, as well as because some overconfident entrants will do
well and provide them with large returns. These successes will further
cement financiers' erroneous conviction in their ability to identify at
tractive startups even when this is not the case.230
Third, the more an entrant has succeeded in exciting the venture
capitalist and interesting him in the details of the planned venture, the
more he has converted the latter from an objective observer to an in227. See MARK CASSON, THE ENTREPRENEUR: AN ECONOMIC THEORY 210-13 (1 982)
(describing the problem faced by the entrepreneur, broadly defined, in obtaining financing
on the basis of private, non-consensus information, and the ways in which financiers can re
duce their risk exposure when lending to entrepreneurs).
228. See Gompers, supra note 225, at 212-15, tbl.8.1 (summarizing selected data on the
U.S. venture capital industry from 1 980-1994).
229. Although financiers should still never finance an entry attempt that is negative
NPV for them.
230. The high level of uncertainty associated with venture capitalists' business may also
lead to a selection bias, where overconfident startups circulate among financiers until, at
times, one happening to find their proposal more attractive exhibits a winner's curse and
funds them. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1994) (discussing evidence of the tendency of winning
bidders to overpay, since the average rather than the highest bid provides the best value es
timate).
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sider. Inasmuch as this conversion has occurred, financiers will be
likely to exhibit a degree of bias, losing some of their relative advan
tage with respect to variables that impact overconfidence.231
It is possible, however, that financiers do perform an important, if
not fully effective, gate-keeping role that is already reflected in the
statistics of entry. Even though they assist overconfident entrants in
their attempts, they reject some negative expected value ventures that
consequently never take place.232 This is especially true of professional
venture capital funds. These funds, despite their high status and re
sources, finance only an exceedirrgly·small proportion of the multitude
of new business ventures started annually.233 And, when they do pro
vide financing, venture capitalists provide close supervision and advice
to the entrants, thereby arguably increasing those ventures' likelihood
of survival.234
Some overconfident entrants who are unable to secure outside
funding, however, are still likely to attempt entry, albeit with personal
or other non-professional sources of funding and at a smaller scale.
The evidence on the relationship between entrant size and survival
lends some support to this hypothesis,235 suggesting that the smaller

231. Once they become more interested in a particular venture, venture capitalists will
show some of the effects of preference on judgment, mainly because of the desirability
related affect heuristic and inside view. See supra Section 11.C.l. To the extent they intend to
support the venture by managerial guidance in addition to funding, moreover, financiers in
evitably increase the impact of their own preferences on their judgments (e.g. "I would love
to be involved in this type of venture."). See supra Section 11.C.2.
232. See Wetzel,
proposals).

supra

note 225, at 28 {describing how "angels" reject many funding

233. See Gompers, supra note 225, at 212-15 tbl.8.1 (reporting that venture capitalists
never funded more than 1 ,729 companies a year in the period between 1980-1994). More
over, even those entrants that succeed in secure VC financing, typically do so when their
ventures are more advanced and have an established track record. Rapahel Amit et al.,

Venture Capital Financing of Entrepreneurship: Theory, Empirical Evidence and a Research
Agenda, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 259 (Donald L. Sexton
& Hans Landstrom eds., 2000) (reporting findings based on Canadian data).

234. There is evidence that venture capital support extends beyond mere financing and
is correlated with higher survival rates (although venture capitalists may merely detect some
superior ex ante entrants). See, e.g., Jeffry A. Timmons & William D. Bygrave, Venture
Capital's Role in Financing Innovation for Economic Growth, 1 J. Bus. VENTURING 161
(1986); see also Harry J. Sapienza, When Do Venture Capitalists Add Value?, 7 J. Bus.
VENTURING 9 {1992) (finding that entrepreneurs and venture capitalists share this percep
tion of the VC role in promoting entry success). This may also be the case, to some extent,
with private financing. See Wetzel, supra note 225, at 27 (describing how "angels" are typi
cally active investors who provide more than just capital). See generally Sophie Manigart &
Harry Sapienza, Venture Capital and Growth, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 248-52 (Donald L. Sexton & Hans Landstrom eds., 2000) (reviewing
evidence on VCs' selection of ventures for funding and how they promote the latter's growth
by supplying monitoring, advising, and assistance).
235. See, e.g., Dunne et al., Growth, supra note 53, at 676 (raw statistics in tbl.l); id. at
686-89 (larger entrant size associated with increased survival rates); see also supra notes 5556 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of small entrant size).
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and typically suboptimal scale of many startups is not only a cause of
their greater mortality, but also a symptom of their inability to obtain
external financing236 or their more extreme underestimates of the re
sources necessary for their ventures, both results of their enhanced
bias.
C.

The Consequences of Boundedly Rational Innovative Entry

NEV entry exerts a far-reaching effect on market outcomes in an
unregulated environment.that.even th.ose private economic actors best
situated to do so fail to prevent. Before examining the natural ques
tion of whether the government should regulate entry, this Part high
lights the close association between the introduction of innovation,
broadly construed,237 and boundedly rational entry.238

1.

Bounded Rationality and Innovative Entry

Startups' inferior performance results from both psychological and
economic factors: the variables affecting overconfidence lead these en
trants to exhibit an enhanced bias, while the economics of entry simul
taneously channel higher-risk ventures to the startup route and make
startup more risky than diversifying entry. These factors also suggest,
however, that the introduction of innovation is related to a higher fre
quency of negative expected value entry· attempts, and that innovative

236. This is especially true for companies that lack substantial tangible assets and have a
large degree of uncertainty about their future, who are unlikely to receive significant bank
loans given that they face many years of negative earnings and are unable to make interest
payments or meet principal repayments. Consequently, such firms face severe financial con
straints and are largely dependent on the availability of venture capital funding.
237. See Giovanni Dosi, The Nature of the Innovative Process, in TECHNICAL CHANGE
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 221, 222 (Giovanni Dosi et al. eds., 1988) ("In an essential sense,

innovation concerns the search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development, imita
tion, and adoption of new products, new production processes and new organisational set
ups."); Schumpeter, supra note 32, at 151 ("Seen in this light, the entrepreneur and his func
tion are not difficult to conceptualize: the defining characteristic is simply the doing of new
things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way (innovation).") (em
phasis added).

238. See Kevin Bryant, Promoting Innovation: An Overview of the Application of Evo
lutionary Economics and Systems Approaches to Policy Issues, in FRONTIERS OF
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS: COMPETITION, SELF-ORGANIZATION AND INNOVATION
POLICY 361, 371 (John Foster & J. Stanley Metcalfe eds., 2001) [hereinafter Bryant, Pro
moting Innovation) (concluding the empirical studies establish that various "market imper
fections" - including imperfect knowledge, bounded rationality and the inclusion of non
financial consideration in decisionmaking, "are universal - and are necessary to drive
change"); Giovanni Dosi & Yuri Kaniovski, The Method of Generalized Urn Schemes in the

Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics, in THE ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND
TECHNICAL CHANGE: TECHNOLOGIES, NATIONS, AGENTS 261, 280 (Gerald Silverberg &
Luc Soete eds., 1994) (using a new modeling paradigm to show how " 'market imperfections'
and 'informational imperfections' often tend to foster technological variety").
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entry is more closely associated with startup rather than diversifying
entry.239
Innovative entry is likely to involve more risk than non-innovative
entry because the introduction of new products and. technologies is as
sociated with a greater degree of uncertainty. An increased uncer
tainty as to development time, costs and success, market acceptance,
future competition and other factors affecting the venture's ultin).ate
fate also implies an increased likelihood of extreme outcomes.240 These
outcomes may be positive, as in the case of early success or unex
pected demand, but often they :are negative as a result of the many
unanticipated obstacles that entrants must overcome to achieve prof
itability.241
Because of it.s greater risk, innovative entry is more likely to be
undertaken by startup entrants.242 New innovators may prefer to sell
their innovations to incumbent firms rather than take the risk of inde-

239. See Roy Rothwell & Mark Dodgson, Innovation and Size of Firm, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION 310 (Mark Dodgson & Roy Rothwell eds., 1 994)
(reviewing evidence showing that small and very large firms - but not medium-size firms enjoy innovative advantages, which vary for small firms depending on the costs of entry);
Zoltan J. Acs et al., Productivity Growth and Firm Size Distribution, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE
MACROECONOMY 367, 369-71, 392-93 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 1 999) (providing a brief re
view of some of arguments for and against the relative innovative advantages of small versus
large firms and, ceteris paribus, of startup versus diversifying entrants); see also FREDRIC M.
SCHERER, Corporate Size, Diversification, and Innovative Activity, in INNOVATION AND
GROWTH 222, 237 (1984) (concluding from the analyses of various data sources that large
corporations invest greater relative resources in R&D, but "contributeO fewer significant
innovations, contest-winning technical advances, and invention patents . . . than smaller en
terprises").
240. See Dosi, supra note 237, at 222 (stating "innovation involves a fundamental ele
ment of uncertainty "); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Rand Corporation, Economic Welfare
and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609
(1 962) (arguing that more frequent innovation may be associated with greater uncertainty,
not only as to the development of the product but also as to consumer demand); FREEMAN,
supra note 173, at 148-68 (discussing the relationship between uncertainty and innovation
and ways to deal with this risk).
241. See, e.g., Giovanni Dosi, Finance, Innovation and Industrial Change, 13 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 299 (1990) (arguing that the search for innovation that extends beyond the
existing competencies of incumbents might be heavily biased towards mistaken attempts);
Giovanni Dosi, Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of Innovation, 26 J. ECON.
LIT. 1 120 (1988) (suggesting that the increased uncertainty associated with innovation de
creases the probability of survival of the innovating business).
242. Cf. Janet E. L. Bercovitz et al., Firm Capabilities and Managerial Decision Making:
A Theory of Innovation Biases, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION, supra note 9, at 233 (ar
guing that large incumbents tend to introduce less radical innovations than do small firms
because of the various individual and organizational biases exerted on the former); see also
FREEMAN, supra note 173, at 1 35-37 (suggesting that the evidence on the relationship be
tween firm size and innovation is not fully conclusive, but that small firms tend to introduce
more innovations, while larger firms are instrumental in developing many innovations and
bringing these innovations to the market).
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pendent entry,243 but incumbents' willingnes·s to ac·quire innovations
will be negatively correlated with their originality. The more innova
tive the new invention, the more incumbents' benefits and costs from
the adoption of the innovation,244 as well their objective opinion of its
attractiveness will diverge from those of inventors.245
In addition, since risk is positively associated with originality, in
terested incumbents will be more likely to introduce more original in
novations via startup rather than under their own name and full liabil
ity. Innovative entrants who are unable (or unwilling) to convince
incumbents of the attractiveness of their' innovation are likely to em
bark on even riskier ventures however.246 Such innovators face the
choice of either giving up or attempting independent new entry. Those
determined ones who proceed to enter by themselves in the face of

243. See, e.g., David B. Audretsch & Zoltan J. Acs, Entrepreneurial Activity, Innovation,
and Macroeconomic Fluctuations, in INNOVATION IN TECHNOLOGY, INDUSTRIES, AND
INSTITUTIONS: STUDIES IN SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 173 (Yuichi Shionoya & Mark
Perlman eds., 1994). When discussing the role of new entry in the introduction of innovation,
Audretsch & Acs explain:
In principle, the inventor of the idea should be able to sell that idea to an incumbent enter
prise, in the form of a higher wage or royalty payment that roughly equals the expected net
value of the idea. As long as there are even the slightest economies of scale associated with
any aspect of the enterprise, such as production, marketing, distribution, advertising, or hir
ing, it should be more economical for the incumbent firm to integrate the innovation into its
organization than for the inventor to start a new firm.
Id.
244. Thus, Audretsch & Acs, following Schumpeter as well as more recent scholarship,
suggest that "the more radical an innovation is - that is, the degree to which the compe
tence of a firm is destroyed by that innovation - the more costly it will be for the firm to
pursue that innovation." Id. at 174.
245. Some suggest that because of the "subjectivity of knowledge" involved in estimat
ing the benefits of innovation, "a differential in the expected net value of a potential innova
tion between the innovator and incumbent firm is likely to emerge. As this gap gets large
enough, the inventor will weight the costs of starting his own firm against the net benefits
accruing from such a new start-up." Id. at 174. Of course, to the extent incumbents are con
vinced of the innovation's attractiveness, they will also be embarking on higher risk projects
than they normally do. See FREEMAN, supra note 173, at 157 (counting among those likely to
embark on high risk innovative projects such firms that unwittingly accept very high risk be
cause they are convinced by the entrepreneurs and share their overoptimism).
246. This will typically happen when the divergence between the innovators' valuation
of their innovations and that of incumbents is great. In these cases, innovators may be un
willing to sell for value they deem unreasonable and incumbents may even be unwilling to
make any offer for innovations they consider too risky or of a very low value. Cf DAVID B.
AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION (1995) (proposing a model in which
an individual agent within an organization, who possesses new knowledge that may or may
not have positive economic value because of uncertainty, may decide to exit and start a new
venture due to asymmetries in knowledge and valuation between the individual and the or
ganization); see also CASSON, supra note 227, at 201-09 (describing some problems faced by
the entrepreneur who believes he has privileged commercial information in exploiting it ei
ther by himself or by approaching others).
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adversity· wm consequently be embarking more often on higher-risk,
negative expected value ventures.247
The economic factors associated with innovative entry increase the
likelihood of bias in those entrants' assessments of their ventures'
prospects.248 Specifically, innovative entrants face a greater degree of
ambiguity when making their entry decisions than do less- or non
innovative entrants. Hence, highly innovative entrants will be prone to
exhibit more extreme estimates of their potential ventures' value and
probability of success.249
Non-innovative entrants; in · contrast, face less risk and uncer
tainty.250 They may therefore be less biased, making fewer negative
expected value attempts. It thus appears that while some NEV entry
results from the inflated assessments of non-innovative ventures, both
economic and psychological factors direct highly biased innovative en
trants to attempt negative NPV entry frequently, with startups being
the likely venue.

2.

The Consequences of Innovative Entry

The association between overconfidence and innovative entry sug
gests boundedly rational entrants facilitate innovation and its atten
dant benefits,251 from the expansion of consumer choice, through tech
nological "spillovers" and an increased rate of growth, to the increase
of competitive pressures upon incumbents.
When overconfident entrants attempt entry more frequently than
rationality dictates, they increase the range of the possible outcomes

247. In certain cases, the innovator may be unable to convince incumbents of the truly
positive NPV of the venture or prefer, for solid economic reasons, to attempt new entry.
Under these uncommon circumstances, the innovative new entry will be rational. Cf. Arrow,
supra note 240 (suggesting that given some simple assumptions small firms are likely to gen
erate a large proportion of innovative research and only some production, while large firms
engage more often in the mass production on the basis of ideas generated by small firms).
248. Cf. Paul J. H. Schoemaker & M. Laurentius Marais, Technological Innovation and
Firm Inertia, in ORGANIZATION AND STRATEGY IN THE EVOLUTION OF ENTERPRISE 179,
189-93 (Giovanni Dosi & Franco Malerba eds., 1996) (discussing the likely of effects of vari
ous cognitive biases on investment decisions).
249. See supra Section 1 1.C.2 for an analysis of how ambiguity increases the magnitude
of entrant overconfidence. Also, innovative entrants may have a greater personal stake in
their proposed ventures; in this case, they will also be prone to exhibit more overconfidence.
Supra Section 11.C.l; see also FREEMAN, supra note 173, at 150-55 (citing numerous eco
nomic studies showing evidence of a strong optimistic bias when discussing the highly limited
reliability of project estimation techniques for innovations).
250. See FREEMAN, supra note 173, at 151 ("[I)t must never be forgotten that estimates
can only be really accurate if uncertainty is reduced, and uncertainty can only be signifi
cantly reduced either by further research or by making a project less innovative.").
251. Cf. Harvey Leibenstein, Entrepreneurship and Development, 58 AM. ECON. REV.
72, 82 (1968) ("[A] lower profit investment that releases entrepreneurial energies and ca
pacities may be more fruitful in the long run than a higher profit investment.").
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of entry selection, bringing to the market many innovative products,
services, and methods of operation that otherwise would not have
been introduced.252 While many high-risk innovative ventures fail,
those that survive expose the economy to a significant amount of in
novation. And, even those who fail, infuse other market participants
with new ideas and information that may later provide a basis for suc
cessful ventures by other entrants or incumbents.253 Failed entrants
may also facilitate and shape consumer demand for innovative prod
ucts, by making consumers - and not just producers - aware of their
possibility of production.�4 Together, these effects of boundedly ra
tional, innovative entry stimulate economic growth.255

252. See, e.g., Martin Carree & Roy Thurik, Industrial Structure and Economic Growth,
in INNOVATION, INDUSTRY EVOLUTION, AND EMPLOYMENT 86, 88 (David B. Audretsch &
A. Roy Thurik eds., 1999) (suggesting that "small businesses may contribute to higher
growth because of their contribution to the selection process due to their variety"); id. at 106
(citing among some additional benefits of small firms the ability to "satisfy a fragmented and
differentiated demand," in a study showing, however, that the relative advantages and dis
advantages of small firms vary depending on industry characteristics); Geroski, What Do We
Know, supra note 25, at 436-37 (suggesting that while innovations are often supply driven,
potential consumers must get acquainted with new products before determining how . they
value their various characteristics, adding that the role of·entry in introducing a variety of
products may be more important in the earlier stages of the development of new markets).

253. See, e.g., William J. Baumol, Innovation and Creative Destruction, in CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION: BUSINESS SURVIVAL STRATEGIES IN THE GLOBAL INTERNET ECONOMY
21, 23-26 (Lee W. McKnight et al eds., 2001) (arguing the positive externalities from "spill
overs" of innovation are important and of a larger magnitude than commonly recognized);
Henry Capron & Michele Cincera, Exploring the Spillover Impact on Productivity of World

Wide Manufacturing Firms, in THE ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS OF INNOVATION 543
(David Encaoua et al. eds., 2000) (discussing the definitions of "spillovers" in the literature

and reporting some evidence of their presence to varying degrees in different economies).
Ironically, a highly innovative environment may simultaneously increase the likelihood
of the successful development of innovation and decrease the likelihood that the innovation
will become a viable and marketable product. See, e.g., David B. Audretsch, Entrepreneur

ship and Economic Restructuring: An Evolutionary View, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SMALL
AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE MACROECONOMY 79, 84-85 (Zoltan J. Acs et
al. eds., 1999) (describing a recent study exploring the relatiqnship between the persistently
asymmetric firm size distribution in industry, whereby small firms dominate, and the fact
that entry is not substantially deterred in industries where scale economics and innovative
activity play an important role).

254. See, e.g., Dosi & Lovallo, Rational Entrepreneurs, supra note 9, at 57-58 (suggesting
that both the success and the failure of entrants fulfills an important role in industry learn
ing, inter alia, by contributing to increased collective knowledge, in which case "they repre
sent a sort of externality for the whole system"); cf. FREEMAN, supra note 1 73, at 201 (stat
ing that the direction of present research determines "the range of real choice available to
consumers" when arguing for governmental support of R&D activity). Schumpeter stated
the early view of the relationship between innovation and consumer choice:
Yet innovations in the economic system do not as a rule take place in such a way that first
new wants arise spontaneously in consumers and then the productive apparatus swings
round through their pressure. We do not deny the presence of this nexus. It is, however, the
producer who as a rule initiates economic change, and consumers are educated by him if
necessary; they are, as it were, taught to want new things, or things which differ in some re
spect or other from those which they have been in habit of using.

SCHUMPETER, supra note 73, at 65.
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Successful innovative NEV entrants also provide an important
competitive check on the behavior of incumbents.256 Thus, the empiri
cal findings on entry suggest that incumbent firms should have little
concern with most new entrants, except possibly some of the largest
diversifying ones, at the time of entry. Nevertheless, some successful
entrants who prosper and grow eventually pose a competitive threat to
incumbents. As time goes by, those remaining entrants become in
cumbents themselves, in part by replacing older and less competitive
predecessors. As today's incumbents, yesterday's successful entrants
exert significant competitive pressure OD' extant incumbents, including
dominant firms, requiring them to become more efficient and com
petitive in order to maintain market share and profitability.
Successful innovative entrants are likely to pose a greater threat to
incumbents than do other entrants, because their successful innova
tions differ to a greater degree from the products and technologies
used by incumbents. The success of such entrants indicates that con
sumers want new products and technologies, and that incumbents
might become obsolete if they fail to provide them. At a minimum,
threatened incumbents will be more likely to seek ways to increase the
efficiency of their production and the competitiveness of their product
prices, to the benefit of consumers and society alike. Successful inno
vative entrants may therefore exert a proportionately greater competi
tive pressure upon other incumbents and dominant firms than the

255. Thus, Bryant recently summarized the present state of the evidence by stating:
"There is a general observation at the macro level that long-run economic growth depends
on innovation . . . ." Bryant, Promoting Innovation, supra note 238, at 371. Innovation leads
to growth by fostering a greater menu of options for market selection. See, e.g., Uwe Cantner
& Horst Hanusch, Heterogeneity and Evolutionary Change: Empirical Conception, Findings
and Unresolved Issues, in FRONTIERS OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS, supra note 238, at
228, 229-34 (suggesting that technological heterogeneity reflects innovation and is responsi
ble for technological change); Pier Paolo Saviotti, Variety, Economic and Technological De
velopment, in INNOVATION IN TECHNOLOGY, supra note 243, at 27, 46 ("[I]nnovations . . .
lead to qualitative change in the composition of the economic system, and this qualitative
change is reflected in a growing variety" - a quantitative criterion the author develops to
denote distinguishable products and economic actors.). See generally Chris Freeman, Inno
vation and Growth, in THE HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION, supra note 239, at 78
(reviewing the relationship between innovation and growth in economic theory); Paul D.
Reynolds, Creative Destruction: Source or Symptom of Economic Growth?, in
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES AND THE
MACROECONOMY 97 (Zoltan J. Acs et al. eds., 1999) (presenting research and describing
additional empirical evidence showing that the volume of entry and its attendant turbulence
have a major role in facilitating economic growth).
256. See, e.g., J. STANLEY METCALFE, EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS AND CREATIVE
DESTRUCTION 115 (1998) ("Effective competition depends on diversity in behaviour and
over time this can only be maintained by the continual introduction of new and better prod
ucts and new and better methods of production." Therefore, "it is the line between innova
tion and competition which has proved to be the mainspring of economic growth.").
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competitive threat other, non-innovative successful entrants are capa
ble of posing.257
IV.

EVALUATIN G ENTRY AFRESH

Despite competitive pressures, and in some large measure because
of them, boundedly rational entrants are overrepresented among the
ranks of ex post successful entrants. Because of the diverging incen
tives and risks facing financiers and entrants, the latter do not always
prevent the former effectively from entering when they should not.
Consequently, some overconfident entrants introduce into the market
negative NPV innovations that would never have been introduced if
all entrants were rational. Building on these conclusions, this Part re
evaluates the social costs and benefits of entry to determine the desir
ability and possibility of using governmental regulation to curb this
pervasive boundedly rational activity.
A.

The Social Costs and Benefits of Boundedly Rational Entry

The private benefits and costs of entry vary from one entrant to
another: most biased entrants suffer overall losses, but a few become
successful because of their boundedly rational behavior. Regardless of
entrants' varying individual fates, as a group negative expected value
entrants necessarily suffer losses, as the inevitable consequence of ag
gregate negative expected value entry.
The private costs of negative expected value entry thus translate
into deadweight loss to society from the unrecoverable resources these
entrants waste on their fa iled attempts.258 This does not mean, how
ever, that all entrants together generate social losses. The direct social
costs of entry are a function of the relative proportion of negative ex
pected value entrants to all other entrants: if the total costs incurred
by the former group are greater than the total profits earned by the
latter, than the phenomena of entry generates direct losses to society.
If, however, the opposite situation obtains - that is, if the net costs of

257. Thus, while many incumbents will be less likely to be leading innovators, they may
very well employ a strategy of "defensive" innovation, attempting incremental improve
ments in response to, or in anticipation of, more radical innovations by new entrants. See
FREEMAN, supra note 173, at 176-83 (noting also how incumbents will often not engage in
pure imitation, but instead seek to improve and modify new innovations). Moreover. as
Geroski notes when counting among the "stylized facts" about entry that "[h)igh rates of
entry are often associated with high rates of innovation and increases in efficiency," such
facts "do not imply the entrants are always, or even often, the major source of innovation in
markets. Many case studies show that entry stimulates incumbents to introduce new products
and processes which they had been holding back." Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note
25, at 431 (emphasis added).
258. See, e.g., Carree & Thurik, supra note 252, at 88 (suggesting that the "lower level of
stability, [of small businesses] inherent in the selection process, leads to welfare losses").
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negative expected value entry are smaller than the net gains of other
entry - then entry may still be beneficial to society.
Negative expected value entrants, however, generate social costs
beyond the resources they waste directly. They generate significant
negative externalities, diminishing the success prospects of less biased
entrants and interfering with the efficient allocation of resources
through market competition.259 Those entrants that had superior ex
ante prospects but either failed after initially attempting entry because
of probabilistic replacement260 or refrained from entry altogether261 in
stead must direct their resources to less beneficial uses, further reducing social welfare.262
Entrant overconfidence also interferes with the market mechanism
of resource allocation.263 Under ideal circumstances, market trading
directs resources to their most valuable use given their original distri
bution in society.264 Consumers can only purchase, however, from
among those products actually available in the marketplace. Those
products that would have been offered by rational entrants who either
refrained from entry altogether or were replaced by overconfident
competitors will inevitably be eliminated from the set of products on
which consumer choice and selection operate. Consumers will also
prefer some negative expected value products, which would not have
been offered if entrants were strictly rational, over some other com·

·

259. This negative extemality is in addition to the negative extemality generated by any
successful entrant - rational or not - and especially innovative ones, of diminishing the
prospects of other entrants and incumbents alike. See Baumol, supra note 253, at 32 (pro
viding a brief explanation of this effect). Schumpeter already suggested that innovative entry
also spells losses to incumbents by decreasing their market share and profitability:
It is similarly clear that entrepreneurial gain is not a net accretion to the returns of the indus
trial sector in which it occurs. The impact of the new product or method spells losses to the
"old" firms. The competition of the man with a significantly lower cost curve is, in fact, the
really effective competition that in the end revolutionizes the industry.
Schumpeter, supra note 32, at

156.

260. See supra Section

II.A.

261 . See supra Section

II.A.

262.

The conclusion that the success of some overconfident entrants causes the diver
sion of some rational entrants' resources to less productive uses becomes obvious when the
exact definition of rational entry is substituted for the simplified definition used throughout
this Article. Only such entry that yields a risk adjusted NPV greater than opportunity costs
of entry is truly rational, and the opportunity costs of entry are the next most profitable use
into which the entrant could put the resources spent on entry. Whenever rational entry is not
made, therefore, the resources which would have been most productive if directed towards
entry are instead channeled to other goals that are less beneficial by definition.

263. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 63-71 (2d
1 988) (an introductory exposition of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics).
264. Id.

ed.
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peting products, substituting some negative NPV products or product
mixes including such products for those products not offered.265
While entrants' bounded rationality generates social costs, it is also
a source of important positive external effects. The various social
benefits brought about by an increased rate of innovation - from the
expansion of consumer choice, through technological "spillovers" and
an increased rate of growth, to the increase of competitive pressures
upon incumbents - all appear to be associated with boundedly ra
tional entry. Hence, if entrants were strictly rational decisionmakers,
economic growth . and development would slow down and competitive
discipline would become even less effective than currently.
The ultimate social balance of negative expected value entry thus
depends, to a significant degree, on the relative proportion of innova
tive to non-innovative entrants within this large group. Apparently,
therefore, innovative negative expected value entrants serve as the
voluntary cannon-fodder of our economy - embarking on ventures
that are personally unprofitable on average while bestowing important
positive externalities on society as a whole.266
B.

Regulating Negative Expected Value Entry?

The behavioral analysis of entrant decisionmaking reveals the
myriad negative and positive effects generated by the boundedly ra
tional entrant behavior. One must therefore not rush to brand the
boundedly rational behavior of entrants a new form of market failure,
justifying the benevolent intervention of the regulator.267 Any inter
vention in the decisionmaking process of entrants in an attempt to re
duce the social costs of negative expected value entry may also limit its
beneficial impact.
265. See, e.g., wALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES
AND EXTENSIONS 164-79 (7th ed. 1998) (providing a basic exposition of substitution); cf
STJGLITZ, supra note 263, at 78 (discussing the lack of complementary markets as market
failure).
266. See, e.g., Dosi, supra note 241 (suggesting that the close association between inno
vation and error implies that the search for new innovation is likely to lead to disappointing
economic fa ilures, on average, for the individual actors who embark upon it, who neverthe
less serve as important agents of economic change); Dosi & Lovallo, Rational Entrepreneurs,
supra note 9, at 57 (suggesting that, when entry is viewed as part of a learning process, a
number of individual and organizational biases, but "especially overconfidence, inside view
thinking, and illusions of control - are essential to sustain exploration, even when the latter is
not individually rewarding") (footnote omitted); G. Silverberg et al., Innovation, Diversity
and Diffusion: A Self-Organisation Model, 98 ECON. J. 1032 (1988) (developing a model of
the diffusion of new technology where, under certain assumptions regarding the learning
process, unequivocally superior innovations sometimes diffuse only if there are overoptimis
tic entrepreneurs - "Schumpeterian sacrificial lambs" - who pay the price of initial explo
ration, bestowing a positive externality upon the industry).
267. See STJGLITZ, supra note 263, at 71-80 (arguing that market failures justify govern
mental intervention in markets).
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In principle, an effective detection and prevention of some nega
tive net present value entry at the margin could be beneficial. The
problem is, however, that there is no easy means of quantifying with
any certainty the benefits and costs of entry. Measuring the direct
deadweight losses of negative expected value entry is the least diffi
cult, since - at least in principle - one could calculate the number of
failed entrants per industry and the average costs they have sunk in
their ventures. The calculation of net losses would be more complex,
though, fo r those entrants who obtain some profits before exiting the
market.
It is even less clear, moreover, how to measure the externalities of
entry. Any quantification of the externalities of negative NPV entry
requires a measurement of the reduction this entry causes in other en
trants' success prospects. This requires finding the number of less bi
ased potential entrants who would have entered but refrained from
entry, and the alternative uses into which those potential entrants have
put the resources they did not invest in entry. Similarly, it is not clear
how to measure the social loss from negative expected value entry's
effect on allocative efficiency - how does one compare the local op
timum generated by competition among actual entrants to the global
optimum brought about when the dynamics of competition operate on
rational entry alone?268
An examination of the quantities that must be measured fo r any
quantification of the positive externalities of negative expected value
entry reveals another impenetrable maze. For example, how does one
quantify the incremental benefits of additional competitive discipline?
And the estimation of the benefits of innovation is even more elusive.
Clearly, these benefits go well beyond the net profits of those few suc
cessful negative NPV entrants. But how does one measure the contri
bution of negative expected value entry - both successful and failed
- to the introduction of new ideas into the market and the develop
ment of consumer demand for innovation?
As if these measurement difficulties were not enough, any attempt
to regulate entry would face a number of practical impediments. First,
it would be difficult and costly for a government agency, for example,
to determine ex ante which ventures have a negative expected value.
Second, any active regulation of entry is likely to harm disproportion
ately innovative entrants because expert regulators would not only be
less optimistic regarding the prospect of entry than individual entrants,
but would also lack access to the "soft" data that motivates entrants,
especially innovative ones, to attempt entry. Third, in addition to
raising additional impediments to entry, regulation - to the extent it
would slow the process of entry - may decrease the attractiveness of
268. Cf. Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM. ECON.
REV. 22 (1957) (stating the classic argument showing how multiple optima arise).
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certain ventures whose success depends on the timing of their entry
into the market. Finally, government agents also suffer numerous
shortcomings in their decisionmaking process: their incentive structure
is not aligned with society's interests; they are often "captured" or af
fected by incumbents and dominant market participants; and they are
not subject to effective pressure or discipline.269
Beyond the numerous difficulties involved in any governmental
regulation of entry, most of the various potential forms of intervention
are also likely to be ineffective in accomplishing the goal of reducing
undesirable NEV entry.270 An attempt to debias entrants - training
them to overcome their boundedly rational predictions and judgments
- would be the best method of intervention. Nonetheless, behavioral
findings suggest that such an approach is doomed to fail in the case of
negative expected value entry. Numerous studies show that, even un
der circumstances far more conducive to learning, decisionmakers find
it difficult to overcome the processes of overconfidence.271 Addition
ally, even partially successful debiasing interventions require training,
and subjects typically fail to generalize their learning from one setting
to another.272 A minimal requirement for effective debiasing is the
269. See, e.g., STIGLITZ, supra note 263, at 198-202 (describing the institutional and per
sonal limitations of governmental action); see also Robert C. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and
Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. R EV. 1703, 1719-20 (1989) (argu
ing that governments lack proper incentives for efficient action); Jolls et al., supra note 1, at
1543-45 (discussing the.limited effectiveness of "Behavioral Bureaucrats").
270. The most radical intervention in the process of entry - short of a complete ban of
new entry - is the erection of entry barriers. The second puzzle of entry has shown, how
ever, that most impediments to entry have little effect on its rate; raising entry barriers,
moreover, would increase the costs of all entry, contribute to the social losses from failed
entry attempts and - to the extent it would reduce entry - provide incumbents with a
highly visible, socially undesirable protection from competitive discipline.
271 . See, e.g., Byram, supra note 167 (finding that various debiasing manipulations fail
to diminish the effects of the planning fallacy on time predictions); Neil D. Weinstein &
William M. Klein, Resistance of Personal Risk Perceptions to Debiasing Interventions, 14
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 132 (reporting how a variety of debiasing methods were found to have
little impact on optimistic overconfidence, while conditions using the opposite manipulations
increased the bias); see also Lisa E. Bolton, The Effects of Nonanalytic and Analytic Think
ing in New Product Forecasting (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
Florida) (on file with author) (providing an extensive set of product forecasting showing the
extreme difficulty of debiasing decisionmakers after they made an initial intuitive business
forecast). In general, the psychological evidence shows the difficulty of debiasing decision
makers even under those conditions most conducive to learning, such as a controlled envi
ronment and clear feedback. See, e.g., Baruch Fischhoff, Debiasing, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND B IASES 422 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (review
ing studies and discussing the difficulty of debiasing).
272. See, e.g., Frank P. McKenna & Ian P. Albery, Does Unrealistic Optimism Change
Following a Negative Experience?, 31 J. APP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1146 (2001) (using a severe
threat manipulation that highlighted vividly the possible consequences of optimistic risk
taking and finding that while this strong manipulation improved estimates in the particular
domain, the effect was domain specific, failing to affect risk estimates in other domains). See
generally Fischhoff, supra note 271, at 422-23 (describing how decisionmakers who are de
biased in one context fail to transfer their learning to judgments in other settings).

Michigan Law Review

548

[Vol. 101:482

availability of clear feecl.back on performance, which is nonexistent be
fore entry occurs.273
The provision of easily understandable relevant statistical informa
tion, which negative expected value entrants may fail to obtain, would
be a weaker form of intervention. This Article's analysis of entrant
bias does suggest that better information may help somewhat in re
ducing the extent of negative expected value entry. The efficacy of this
intervention might nevertheless be limited by entrants' tendency to
discount pallid statistical information regarding the market at large
that seems irrelevant to the fate of their unique venture.274
C. Antitrust Law and Boundedly Rational Entry
The balance of boundedly rational entry's social costs and benefits
appears uncertain, and its regulation of questionable desirability and
little practicality. But if intervention is neither clearly necessary nor
effectively possible, the law should take the pervasive presence of
overconfident entry as given and examine whether its doctrines re
quire modification. A primary area in which this should be done is an
titrust law, whose doctrines frequently rely on analyses of entry. This
Part therefore examines briefly some potential implications of the be
havioral analysis of entry for antitrust law.
1.

General Conclusions: Entry and Market Power in Antitrust

Among the findings of the behavioral economic analysis of entry,
the following are the most significant for a critical evaluation of the
role of entry in antitrust law:
1) Entry is not exceptionally difficult; however, post-entry
success and survival are unlikely for most entrants.275
2) Most startups, and small entrants generally, pose no
short-term competitive threat to incumbents.276

273. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in De
cision Making, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 1 {Thomas
S. Wallsten ed., 1980) (emphasizing the importance of unambiguous feedback for learning);
Richard E. Nisbett et al., Improving Inductive Inference, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 445, 445-46 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
(noting that decisionmakers need to know that an error has occurred, how it has occurred,
and how to improve the decision process).
274. See supra note 148; see also Weinstein & Klein, supra note 271, at 132 (citing vari
ous studies that found the provision of information to be largely ineffective in modifying risk
perceptions and even less effective in producing changes in behavior).
275. See supra Section I.A.1; e.g. , GEROSKI ET AL., supra note 61, at 3 ("[E]ntry appears
to be easy but post-entry market penetration and, indeed, survival is not.").
276. See supra Section l.A.3.
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3) Some large diversifying entrants may pose a competi
tive threat to incumbents even in the short-term, al
though the prospects of these entrants for survival and
prosperity are far from certain.277
4) In the long run, the few successful boundedly rational
innovative entrants are an important source of com
petitive pressure on incumbents.278
5) Those market characteristics known as "entry barriers"
do little to deter entry (except possibly when industry
is also concentrated).279
6) Such barriers nevertheless affect the post-entry per
formance of entrants, and significantly decrease their
survival. Thus, in the presence of bounded rationality,
entry barriers become survival barriers
economic
a
f ctors that often, instead of inhibiting entry, make
post-entry survival more difficult and less likely.280
These findings suggest that the fundamental hostility of antitrust
law to unnecessary restrictions on new business entry281 is well
founded, given entry's important pro-competitive benefits. In fact, the
analysis here shows that survival barriers in the market should be
viewed with additional concern. Much like intra-industry "mobility
barriers," which prevent entrants from moving from one industry
group to another,282 survival barriers create impediments to new en
trants' survival and growth that are especially pernicious because of
entrants' relative insensitivity to their presence.
Additionally, the presence of significant benefits from boundedly
rational, small, innovative entry also indicates that the long-discarded
"populist" goals of antitrust law283 do not contradict the now-accepted
-

277. See supra Section I.A.3.
278. See supra Section 111.C.
279. See supra Section l.A.2.
280. Cf. Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at 436 (suggesting, after discussing
the puzzling co-existence of high entry barriers and high rates of entry that "[i]f . . . barriers
to entry are thought of as an obstacle which prevents new firms from surviving long in a
market, then the data present Jess of a puzzle").
281. See, e.g., 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, '1[ 112a.
282. R. E. Caves and M. E. Porter, From Entry Barriers to Mobility Barriers: Conjec
tural Decisions and Contrived Deterrence to New Competition, 91 Q. J. ECON. 241 (1977).
283. Such goals include the dispersion of economic and political power and the protec
tion of small competitors from larger and more powerful riyals, the latter of which was espe
cially significant in the legislative history of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2569
(Mar. 24, 1890) (Senator Sherman's statement when arguing the merits of the proposed Act
regarding the negative consequences of "combinations" with "a purpose to prevent competi
tion, so that if a humble man starts a business in opposition to them, solitary and alone, in
Ohio or anywhere else, they will crowd him down"); id. at 3147 (Apr. 8, 1890) (Senator
Geroge's argument that by "the use of this organized force of wealth and money the small
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goal of promoting economic efficiency as much as commonly thought.
The conclusions from this Article's analysis regarding the important
role of small entrants in both facilitating the introduction of innova
tion and increasing competitive pressures in the market suggest that
early populist views may have reflected, to a degree, a well-founded
concern with maintaining the contribution of small, boundedly ra
tional, entry to society. Nonetheless, while this partial reconciliation of
economic and "populist" objectives is useful in highlighting their
common ground, as a practical matter, the analysis here confirms that
an economic approach, albeit modified, still provides the most coher
ent framework for the interpretation and application of the antitrust
laws.284
At the same time, however, these conclusions indicate that the law
should be wary of relying on findings of low barriers alone to guaran
tee competitive pressure on incumbents in the short-run because most
new entrants detract little from incumbents' market power.285 When
low barriers are accompanied with larger scale, actual or potential, di
versifying entry, on the other hand, incumbents are more likely to face
competitive pressure even in the short term. Additionally, the effects
of barriers are especially pernicious in concentrated markets.286 The
empirical evidence shows that when markets are concentrated, enmen engaged in competition with [the trusts) are crushed out, and that is the great evil at
which all this legislation ought to be directed"); see also United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323-24 (1897) (emphasizing the harmful consequences of driving
out small and independent dealers). The emphasis on noneconomic concerns continued
through the years of the Warren Court. See, e.g. , United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384
U.S. 270, 274 (1 966) ("From this country's beginning there has been an abiding and wide
spread fear of the evils which flow from monopoly . . . . On the basis of this fear, Congress in
1890 . . . passed the Sherman Act in an attempt to prevent further concentration and to pre
serve competition among a large number of sellers."); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("[W)e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote competi
tion through the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated
that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented in
dustries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentraliza
tion.").
For a discussion of the various conflicting goals attributed to the antitrust law both his
torically and at the present, see 1 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, '1'1 101-12.
284. Antitrust commentators have long pointed out that such noneconomic goals fail to
provide proper guidance to the courts in its implementation of the antitrust laws. See, e.g. , 1
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 'I 103; (arguing that the traditional economic ap
proach to antitrust law, even if imperfect, is still far more coherent than alternative ap
proaches); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
6-11 (2d. ed. 1993) (discussing the conflicting goals of the antitrust laws and arguing for the
alignment of antitrust policy with efficiency considerations); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW, at vii-x (2d. ed. 2001).
285. This conclusion is also supported by the findings on limited incumbent reaction to
entry generally, and the rarity of price-related entry-deterring strategies on the part of in
cumbents specifically. See infra note 300; cf Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at
437 (arguing in favor of antitrust law's emphasis on entry barriers but suggesting that the
pro-competitive effects of entry can be easily exaggerated, especially in the short run).
286. See supra note 41.
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trants not only fa ce high mortality rates, but are also significantly less
likely to attempt entry and challenge incumbent firms. The doctrines
of antitrust law that look to entry barriers as part of market power de
terminations should therefore be reexamined.
Theoretically, all determinations of whether an individual firm or a
number of firms together enjoy market power - that is, the power to
profitably charge supra-competitive prices for their products - impli
cate entry: When entry is sufficient to drive prices back to competitive
levels, firms do not enjoy market power and, therefore, pose no sig
nificant threat to competition and need not concern the law.287 In prac
tice, however, the law treats impediments to entry differently de
pending on the nature of the potentially anti-competitive behavior at
stake. It declares certain behaviors illegal per-se - such as horizontal
price fixing - based on the understanding that these practices are so
likely to be harmful in the short-term that a detailed inquiry into their
particular circumstances is unnecessary. Accordingly, an analysis of
entry is less important in those instances.288 Other practices, however,
require the court to inquire further into the circumstances of the case
and thus raise the question of the effectiveness of entry. The following
sections examine briefly two of the settings in which such inquiries

287. See Ball Mem'I Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the argument that market share indicates market power even in the absence of
entry barriers, stating that "the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of new
entry, the less power existing firms have"); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776
F.2d 665, 672 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Unless barriers to entry prevent rivals from entering the
market at the same cost of production, even a very large market share does not establish
market power."); United States v. Waste Mgmt. Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[A]
market definition artificially restricted to existing firms competing at one moment may yield
market share statistics that are not an accurate proxy for market power when substantial po
tential competition able to respond quickly to price increases exists."); see also 2A AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 'I 420b & n.10 ("Entry conditions are therefore relevant to
assessing the market power required by most antitrust doctrines," because "[m]arket power
bears on the anticompetitive potential of challenged conduct. Indeed, challenged conduct
may be deemed unreasonable or exclusionary, and therefore illegal, precisely because it cre
ates a barrier to new competition without sufficient offsetting justification.").
288. See, e.g., Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of.Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100, 109-10
(1984) (stating that "[h)orizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned
as a matter of law under an 'illegal per se' approach because of the probability that these
practices are anticompetitive is so high" and that "as a matter of law, the absence of proof of
market power does not justify a naked restriction on price or output"); Nat'I Soc'y of Profl
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (horizontal price-fixing agreements are
"agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elabo
rate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality - they are 'illegal per se' ");
see also 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, 'l'I 2010-12 (introducing the basics of
horizontal cartels and price fixing); id. 'f 201lc (explaining why market power as traditionally
understood is not necessary for this offense). See generally 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP,
supra note 7, '1'1 1500-11 (providing an introduction to the issues surrounding the per-se rule
and its main alternative - the rule of reason).
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into entry are important - predatory pricing by dominant firms and
horizontal mergers.2s9

2.

Predatory Pricing: Entry and Recoupment

Entry plays an important role in the legal analysis of predatory
pricing, the practice of selling at non-remunerative prices to drive out,
exclude, or discipline rivals.290 Because predatory pricing requires the
predatory firm to make significant investments by selling at unprofit
able prices, it is only deemed illegal if the predator has the opportunity
to recoup its losses.291 That is, the predator must enjoy a sufficiently
long period in which it is able to sell at sufficiently high prices follow
ing predation.292 According to the case law, for recoupment to be pos289. Entry and barriers to entry play an important role in numerous other antitrust doc
trines, including vertical and conglomerate mergers and certain restraints of trade, such as
tying arrangements. The present analysis is therefore far from exhaustive, only intended to
outline some of the antitrust implications of the behavioral analysis of entry decisionmaking.
290. Predatory pricing violates both the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (the offense
of monopolization) and the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2000). See generally 3
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, <JI 723.
291. Thus, the Supreme Court had declared that when pursuing predatory pricing allegations:
Recoupment is the ultimate object of an unlawful predatory pricing scheme; it is the means
by which a predator profits from predation. Without it, predatory pricing produces lower ag
gregate prices in the market, and consumer welfare is enhanced. Although unsuccessful
predatory pricing may encourage some inefficient substitution toward the product being sold
at less than its cost, unsuccessful predation is in general a boon to consumers . . . . The plain
tiff must demonstrate that there is a likelihood that the predatory scheme alleged would
cause a rise in prices above a competitive level that would be sufficient to compensate for
the amounts expended on the predation, including the time value of the money invested in
it.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224-25 (1993) (re
jecting claims of competitive injury in a price discrimination suit, which the Court deter
mines to be of the same general character as the injury inflicted by predatory pricing
schemes actionable under § 2 of the Sherman Act).
Areeda & Hovenkamp introduce their discussion of recoupmerit by stating:
No rational firm would bear the losses, difficulties, and possible legal troubles of trying to
exclude or discipline rivals by predatory pricing unless the firm is reasonably confident of a
payoff that exceeds the investment, taking into account all relevant risks, including the risk
of antitrust litigation. This payoff is generally referred to as "recoupment" of the predation
investment.
3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, ' 726a.

292. Importantly, the possibility of recoupment is not the only precondition fo r preda
tory pricing beyond the related requirement of market power discussed infra. The pricing
employed by the alleged predator must also be below some measure of costs. Brooke, 509
U.S. at 222 ("[A] plaintiff seeking to establish competitive injury resulting from a rival's low
prices must prove that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its ri
val's costs.") (footnote omitted). For a discussion of the relationship between the different
requirements for proving predatory pricing, see 3 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7 ,
' 725b.
Note, however, that the Court failed to articulate what is the appropriate measure of
costs below which prices may be deemed predatory, Brooke, 509 U.S. at 222 n.l (noting that
"[b]ecause the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average variable
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sible, the alleged predator must enjoy, inter alia, the protection of high
barriers to entry; in the absence of such barriers, the predator will be
unable to sell at supracompetitive prices for a sufficiently long period
after driving out or disciplining its victims, since new firms will simply
enter the market.293 Thus, the Supreme Court, in Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , declared that predatory pricing
allegations can be rejected summarily when entry is easy.294
While the traditional approach to entry suggests that the presence
of actual entry and the lack of high entry barriers guarantee that
predatory pricing will be unprofitable, the present analysis suggests a
somewhat different conclusion. Specifically, since a high rate of over
confident entry may be accompanied by very limited market penetra
tion, the mere evidence of entry should not be sufficient to reject
predatory pricing claims out of hand. Instead, the courts should focus
on the success ofentrants in penetrating the market as a better indicator
of the short-term competitive threat such entrants pose for allegedly
predatory incumbents. Such historical success in penetration can be
based on the record of performance in the relevant market, which
should not be more difficult to obtain than other evidence of market
conditions or past performance that parties are often required to pres
ent in antitrust cases.295
Courts tend to dismiss predatory pricing allegations quickly, be
cause they often believe that recoupment is impossible. Although the
courts' analysis of entry is often summary, some courts nevertheless
appear to consider evidence of actual penetration. Thus, in Brooke,
the Court noted that an evidentiary finding of easy new entry would
bar a reasonable jury from concluding that an alleged predatory

cost, however, we again decline to resolve the conflict among the lower courts over the ap
propriate measure of cost"), and a debate currently rages over the question of this definition,
see, e.g., Aaron S. Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J. 941 (2002)
(arguing that above cost pricing can be predatory); Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price
Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Do Not Signal Predation or Even Market Power - and the Impli
cations for Defining Costs (manuscript at 9-12, 17-37) (forthcoming YALE L.J., on file with
author) (reviewing the state of the law and offering a new definition of variable costs as the
appropriate costs for determining the possibility of predatory pricing).
293. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226. Importantly, where the alleged predator merely lowered
its prices in response to a competitive threat, the antitrust laws do not condemn the preda
tor's behavior because it benefits consumers and is "the very essence of competition." Id.
(quoting Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 (1986) (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
294. Id. at 225-26.
295. See, e.g., 2A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, «j( 420b (discussing the re
quirements and burdens of parties to an antitrust suit involved in proving entry conditions);
see also infra notes 296-298 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement of showing
likely "effective" (and not merely "any") entry that would have a price-disciplining effect in
horizontal merger cases).
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scheme would likely result in sustained supracompetitive pricing.296
When addressing the allegations at hand, however, the Court did not
simply apply its earlier clear neoclassical statement, which equates
easy entry with effective price competition. Instead of limiting the
relevant portion of its inquiry to the evidence of mere entry following
the alleged predation, the Court relied on evidence of expansion in the
relevant segment of the market to reject the possibility of recoupment.
Noting the rapid expansion in the relevant segment - the outcome of
successful penetration as well as the continued growth of the alleged
predator's sales in this segment - the Court explained that recoup
ment was unlikely. In the face of evidence of expansion, where the al
leged predatory pricing did not cause a restriction in output, the su
pracompetitive pricing that is crucial for recoupment could not have
occurred.297
Much like the Brooke decision, which formally followed the neo
classical entry criterion even while relying, to a degree, on evidence of
penetration and growth, the First Circuit has also recognized the im
portance of successful penetration in rejecting predatory pricing alle
gations. In R. W. lnt'l Corp. v. Welch Food Inc. , the circuit affirmed the
dismissal of such allegations upon a motion for summary judgment in
the district court.298 In doing so, the Welch court explicitly referred to
evidence of new product penetration at the time of the alleged preda
tory pricing, declaring that such evidence reveals that the alleged
predatory pricing caused no injury to competition.299
Despite the fact that it appears courts sometimes consider market
penetration when analyzing entry, they often fail to consider factors
that would make predatory pricing claims seem more plausible. These
factors are primarily the lack of entrant penetration into the market,
the absence of large-scale entry, and the absence of innovative entry.
In essence, the presence of small entrants without additional evidence
of actual or potential significant market penetration should not be
taken as sufficient evidence that recoupment by the predator is un
likely, as is frequently the case now.
The conclusion of this Article's entry decisionmaking analysis sug
gests that courts examining the ease of entry as part of recoupment
296. Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226 (enumerating easy entry among a number of market cir
cumstances that would bar a reasonable jury from finding a likelihood of recoupment).
297. ld. at 233-34. To be precise, the Court still entertained the possibility that supra
competitive pricing might have occurred even given rapid expansion if the evidently fast
growth was still slowed down by the alleged predatory pricing. This possibility was rejected
by the Court, however, as lacking concrete evidence. Id. at 234.
298. 13 F.3d 478, 488 (1st Cir. 1994).
299. Id. ("Where . . . a new product is able to deeply penetrate the market during the
challenged price-cutting period, it is evident that competition is unharmed and 'summary
disposition of the case is appropriate.' ") (quoting Brooke, 509 U.S. at 226) (emphasis
added).
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analysis should also be attentive to the entry of relatively large-scale,
often diversifying, firms. By posing a more significant short-term com
petitive check on the incumbents, these entrants are likely to make re
coupment more difficult. They are also very likely to be the firms
against which the alleged predator is directing its practices.300
The long term threat posed by innovative entrants provides a fur
ther reason for the courts to submit predatory pricing allegations to
closer scrutiny: incumbents may be concerned not only with short
term diversifying entrants but also with the long-term threat posed to
them by those few successful innovative entrants.301 Thus, when taking
into account the long-term benefits predatory incumbents can obtain
from holding back the introduction and dissemination of significant
innovations that fundamentally threaten their position, the possibility
of recoupment appears greater than the traditional approach seems to
recognize. Hence, while the quantification of such benefits to the
predator may be highly uncertain, their presence should at least make
courts more careful in rejecting predatory pricing allegations out of
hand on the basis of the supposed impossibility of recoupment, espe
cially when the alleged victim of the predation is an innovative en
trant.

3.

Horizontal Mergers: Entry in the Merger Guidelines

Traditionally, the antitrust laws have been concerned with horizon
tal mergers - mergers between competitor firms - because of the
potential harm to competition between the merged firm and its re
maining rivals in the market.302 At the extreme, a merger may create a

300. The empirical data on incumbents' responses to entry are mixed, suggesting that
they tend to ignore entry on most occasions, but may engage in various entry deterring
strategies - most notably by increasing advertising and typically not by lowering prices - in
specific cases. See Geroski, What Do We Know, supra note 25, at 431-34 (reviewing the vari
ous findings on incumbents' reactions and noting some of their limitations). However, preda
tory pricing cases typically revolve around allegations made by a sizable but smaller com
petitor against one or a number of its larger counterparts. See, e.g., Brooke, 509 U.S. at 21214 (plaintiff increased its shrinking share from two to five percent of the highly concentrated
national cigarette market by pioneering the development of a new "generic" segment in the
market by the time the alleged predation occurred, but this had happened only four years
after the introduction of the new segment during which this segment grew from a fraction of
a percent of the market - a share typical of new entrants - to over four percent of the total
market); Cargill Inc. v. Monfort•of Colo. Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106-07 n.2 (1986) (plaintiff, who
was challenging a merger between two of its larger competitors in an oligopolistic market
inter alia on the grounds that the merger would be 'followed by predatory pricing, was the
fifth-largest firm in the market with a five to six percent market share).
301. Cf Brooke, 509 U.S. at 214-15 (the response of the alleged predator to the in
creasingly successful innovation of a new market segment by the plaintiff).
302. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW,
POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 835-36 (3d ed. 1994) (summa
rizing the potential effects of horizontal mergers). See generally 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 2 (Apr. 2, 1992) (promulgated by the U.S. Department of
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dominant firm or a monopoly, and even in less extreme cases, it may
give the merged firm sufficient market power to raise prices to supra
competitive levels for a significant period of time. Unlike price-fixing
between competitors, however, horizontal mergers also have the po
tential to create procompetitive efficiencies. The newly merged firm
may enjoy, for example, new economies of scale or better integration,
resulting in increased efficiency and lower prices, which benefit con
sumers.303 Consequently, the law does not presume that every horizon
tal merger has anticompetitive effects. Instead, it requires a
case-by-case determination of whether the newly-merged firm will ob
tain sufficient power over price to cause competitive harm.304
Unsurprisingly, the presence of potential entry is one of the major
factors considered by the courts and the regulatory agencies in deter
mining whether a merged firm would have the power to raise prices. If
the post-merger firm were to raise prices to supracompetitive levels
and firms would enter as a result of the higher profit potential, the
merger would not pose a significant competitive threat.305 The revised
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines306 ("Guidelines") - used by the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission in reviewing mergers and deciding whether to challenge
them - rely on potential entry analysis both for defining "the market"
in which the power of the merged firm is examined and for determin
ing that firm's market power.307
Justice and Federal Trade Commission) (reviewing the various potential adverse competi
tive effects of horizontal mergers).
303. See generally Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 4 (1992).
304. Thus, the statutory test for the legality of a merger under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, is whether the effect of the merger "may be substantially to lessen com
petition." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962) (citing and analyzing
the test under Section 7 in the context of a vertical merger); see also United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 355 (1963) (applying the test to a challenged horizon
tal merger); Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 0.1 (1992) ("The unifying
theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance mar
ket power or to facilitate its exercise.").
305. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Mgmt Inc., 743 F.2d 976, 981-84 (2d. Cir. 1984)
(reversing the district court's judgment on the grounds that a merger resulting in a large
market share did not substantially lessen competition where entry was easy); see also
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 3.0 (1992) ("A merger is not likely to
create or enhance market power or to facilitate its exercise, if entry into the market is so
easy that market participants, after the merger, either coll�ctively or unilaterally could not
profitably maintain a price increase above premerger levels.").
306. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
307. Another aspect of this Article's conclusions that has significance for the analysis of
horizontal mergers is the impact of concentration on entry. Unsurprisingly, both the courts
and the Guidelines agree that mergers are likely to create or enhance market power or facili
tate its exercise only when it significantly increases concentration. See, e.g., United States v.
Baker H ughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("The basic outline of a section 7
horizontal acquisition case is familiar. By showing that a transaction will lead to undue con
centration in the market for a particular product in a particular geographic area, the gov-
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The Guidelines include in the definition. of potential entry such
sellers who would enter the market given a price increase within a cer
tain time period. For market definition purposes, the period is one
year;308 for price effects purposes, the period is two years.309 In other
words, only sellers that could enter at competitive prices within a year
are "in the market" where the merged firm's power · is examined.
When determining post-merger market power, however, the
Guidelines state that as long as sufficient entry would likely occur
within two years from the date the merged firm were to begin charging
supra-competitive prices, the merger will not be banned.310 The
Guidelines consider as potential entrants only "committed entry" "new competition that requires expenditure of significant sunk costs of
entry and exit."311 The committed entrant definition encompasses all
new entry by new plant creation - by diversifying entrants and start
ups alike - without making any distinction between the two entrant
types. .
This Article's findings suggest, however, that diversifying entrants,
which tend to attempt entry at a much larger scale than startups, and
larger-scale entrants more generally, are those most likely to provide a
short-term competitive check on the newly-merged firm. Nevertheless,
the Guidelines' language_ is flexible enough to accommodate these
findings.
Specifically, the first component of the Guidelines' three-part
analysis of the effectiveness of entry in counteracting anticompetitive

emment establishes a presumption that the transaction will substantially lessen competi
tion." (footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 12022 (1975)); Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 363; Horizontal Merger Guidelines 57 Fed.
Reg. 41,552, § 1 .0 (1992).
Even in mergers occurring in concentrated industries, however, one court has required
defendants to provide only limited proof that a merger creating a dominant firm is unlikely
to substantially lessen competition, relying, inter alia, on the traditional belief in the discipli
nary power of potential entry. Baker Hughes, 908 F.2d at 983-988 (citing numerous cases to
argue that when barriers to entry are low, potential entry serves as a check on the use of
market power). The findings here suggest, however, that in concentrated industries the
short-term disciplinary potential of new entry is especially limited, even more than it is in
other industries. The Baker Hughes court was therefore probably mistaken in relying on po
tential entry to discipline the post-merger firm from exercising its power.
308. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 1 .32, § 1 .321 (1992).
309. Id. at § 3.2.
310. The framework of this three-part test, although not typically applied as suggested
below, is largely compatible with the conclusions of this Article regarding the competitive
impact and limitations of new entry in the post-merger market.
311. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, § 3.0 (1992). This definition
differentiates these potential new entrants from those "uncommitted entrants" that are able
to respond to a profit opportunity in the relevant market without making significant sunk
investments. Id. at § 1.32. Such entrants are largely comparable to the diversifying product
mix entrants discussed briefly above. See supra Section I.A and notes 47 & 50. The
Guidelines take into account their competitive impact when defining the relevant market.
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effects is "timeliness."312 To be timely enough, the potential new entry
must not only occur within two years from initial planning; it must also
be expected to "achieve a significant impact on price in the relevant
market" within this time frame.313 This component of the timeliness
requirement - the demand that the anticipated new entry will have
significant impact on price - can accommodate the distinction be
tween different types of potential entrants. If the conditions and his
tory of the market suggest that larger-scale, probably diversifying, en
try is likely to occur following the merger, then a significant impact on
price is more likely to follow. If, however, the evidence suggests that
only smaller-scale, mostly startup, entry is likely to occur, then a sig
nificant timely impact on price would not be expected.314
The second component of the analysis is that entry must be
"likely."315 As one might expect, the Guidelines state that entry is
likely only "if it would be profitable at premerger prices."316 This stan
dard might appear to understate the likelihood of new entry, at first,
given the empirical evidence showing the pervasiveness of boundedly
rational entry. In fact, when determining the likelihood of profitable
entry, the Guidelines specifically explain that all the costs of entry
must be taken into fiCcount, "including an appropriate rate of return
on invested capital given that entry could fail and sunk costs, ifany, will
be lost. "317
However, while the Guidelines may understate the likelihood of
entry per se, their definition is largely compatible with the evidence on
likely penetration - the relevant source of competitive . impact on
post-merger prices. The definition does just that by declaring that en
try is unlikely if new entrants would not have the opportunity to ob
tain minimum viable scale,318 which the empirical findings examined in
this Article suggest will often be the case with many smaller entrants.
312. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, §§ 3.0, 3.2 (1992).
313. Id. at § 3.2.
314. See e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d. 1421, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1995)
("The fact that entry has occurred does not necessarily preclude the existence of 'significant'
entry barriers. If the output or capacity of the new entrant is insufficient to take significant
business away from the predator, they are unlikely to represent a challenge to the predator's
market power."); Ohau Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Res., Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 366-67 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1998) (finding that evidence of entry that did not pose a competi
tive threat to incumbent - including small entry - did not preclude a jury finding that de
fe ndant monopolized the market); In re Time Warner, Inc., 123 F.T.C. 171 (1997), 1997 FTC
LEXIS 13, *56 (the majority of the commissioners finding in a statement accompanying a
consent order that evidence of small entry does not suggest a likely competitive threat to the
large merging firms within the time frame set by the guidelines, due to the difficulty of
achieving significant penetration).
315. Id. at § 3.3.
316. Id.
317. Id. (emphasis added).
318. Id.
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Therefore, especially in those markets where economies of scale are
important for the survival of new ventures - but not sufficiently taken
into account by many prospective entrants - the requirement of
likely rational entry minimum viable scale prospects aligns the
Guidelines' definition with the more competitively significant prospect
of "increased likelihood of penetration."319
Moreover, the factors enumerated by the Guidelines as potential
sources of sales' opportunities available to entrants include, inter alia,
"the ability of the latter to capture a share of reasonably expected
growth in market demand" and "divert sales from incumbents."320 By
taking into account such factors, the Guidelines leave room for con
sidering the special impact successful innovative entrants may have in
markets that are characterized by a high rate of innovation.321 In such
markets, startup entrants may often contribute to growth and some
times divert sales from incumbents, increasing the likelihood that
some new entrants will obtain the requisite minimum viable scale, and,
therefore, that new entry will impact post-merger prices.322
Finally, the Guidelines emphasize not only the timeliness and the
likelihood of entry but also the sufficiency of its "magnitude, character
and scope."323 However, this requirement - which could have been
used to guarantee that entry will be deemed easy only when suffi
ciently large-scale or significant innovative entry is likely to occur - is
constructed narrowly by the Guidelines. In fact, the sufficiency re
quirement appears almost automatically fulfilled whenever entry is
likely.324

319. Cf., e.g. , FfC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 54-58 (D.D.C. 1998)
(finding, when examining whether merging defendants have rebutted evidence of market
power given high post-merger concentration, that where larger-scale entry was unlikely to
occur within the time frame set by the guideline, the existing potential for expansion by
small "fringe" firms was not sufficient to achieve the required impact on price).
320. Id.
321 . Note, however, that to the extent an innovative entrant who can already be identi
fied is "uncommitted" to entry, it would be taken into account at the market definition stage
rather than in determining the likely impact of potential entry on post-merger prices, as ex
plained supra note 311 and accompanying text.
322. Thus, the Guidelines explain that "(e]ntrants' anticipated share of growth in de
mand depends (inter alia] . . . on the relative appeal, acceptability, and reputation of incum
bents' and entrants' products to the new demand." Id. at § 3.3 n.33.
323. Id. at §§ 3.0, 3.4.
324. The only two exceptions noted by the Guidelines are those occasions where incum
bents control important assets that limit entrants' opportunities and on some mergers be
tween producers of differentiated products. Id. at § 3.4.
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BOUNDED RATIONALITY IN MARKETS: LESSONS FOR
LEGAL POLICY

A.

The Prevalence of Bounded Rationality in Legally
Relevant Market Settings

The behavioral analysis of entry demonstrates why the law should
often take into account the bounded rationality of legal actors in mar
ket and nonmarket settings. It shows how a legal policy that disregards
either the effects of barriers on overconfident entrants or the· long
term benefits of small-scale, innovative, negative expected value entry,
stands a significant risk of decreasing instead of increasing social wel
fa re.
More generally, some of the characteristics identified in the area of
entry as facilitating overconfidence and preventing effective learning
from taking place are typical of other market environments as well:
1) Motivation. Market participants must often make
judgments about their future performance and the
outcomes of events that are important for them; these
judgments are therefore highly likely to reflect opti
mistic and desirability biases.325
2) Decision Ambiguity. Before making their decisions,
market decisionmakers generally have some informa
tion but also face a significant degree of ambiguity.
This ambiguity provides room for the preferences of
these actors to bias their judgments.326
3) Noisy Feedback. Market participants find it difficult to
discover their errors. Even when they recognize that
their judgments caused negative outcomes, they rarely
are able to associate these outcomes with specific
judgmental mistakes.327
4) No Effective Arbitrage. Profitable opportunities for ar
bitrage in the face of significant uncertainty are rare.
Consequently, arbitrageurs do not effectively limit the
operation of bounded rationality in many markets.328
5) No Simple Intervention. Contrary to the suggestions of
traditional law and economics advocates,329 debiasing
market decisionmakers is typically not a realistic op325. See supra Section II.CJ.
326. See supra Section 11 C.2
.

.

327. See infra note 333.
328. See infra note 334.
329. E.g. , Posner, supra note 4, at 1575.
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tion. Other interventions, such as the provision of in
formation, may prove helpful in certain cases. Most of
ten, however, these interventions cannot overcome the
fundamental, pervasive forces that generate decision
biases.330
Taken together, the prevalence of these characteristics in legally
relevant market settings suggests that boundedly rational behavior
may be far more common in markets than traditional analyses ac
knowledge. Legal scholars would therefore be well advised to examine
the impact of behavioral forces in shaping market outcomes when de
termining the appropriate role of the law in regulating economic be
havior.
B.

The Limits ofArguments Relying on Markets to Eliminate
Bounded Rationality

Advocates of traditional law and economics have claimed that the
law need not take into account bounded rationality when examining
the behavior of legal actors in market settings. The main argument
marshaled for this position is that competitive forces will discipline
boundedly rational actors. According to this theory, wherever com
petitive selection operates, boundedly rational actors will make more
errors, underperform and exit.331
The fable of entry has shown the limits of competitive selection. In
the following paragraphs, this Article explains why other arguments
for the corrective effects of markets are of little relevance to the analy
sis of entry and many other market settings of legal interest.
First, traditional economists argue that because in markets deci
sionmakers pay a price for their mistakes they learn and correct their
errors.332 The learning argument assumes, however, that decisionmak330. See supra Section IV.B.
331. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The arguments promoted by Jaw and eco
nomics scholars mirror the traditional responses of economists to assertions that behavioral
findings cast doubt on the applicability of rational actor models, most notably traceable to
Milton Friedman. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in
ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 21-22 (1953). Hogarth & Reder summarize this position
stating:
The economics paradigm focuses on actions taken in competitive circumstances. The under
lying assumption is that through competition the action of individual agents are subject to
feedback that forces them either to become effective or to withdraw from such actions . . . .
Economists have little interest in modeling agents who do not behave according to rational
principles since they believe that these agents will not survive in the market.
Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder, Introduction: Perspectives from Economics and Psy
chology, in RATIONAL CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY
1, 6 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1986) [hereinafter RATIONAL CHOICE]
(note omitted).

332. That is, before market discipline eliminates them.
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ers are able to identify their mistakes, associate them with the costs
they incur and proceed to correct them. These assumptions are rarely
met either in the case of entry or in other legally significant real-world
settings.333
Second, some theorists suggest that where markets are available,
rational actors will identify, exploit, and consequently erode the profit
opportunities resulting from the errors of boundedly rational deci
sionmakers.334 The arbitrage argument assumes, however, the presence
of a sufficiently large group of arbitrageurs who can both identify the
opportunity and bear the risk involved with selling to or buying from
the boundedly rational actors.335 It also assumes the ready availability
of substitutes for the products overpriced or underpriced by bound
edly rational actors.336 Since the conditions necessary for effective arbi
trage rarely exist even in the most advanced financial markets, this ar
gument fails to apply to other market settings.337 For example, rational
arbitrageurs would be hard pressed to find an easy way to benefit from
negative expected value entry attempts of overconfident entrants.
Last, economists have asserted that individual behavior is of no
import in market settings as long as markets perform in the aggregate

333. See supra

note

273 and

accompanying text;

supra Section

IV.B (discussing the diffi-

culty of learning in real-world settings). As Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman explain:
Effective learning takes place only under certain conditions: it requires accurate and imme
diate feedback about the relation between the situational conditions and the appropriate re
sponse. The necessary feedback is often Jacking for decisions made by managers, entrepre
neurs, and politicians because (i) outcomes are commonly delayed and not easily
attributable to a particular action; (ii) variability in the environment degrades the reliability
of the feedback, especially where outcomes of low probability are involved; (iii) there is of
ten no information about what the outcome would have been if another decision had been
taken: and (iv) most important decisions are unique and therefore provide little opportunity
for learning.
Amer Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in
RATIONAL CHOICE, supra note 331, at 67, 90 (citation omitted).

334. See SHLEIFER, supra note 93, at 1, 3-4, 13-16 (2001 ) (providing a highly readable
introduction to the argument from arbitrage and related evidence from financial markets).
335. This risk is especially large i n a world fraught with uncertainty where rational ac
tors sometimes mak.e mistakes as well, the boundedly rational are probabilistically selected
for success on some occasions, and profits materialize only in the long run.
336. SHLEIFER, supra note 93.
337.

The case for arbitrage is obviously even more tenuous in noneconomic legal set-

tings:
Consider the proposition that a potential criminal will commit some crime if the expected
gains from the crime exceed its expected costs. Suppose a criminal mistakenly thinks that the
expected gains outweigh the expected costs. when in fact the opposite is true. First notice
that no arbitrage will be possible in this situation. If someone is unfortunate enough to
commit a crime with a negative expected value. then there is no way for anyone else to profit
directly from his behavior. Outside of financial markets (and not always there). those who
engage in low-payoff activities lose utility but do not create profit opportunities for others.
Nor do they typically disappear from the market.
Jolls et al., supra note l, at

1486.
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"as if" individuals were strictly rational.338 According to this view,
there is reason to believe that rationality assumptions approximate ac
tual market performance because the various erroneous decisions
made by specific individuals will cancel out. For example, some deci
sionmakers will overestimate the · risks associated with a certain in
vestment while others will underestimate it. As a result, the former
will demand an excessive return on this investment while the latter will
only require a lower-than-rational return. On average, however, the
return demanded for the investment in the market will resemble the
return that would have been demanded if the various decisionmakers
were demanding the "rational" rate of return individually.339
The problem with the "as if' argument is that individual errors will
only cancel in the aggregate if two conditions are fulfilled: the errors
must be randomly distributed and their mean must resemble the "ra
tional" judgment.340 These conditions, however, do not hold where
bounded rationality causes systematic, predictable errors in human
judgment.341 The evidence of the significant and consistent entrant
overconfidence and bias therefore undermines this argument, as the
operation of cognitive heuristics and biases in other legal settings
often does.
Thus, the arguments commonly used to support and explain the
impact of markets are, at best, of limited relevance in legal settings
such as the entry context examined here. Clearly, they do not justify a
presumption that legal analysis can avoid examining the role of
boundedly rational behavior and its consequences in market settings
more generally.
C.

Some Broader Lessons for Legal Analyses of Market Behavior

This Article's novel framework provides a clear example of the
unique advantages of a behaviorally-informed approach over other
uninformed alternatives. It can also be generalized to many other
market settings of legal interest.

1.

When Should Legal Analyses of Market Behavior Take Bounded
Rationality into Account?

The findings of the behavioral approach to entry stem from a bet
ter understanding of the psychological processes of human judgment
and decisionmaking. These processes not only make all entrants prone
338. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 331.
339. E.g., POSNER, FRONTIERS, supra note 4, at 261; Posner, supra note 4, at 1556.
340. E.g., Posner, supra note 4, at 1556.
341. See supra note 3 and the accompanying text; see also Jolls et al., supra note l, at
1476-78 (emphasizing that patterns of bounded rationality are systematic and predictable).
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to exhibit overconfidence and other biases, but also make startup en
trants more biased than diversifying ones. Because of the large num
ber of highly biased potential entrants, competitive forces generate an
overrepresentation of highly . biased entrants ·among the ranks of suc
cessful competitors, even while they eliminate many similarly biased
ones from the market.
These basic characteristics of the dynamics of competition among
entrants are present in other legally relevant market settings as well.
In fact, any market interaction involving a sufficiently high proportion
of biased legal actors will likely lead to the success and survival of
some biased actors, significantly affecting market outcomes. Impor
tantly, the relevant bias need not be overconfidence - although this is
a pervasive phenomenon342 - and the proportion of highly biased en
trants need not be as extreme as it is in the case of entry. The degree
of impact on the private and social outcomes of the interaction be
tween these decisionmakers will depend, however, on the extremity of
both the bias and the ratio of more- to less-biased legal participants, as
well as the presence or absence of those market forces examined
above343 that may correct or eliminate boundedly rational behavior.
The area of securities regulation, for example, is a case in point. In
this area, the law has long recognized the need for regulation of vari
ous market behaviors relating to both the original sale of securities
and their trading by market participants.344 Many of these participants,
most notably individual investors but investment professionals as well,
exhibit significant overconfidence; moreover, the bounded rationality
of these investors not only generates private losses for them but also
affects the overall performance of securities markets.345 It is therefore
not surprising to find the securities laws attempting to limit the impact
of bounded rationality and facilitate rational investing in the market.346

342. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 86, at 760-63 (arguing that because overconfidence is so
pervasive, it is likely to exert a persistent effect on the behavior of contracting parties mak
ing decisions on liquidated damages than will other, less robust psychological factors).
343. See supra Sections V.A & V.B.
344. See 1 LOUIS Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 1-A - 1 -G (3d
rev. ed. 2001).
345. See supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text.
346. The present regime does not necessarily appear optimal when examined from a
behavioral perspective, however. For some behaviorally informed analyses of securities
regulation, see Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L.
REV. 101 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law
from Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 627 (19%).
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How Should Legal Analyses of Market Behavior Take Bounded
Rationality into Account?

The behavioral analysis of entry suggests that the law must be sen
sitive not only to the bounded rationality of actors generally, but also
to the presence of behaviorally different types of actors in ·the market.
It is therefore important to develop an understanding of the variables
that determine both whether decisionmakers will be biased and how
biased they will be.347
So, in other words, the fable of entry teaches us that all legally
relevant economic actors are not the same. This important conclusion
resonates with numerous legal doctrines that provide different rules
for different types of actors. In tort law, for example, the standard of
behavior that amounts to "due care" on the part of an allegedly negli
gent tortfeasor varies with the defendant's level of expertise.348 The
present analysis shows, however, that different legal actors may vary
not only in obvious personal or economic characteristics, such as their
information or experience, but also in the degree and kind of bounded
rationality they are likely to manifest. It will therefore be beneficial
for legal scholarship to examine whether and to what degree the law
already addresses or should address such behavioral differences.
A related important lesson from the analysis in this Article is that
the legal analyst should strive to develop an accurate understanding of
those variables that determine whether and how biased different ac
tors are likely to be. In the case of entry, an understanding of the role
motivation and ambiguity play in shaping entrant bias has exposed
systematic differences between entrants. These and similar behavioral
factors also affect decisionmaking in numerous other legal settings.
For instance, contract law scholars have long attempted to explain
the limitations imposed by the law on the bargain principle. According
to this principle, contracting parties should be bound to the terms of
their agreement. Many legal doctrines nevertheless limit freedom of
contract and trump the bargain principle by defining circumstances in
which parties are not bound to their original agreement.349 The be
havioral approach suggests, however, that certain limitations of the
bargain principle, such as the special scrutiny with which the courts re347. This is not to say that one could necessarily quantify with accuracy the degree of
bias of individual actors. See supra Section IV.B. A general understanding of the factors that
create and facilitate decision errors is still helpful for the analysis of legal rules and doctrines,
however, as the fable of entry shows.
348. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (the general standard of con
duct only requires one to behave as would a reasonable man under the circumstances); id. at
§ 299A (stating that professionals are "required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally
possessed by members of that profession or trade").
349. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982).
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view liquidated damages, may reflect the law's recognition of the
bounded rationality of contracting parties.350
The case of form contracts is another area of contract law that may
have developed rules that limit the bargain principle based on behav
ioral differences between different types of legal actors. Both the
Uniform Commercial Code and common law doctrine provide special
rules that govern the validity of pre-printed terms,351 tending to treat
repeat market players and non-repeat market players differently.
More generally, informed analyses would build on the major
strength of the behavioral approach as compared to traditional ones
- its awareness of the effects of context. Because of its sensitivity to
the effects of context on human behavior, a behaviorally informed
analysis can often avoid the pitfa ll of over-generalization that is com
mon in legal theory.352 Instead of assuming decisionmakers always con
form to a fixed set of norms, a behavioral approach can often identify
how decisionmakers will behave, taking into account the environment
in which they will make their decisions.353
A behaviorally informed scholarship can therefore provide impor
tant benefits beyond law and economics. Regardless of the normative
theory the legal analyst applies to the question at hand, a scientific
empirically-based understanding of human judgment and decision
making is bound to provide better predictions, and consequently more
effective prescriptions, for legal policy.354
Finally, this Article has shown the importance of the behavioral
approach for the legal analysis of competitive behaviors - where

350. This possibility has been explored recently by a number of legal scholars. See
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contracc, 47 STAN. L.
REV 21 1 {1995) (suggesting that various limitations of the bargain principle, including liqui
dated damages, are better explained by a behavioral approach than by other traditional ex
planations); Rachlinski, supra note 86 (providing a behavioral analysis of liquidated dam
ages). Bue see Robert A. Hillman, The Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal
Analysis: The Case of Liquidated Damages, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 717 (2000) (arguing that
behavioral findings provide no clear directive as to the optimal legal regime for liquidated
damages).
.

351. These rules include the provisions of U.C.C. § 2-207(1) and the common law doc
trine of unfair surprise. See Eisenberg, supra note 350, at 245-48.
352. Some legal scholars argue that awareness of context effects is a potential disadvan•
tage rather than an advantage of the behavioral approach. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 350,
at 730-31 . However, since human behavior does vary systematically depending on its con
text, whether or not the theorist assumes such variations away, remaining uninformed about
robust and systematic effects of context on decisionmaking is not a sensible strategy of
dealing with the complexity of human behavior.
353. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 86, at 743-44 ("Studying the effect of context has
long been a part of psychology in general and [behavioral decision theory] in particular. It is
a core principle of psychological research that understanding a phenomenon requires under
standing when the phenomenon will occur and when it will not.").
354. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 86, at 743 (noting the scientific, empirical founda
tion of the behavioral approach).
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many scholars have deemed it irrelevant. It follows that in other legal
settings, where even the limited impact of market forces is absent and
decisionmakers have greater freedom to engage in boundedly rational
. action, behavioral insights are often indispensable.m
CONCLUSION

Scholars have noted that the rate of entry seems excessive, given
the data on entrant mortality and profitability, and recent experimen
tal findings have linked excess entry to optimistic bias. The present
analysis goes beyond the existing literature by developing a systematic
behavioral framework for understanding the processes that generate
robust and common overconfident entry. This novel framework also
explains a set of additional puzzling empirical findings on entry, re
vealing that entrants' insensitivity to market predictors of their future
profitability is a likely byproduct of the processes of overconfidence
and showing that the inferior average performance of startup entrants
stems from their greater degree of overconfidence as compared to
their diversifying competitors.
In this way, the behavioral approach provides a unified, coherent
solution to the puzzles of entry, showing them all to stem from related
aspects of entrant bounded rationality. Furthermore, an analysis of the
interaction between the differential economics of startup and diversi
fying entrants and their differ�nt degrees of overconfidence have
painted the competition among entrants in a new light. It showed how
the enhanced bias of startups and their large numbers lead to their
overrepresentation as a group among the ranks of successful entrants,
even while it diminished their average individual prospects.
Initially, the market's selection and promotion of many boundedly
rational actors even while disciplining most others suggested that some
form of entry regulation may be advisable. A comparison of the social
costs and benefits of negative expected value entry found, however,
that while overconfident entrants generate negative externalities, they
also bring about significant social benefits, most importantly when
they serve as a venue for the introduction of innovative ideas and
products into the market and ·an important source of additional com
petitive pressure on incumbent firms in the longer term. Upon further
analysis it also became apparent that the regulation of entry would not
only be mostly undesirable, but also costly, impractical, and largely in
effective.
After dismissing the regulatory option, the analysis concluded by
outlining the implications of the behavioral approach for antitrust law,
taking the presence of boundedly rational, overconfident, entry as
given. The framework developed here supported the traditional hos355. See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 1, at 1473.
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tility of the law to unnecessary restrictions on new entry and suggested
that the legal view of the relationship between market share, market
power, and entry barriers incumbents may require modification to account for the boundedly rational behavior of entrants.
Last, this study of the competition for profitability and survival
among new entrants into industry also illustrated how a detailed un
derstanding of the psychology of boundedly rational actors is not only
helpful for clarifying empirical findings, but also crucial for developing
effective, realistic legal policy towards complex economic phenomena.
In view of the profound impact boundedly rational actors can exert on
the market in an intensely competitive environment - on the occa
sions where market forces do not suffice to discipline them fully - it
seems all the more important to examine those psychological proc
esses affecting human judgment and decisionmaking in other legal
contexts, where the lack of intense competitive pressures might allow
an even more far-reaching expression of bounded rationality.
·

